| People v Ham |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50826(U) [43 Misc 3d 1227(A)] |
| Decided on May 8, 2014 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County |
| Qui�ones, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on May 8, 2014
The People ofthe State of New York against Kenneth Ham, Defendant. |
2013KN082115
For the People:ADA Dena-Kay Martin
For the Defense: Susan Millor, Brooklyn Defender Services
Joanne D. Qui�ones, J.
Defendant is charged with Petit Larceny, in violation of Penal Law (P.L.) section155.25, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree, in violation of P.L.section 165.40, Menacing in the Third Degree, in violation of P.L. section 120.15, andHarassment in the Second Degree, in violation of P.L. section 240.26(1). Defendant nowmoves for dismissal of the Petit Larceny and Criminal Possession of Stolen Propertycharges on the grounds that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant toCriminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) section 30.30.
In the first time and place of occurrence (TPO), the accusatory instrument chargesthe defendant with the offenses of Petit Larceny and Criminal Possession of StolenProperty in the Fifth Degree.[FN1]The information alleges, in relevant part, that on August 8, 2013, at Bloom Café,located at 996 Broadway, in Kings County:
The deponent [Policer Officer (P.O.) Juned Khan] is informed by RebeccaThybulle that informant is employed as a manager at ... Bloom Café, and that assuch informant is [the] custodian of video footage of said location, kept in the regularcourse of business, that informant is [the] custodian of employment, schedule and receiptrecords at said location, kept in the regular course of business, and that defendant was anemployee of said location on [August 8, 2013].
The deponent is further informed by the informant that in the regular courseof business, employees place revenue of the above mentioned location into envelopesand place said envelopes into open slots of a safe within the above mentionedlocation.
The deponent is further informed by the informant that informant reviewedreceipts of revenue of the above mentioned location at the first above mentioned date,compared said receipts with United States currency in the above mentioned safe andobserved a shortage of United States currency in said safe, specifically One HundredTwenty Two Dollars and Thirty Five Cents United States currency.
The deponent is further informed by the informant that the informantreviewed video footage depicting the first above mentioned time and place and observedsaid video footage depict defendant remove an envelope from a slot in the abovementioned safe which had not been entirely placed into said safe from said slot and placesaid envelope into defendant's pants pocket.
The deponent is further informed by the informant that informant is thecustodian of the above mentioned safe and sum of United States currency and defendantdid not have permission or authority to take, possess, or otherwise exercise dominion orcontrol over said sum of United States currency and to remove envelopes from the abovementioned safe.
On or about February 26, 2013, the People filed and served a Statement of Readiness(SOR) together with a superseding information. The new instrument added the followingparagraph:
"The deponent [P.O. Khan] is further informed by informant [Ms. Thybulle] that theabove-mentioned video surveillance footage was made in the ordinary course ofbusiness, and it was the regular course of the above-mentioned location to make suchrecords at or near the time of the matter recorded."[FN2]
PARTIES' CONTENTIONSDefendant's speedy trial motion is based on the premise that at the court appearanceon January 7, 2014, "the court [then presiding] found that the charges of Petit Larcenyand Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree, from the first TPO wereunconverted" (Defendant's Affirmation, p 4, ¶ 8). The defendant maintains thatbecause the People were not ready on the first TPO, all the time from arraignment onNovember 6, 2013, through the time the motion was served and filed on or aboutFebruary 26, 2014, is chargeable to the People for a period of "at least 111 days"(id.).[FN3]
The People counter on procedural grounds that the defendant's motion is untimely.They cite People v. Odoms, 143 Misc 2d 503, 505 (Crim Ct, NY County 1989),which held that "[a] defendant may not lie silently in wait,' while CPL 30.30 timeexpires, raising no objections to the sufficiency of an information" (People'sMemorandum of Law, p 7).
On the merits, the People maintain that the factual allegations contained in theoriginal complaint are sufficient to establish the charges of Petit Larceny and CriminalPossession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree and that the supporting deposition ofthe informant, filed and served on November 29, 2013, together with an SOR, properlyconverted the complaint into an information. They further aver that the originalcomplaint lays a proper foundation pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.)section 4518(a) to permit the reliance upon the surveillance video under a businessrecord rule.
