| Rollins v Fencers Club, Inc. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 03769 [128 AD3d 401] |
| May 5, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1](May 5, 2015)
| Lyn Rollins, Respondent, v Fencers Club, Inc.et al., Appellants. |
Miranda Sambursky Slone Sklarin, Verveniotis LLP, Mineola (Michael A. Mirandaof counsel), for appellants.
Schwartz & Perry, LLP, New York (Brian Heller of counsel), forrespondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered August 15,2013, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintalleging age-based discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law,affirmed, without costs.
It is essentially undisputed that plaintiff has made out the first three elements of aprima facie case of discrimination by showing that, aged 58 at the time of her hiring, shewas a member of a protected class based on her age, was qualified for the position ofexecutive director of defendant Club, and was terminated and thereby subjected to adisadvantageous employment action (see Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 AD3d621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]). Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we conclude thatthe fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination, namely, that plaintiff wasdisadvantaged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, issufficiently made out to warrant a trial.
Plaintiff testified that Elizabeth Cross, the Club board member who succeededplaintiff as executive director, "very frequently" made references to plaintiff's age,including by saying, "Are you sure you're up for this? You know you're at that age whereyou . . . need more rest. You look tired," and asking whether plaintiff was"up for" meetings that "might be too much" for her and would "tire [her] out."Notwithstanding the dissent's dismissive characterization of these statements as "strayremarks" and, more incredibly, as the concern of a solicitous employer, as if they had nodiscriminatory import or implication, we find that when plaintiff's testimony is creditedfor purposes of this motion, these remarks directly reflect age-based discriminatory biason Cross's part (see Weiss v JPMorgan Chase & Co., 332 Fed Appx 659,665 [2d Cir 2009]), and raise an inference of age-related bias sufficient to make outplaintiff's prima facie case of employment discrimination (see Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys.,Inc., 92 AD3d 29, 35 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 811 [2012]).In concluding that no inference of discriminatory motive can be drawn from thisevidence, the dissent fails to abide by the precept that "all of the evidence must beviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and all reasonableinferences must be resolved in that party's favor" (Udoh v Inwood Gardens, Inc., 70 AD3d 563, 565 [1st Dept2010]). In particular, in observing that there is no direct evidence that Crosscommunicated to the board her views regarding plaintiff's age-related unfitness for thejob, the dissent fails to recognize that given her position as executive director, it is fair toinfer that Cross would have made such communications in the normal course of carryingout her responsibilities.
Under these circumstances, the fact that several of the persons involved in thedecision to fire plaintiff were close to her in age, and thereby in the same protected class,does not vitiate the inference of discriminatory animus raised by Cross's claimed remarks(see O'Connor v Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 US 308, 312 [1996]). Inparticular, Elizabeth Cross's age of 53 does not eliminate the import or weight of herremarks; indeed, she was not only implying that plaintiff, at 59, almost 60, was infirm,but was also implicitly suggesting that the [*2]boardshould view Cross herself, at 53, as a member of a younger age group than that in whichshe placed plaintiff. Nor is the discriminatory inference negated because plaintiff washired at the age of 58. When plaintiff was hired, Cross was not a part of thedecision-making process; however, Cross was allegedly a prime mover in the board'sdecision to fire plaintiff, and her discriminatory impulse may be attributable to theboard.
In response to plaintiff's showing, defendants contend that they terminated herbecause of her poor performance, as reflected in Cross's findings in a management studyshe submitted to the Club's executive committee on November 7, 2008. In particular,defendants contend that, among other things, plaintiff was rude to members, failed toboost membership levels, was inefficient and unnecessarily raised Club operatingexpenses. Defendants' submissions shift the burden back to plaintiff to prove that theproffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination (see Bennett, 92 AD3dat 36). However, notwithstanding the dissent's implication, defendants' assertions are notestablished facts, they are simply allegations that are disputed by plaintiff.
To show that the reasons offered by the Club for her firing were pretextual, plaintiffpoints out that, on September 2, 2008, defendant board member James Melcher wrote anopen letter to all Club members in which he stated that, since becoming Club manager inAugust 2007, plaintiff had "done a terrific job of reorganizing and modernizing ourprocedures across the board, while continuing our tradition of friendly and welcominginteraction with members, parents, and coaches." This praise directly contradicts Cross'sfinding that plaintiff had poor relations with members. The 20% total bonus she wasawarded in late September 2008 also supports plaintiff's position. Coming as little as sixweeks before Cross's study, the Melcher letter and the 20% bonus substantiallyundermine defendants' proffered reason for plaintiff's termination (see Carlton vMystic Transp., Inc., 202 F3d 129, 137 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied 530 US1261 [2000]).
Documentary evidence also undercuts Cross's finding that plaintiff unnecessarilyboosted expenses. Notably, Club records indicate that expenses for calendar year 2009,when Cross was in charge, increased by over $500,000 (from $1.2 million to $1.7million) from calendar year 2008, when plaintiff was in charge until mid-November.