DISCUSSIONBefore turning to defendant's speedytrial motion, the court will first address the issues of [*2]conversion and facial sufficiency.
Conversion
At the court appearance on January 7, 2014, the defense argued that, with respect tothe first TPO, "in order for the People to fully convert this complaint, we need the videofootage seeing as those observations were not based on her personal knowledge ... [andthat] until we have a video footage there is still hearsay" (Transcript of Minutes [Tr.] of1/7/2014, p 2, line 18 - p 3, line 2). After a discussion on the record, the court found thatthe first TPO was not converted.
At the outset, this court notes that it is not bound by calendar notations or interimmarkings made by other judges as such a determination is to be made when a defendantmoves to dismiss on speedy trial grounds (People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333,348-349 [1980] People v.Gordon, 31 Misc 3d 1231[A] [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2011] People v.Ashkinadze, 167 Misc 2d 80, 83 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1995]). The determinationas to whether the complaint was sufficiently converted on that date is directly relevant tothe merits of this motion, and the law requires that specific grounds for dismissal bemade in writing on notice to the People (see C.P.L. §§ 210.45; 170.45).Moreover, the "law of the case doctrine" is applicable only in those instances where theparties have had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue in controversy, and questions oflaw have been "squarely decided" (People v. Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 502 [2000]People v. Lambert, 2002 WL 1769931 [Crim Ct, NY County 2002]). An issue isnot considered fully litigated until it has been addressed in written submissions, withnotice and opportunity for response (People v. Portorreal, 28 Misc 3d 388, 392 n3 [Crim Ct,Queens County 2010] People v.Grant, 42 Misc 3d 1236[A], *4 n2 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2014]).
Regarding the People's procedural argument that the defendant's motion is untimely,the court finds that the People were on timely notice of the defendant's objections to theconversion of the first two charges relating to the first TPO as the issues were raised atthe court appearance on January 7, 2014, and again on February 24, 2014. Further, itappears that in response to defense counsel's argument and the court's ruling on January7, 2014, the People filed and served a superseding accusatory instrument attempting tolay a further foundation for reliance on the videotape. Therefore, the court finds that thedefendant did not "lie silently in wait," before filing the instant speedy trial motion.Withrespect to whether the video observations made by the informant constitute hearsay, thecourt finds that the surveillance video, and specifically the informant's sworn statementthat she viewed the surveillance video and that it showed the defendant remove anenvelope from the store's safe and put it in his pants pocket, is not hearsay and issufficient to convert the complaint.
This court finds convincing the line of cases which hold that a complainant'sstatement of what he or she viewed on a videotape is not hearsay (seeLambert, supra at *3 ["one who personally observes the content of avideotape can give sworn testimony about his observations without violating the hearsayrule"] People v. Patten, 32Misc 3d 440, 444 [City Court, Long Beach New York 2011] ["observations of avideotape are not hearsay"] seealso People v. West, 41 Misc 3d 542 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2013] [allegationsin the supporting deposition that complainant saw the defendant take $100.00 from theregister were sufficient where those statements were based on deponent's review of avideotape] People v.Giarraputo, 37 Misc 3d 486, 487 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 2012] ["It isaxiomatic that personal observations of a [*3]condition,event, incident or tangible item made by a witness are not hearsay"]).
Hearsay is defined as " testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what heor she knows personally, but what others have said and is therefore dependent on thecredibility of someone other than the witness' " (Giarraputo, 37 Misc 3d at 487,citing Black's Law Dictionary [7th ed 1999]). That is to say, that while the audiocomponent of a videotape might well fall under the hearsay rule, and may be foundinadmissible absent a hearsay exception, the visual component of a videotape is notusually hearsay (see Patten, 32 Misc 3d at 444, n1). Therefore, since thecomplaint here refers to the personal observations made by the informant-manager basedon her review of a videotape, they do not constitute hearsay.
At trial, where the burden of proof is much higher than that required at the pleadingstage, the proper foundation will have to be laid for the admissibility of the videotape,including chain of custody, and the "best evidence" rule will have to be considered(see, e.g., People v. Patterson, 93 NY2d 80, 84 [1999] People v. Orlando, 61 AD3d1001, 1002 [2nd Dept 2009] Lambert, 2002 WL 1769931). However, whileit is "true, [that] at trial, ... testimony [about videotape observations] might not be the best evidence' of the facts sought to be proved, ... a hearsay' objection would not lie"(Lambert, 2002 WL 1769931 at *3).
Similarly, the allegations in the complaint that the informant-managerpersonally compared revenue receipts with the currency in the safe and found a shortage are not hearsay. "Hearsay is a statement not made in the course of a trial inwhich it is offered ... if it is offered for the truth of the fact asserted in the statement' "(People v. Huertas, 75 NY2d 487 [1990] [internal citation omitted]). Theseallegations are the personal observations and actions of the informant; they are not beingoffered to establish that there was in fact a shortage in the amount of $122.35.To theextent that other courts of concurrent jurisdiction have found that a deponent'sobservations of video are hearsay and are not sufficient to convert an accusatoryinstrument, this court finds those cases unpersuasive and is not bound by thoserulings.
Based on the foregoing, this court finds that the informant's reliance on a videotapeand on a comparison of the cash register receipts to the currency in the safe is nothearsay, and the charges of P.L. sections155.25 and 165.40 are sufficientlyconverted.[FN4]
Facial Sufficiency
A facially sufficient accusatory instrument alleges evidentiary facts supporting ortending to support the charges which provide reasonable cause to believe that thedefendant committed the offense charged and contains non-hearsay allegations whichestablish, if true, every element of the offense charged and defendant's commissionthereof (C.P.L. §§ 100.15[3], 100.40[1][b], [c] see also People v.Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]).
In determining the facial sufficiency of an accusatory instrument, the court mustview the facts in the light most favorable to the People (People v. Contes, 60NY2d 620, 621 [1983]). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give anaccused notice sufficient to prepare a [*4]defense and areadequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense,they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v.Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).
A defendant is guilty of Petit Larceny when he steals property (P.L. §155.25).A person is guilty of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree "whenhe knowingly possesses stolen property, with the intent to benefit himself or a personother than the owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof." Based onthe discussion above, the court finds that the factual allegations in the accusatoryinstrument are sufficient to support those charges.
Speedy Trial
The court will now turn to defendant's speedy trial motion.
In the first TPO, the defendant is charged with two class A misdemeanors(see P.L. §§ 155.25, 165.40). Class A misdemeanors are punishable bya sentence of imprisonment not to exceed one year (P.L. §70.15[1]). Where adefendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment ofmore than three months, a speedy trial motion must be granted where the People are notready for trial within 90 days of commencement of the criminal action (C.P.L.§30.30[1][b]).The defendant has the initial burden of showing, through swornallegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted bythe statute, in this case 90 days (People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]).Once the defendant has made that showing, the People bear the burden of demonstratingsufficient excludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss (id.).
Based on a review of the official court file and the submissions of the parties, thecourt finds as follows:
November 6, 2013 - January 7, 201423 days
On November 6, 2013, defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint andreleased on his own recognizance. The matter was adjourned to January 7, 2014, forconversion.On November 29, 2013, the People filed with the court and served on defensecounsel a supporting deposition accompanied by an SOR.
The People are ready for trial when they communicate their actual readiness in opencourt or file with the court and serve on defense counsel a certificate of actual readiness(see People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]). The People's act in filing andserving an SOR served to toll the speedy trial clock for the remainder of the adjournment(People v. Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 440 [1998]).
As discussed above, this court finds that the supporting deposition served and filedon November 29, 2013, converted the complaint and thus the People's SOR filedtogether with the supporting deposition was valid and effectively tolled the speedy trialclock. The People are chargeable, however, with the 23 days preceding their declarationof readiness.
January 7, 2014 - February 24, 20140 days
On January 7, 2014, the People announced ready (Tr. of 1/7/2014, p 2, line 11). Thecourt set a date of January 31, 2014, for the People to provide discovery by stipulation(DBS) and the matter was adjourned to February 24, 2014, for hearings and trial.
An adjournment for discovery is excludable (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a] People v.Dorilas, 19 [*5]Misc 3d 75, 76-77 [App Term, 2ndDept 2008] [time attributable to DBS is excludable] People v. Khachiyan, 194Misc 2d 161, 166 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2002] [An adjournment for DBS which "is inlieu of motion practice and discovery practice in Kings County" is excludable]).
Additionally, the People are entitled to a reasonable adjournment to prepare forhearings and trial once hearings are ordered (see People v. Greene, 223 AD2d474 [1st Dept], lv den 88 NY2d 879 [1996] People v. Hernandez, 268AD2d 344 [1st Dept], lv den 95 NY2d 253 [2000] People v. Lucas, 25 Misc 3d1213[A], [Crim Ct, Kings County 2009]).
February 24, 2014 - February 26, 20141 day
In their response papers, the People submit that they answered ready on February 24,2014 (People's Memo, p 6). Defense submits and the court action sheet reflects that thePeople answered not ready, stating that the assigned Assistant District Attorney was outsick, and requested an adjournment of one (1) day. The matter was adjourned to February26, 2014, for hearings and trial.
Because the People had previously answered ready on the case, the matter was in astate of post-readiness. When a case is in a post-readiness posture, adjournments thatextend beyond the delay requested by the People are not chargeable to the People(People v. Bruno, 300 AD2d 93, 95 [1st Dept 2002], lv den 100 NY2d641 [2003] People v. Dushain, 247 AD2d 234, 236 [1st Dept], app den91 NY2d 1007 [1998]). The People are thus only charged with the time theyrequested.
February 26, 2014- May 8, 201410 days
On February 26, 2014, the People announced ready for trial and defendant filed andserved the instant speedy trial motion. The court set a date of March 14, 2014, for thePeople to file and serve their response, and adjourned the matter to May 8, 2014, fordecision.
On or about March 18, 2014, the People who had not complied with the originaldeadline set by the court, contacted the court's court attorney and requested additionaltime to submit a response indicating that they had to obtain court minutes.
The People filed and served their response on March 24, 2014. The court notes thatthe People's response neither included a copy of any court minutes, nor referenced anycourt minutes.
As a general rule, defendant's filing of a speedy trial motion tolls the speedy trialclock, and adjournments for motion practice are generally excluded for speedy trialpurposes (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a] People v. Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 527[1985]). However, where the People fail to abide by a court imposed deadline for serviceof response papers, the People are properly charged for the delay (People v.Delosanto, 307 AD2d 298, 299 [2nd Dept], lv den 100 NY2d 641 [2003]People v. Gonzalez, 266 AD2d 562, 563 [2nd Dept 1999], lv den 94NY2d 920 [2000] People v. Commack, 194 AD2d 619, 620 [2nd Dept1993]).
The People's delay may be excused, however, where there is a legitimate reason forthe delay and the delay is not unreasonable (People v. Kukla, 27 Misc 3d 1221[A] [Crim Ct, QueensCounty 2010] [extension of time to respond reasonable where the issues are complex orwhere timely-ordered and necessary minutes are not yet available]). However, as thePeople did not indicate to this court when the minutes were requested and, in fact, did notrequest any additional time prior to the date their opposition was due, this ten delay ischarged to the People.
CONCLUSION
In total, the People are charged with 34 days, which does not exceed theallowable time [*6]set forth in C.P.L. section 30.30(1)(b).Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of Petit Larceny and CriminalPossession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree for lack of a speedy trial is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York____________________________
May 8, 2014
JOANNE D. QUI�ONES
J.C.C.
Footnote 1:The defendant is onlymoving to dismiss the two offenses charged in the first TPO.
Footnote 2:The court notes thatthere is no supporting deposition signed by the informant to support this new allegation.
Footnote 3:The defendant does notargue that the theory of partial conversion raised by the People at the court appearance onJanuary 7, 2014, does not apply; nor does the defendant allege that the People's SOR isineffective as to the offenses charged in the second TPO.
Footnote 4:Although a secondsupporting deposition from the informant corroborating the additional paragraph in thesuperseding instrument was not filed and served, the court finds that the new languagepurporting to lay a proper foundation for reliance on the videotape is superfluous and notrequired to convert the complaint (see West, 41 Misc 3d at 545, citingPatten, 32 Misc 3d at 546 ["an evidentiary foundation need not be laid for thepurposes of the supporting deposition"]).