Plaintiff has thus met her burden of showing pretext by "respond[ing] with someevidence that at least one of the reasons proffered by defendant is false, misleading, orincomplete" (Bennett, 92 AD3d at 45; accord Sandiford v City of New York Dept. of Educ., 94 AD3d593, 595 [1st Dept 2012], affd 22 NY3d 914 [2013]). Accordingly, a trial iswarranted, and the motion court correctly denied defendants' summary judgmentmotion.
Because defendants have not shown that they are entitled to summary judgmentunder the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework (see McDonnellDouglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792 [1973]), we need not analyze plaintiff's claimsunder the "mixed motive" framework (see Bennett, 92 AD3d at 40-41).Concur—Acosta, Saxe, Gische and Kapnick, JJ.
Friedman, J.P., dissents in a memorandum as follows: I respectfully dissent becausethe record before us does not give rise even to a prima facie case that defendants violatedthe New York City Human Rights Law by discriminating against plaintiff based on herage. In brief, plaintiff was hired at age 58, discharged at age 59 and replaced by a53-year-old woman only six years younger than herself—a member of the sameprotected class to which plaintiff belongs—and there is no other evidence in therecord from which it could reasonably be inferred that defendants' adverse actionsagainst plaintiff were [*3]motivated by age-baseddiscriminatory bias.[FN1] Plaintiff's vague testimony about strayremarks made by the 53-year-old woman who replaced her, to the effect that plaintifflooked "tired" or seemed to need "rest" on certain occasions, do not, by themselves,suffice to support an inference of discrimination, as Supreme Court, notwithstanding itsdenial of the summary judgment motion, recognized at certain points in itsdecision.[FN2] Thelack of a prima facie case makes it unnecessary to reach the question of whetherdefendants' stated reasons for demoting and subsequently terminating plaintiff werepretexts.[FN3]Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint shouldhave been granted, and the order denying that motion should be reversed.
While this circumstance forms no part of the legal basis for my dissent, this lawsuitdoes illustrate the truth of the old adage, "No good deed goes unpunished." Defendantsare plaintiff's former employer, Fencers Club, Inc. (the Club)—a not-for-profitcorporation dedicated to the promotion of the sport of fencing—and the volunteerofficer of the Club who recommended plaintiff's hiring, James Melcher. It is undisputedthat Melcher met plaintiff, then 58 years old, when she interviewed for a position atMelcher's firm in the summer of 2007. Although Melcher did not offer plaintiff a job athis firm, he told plaintiff that the Club, of which he was then chairman of the board, wassearching for a new general manager and suggested that she apply for that position. InAugust 2007, the Club hired plaintiff as general manager at a salary of $60,000. InFebruary 2008, at plaintiff's request, the Club gave her the title of executive director andbroader responsibilities, including bringing in new members.
In November 2008, due to deficiencies in plaintiff's performance perceived by theClub's executive committee (which plaintiff disputes), the Club demoted her fromexecutive director to [*4]office manager, but did notdecrease her salary. Plaintiff's replacement as executive director (to whom she was toreport) was Elizabeth Cross, a 53-year-old member of the Club's executive committeewho had substantial business and fund-raising experience and considerable knowledge offencing. Unfortunately, plaintiff and Cross proved unable to work together, and the Clubterminated plaintiff's employment in December 2008. The Club did not hire anyone toreplace plaintiff as office manager.
For a prima facie case of discrimination to exist (whether under the framework ofMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792 [1973] or under the "mixedmotive" framework recognized in Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 AD3d 29, 40 [1st Dept2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 811 [2012]), there must be evidence that "(1) [theplaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified to hold the position; (3)she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action;and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise toan inference of discrimination" (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305[2004]).
It is undisputed that plaintiff satisfies the first three criteria for a prima faciecase—she was 58 and 59 years old at the time of the relevant events; defendantshad deemed her qualified for the position when they hired her less than a year and a halfbefore she was terminated; and her demotion (notably, without a reduction in salary) andsubsequent discharge plainly constitute adverse employment actions. Plaintiff fails,however, to satisfy the fourth criterion of the prima facie test, in that the adverseemployment actions against her simply did not "occur[ ] under circumstancesgiving rise to an inference of discrimination" (Forrest, 3 NY3d at 305). This isbecause (1) plaintiff's termination at age 59 occurred only about one year after she hadbeen hired at age 58; and (2) plaintiff's replacement as executive director of the Club wasthe aforementioned 53-year-old Elizabeth Cross, only six years younger than plaintiff anda fellow member of the same protected class to which plaintiff belongs.[FN4] While these facts wouldnot necessarily negate an inference of discriminatory intent that could be drawn fromother evidence, the problem for plaintiff, and the flaw in the majority's analysis, is that, inthis case, there is no evidence in the record from which such an inference could rationallybe drawn.
The remarks by Cross, after she replaced plaintiff as executive director, aboutplaintiff looking "tired" or seeming to need "rest" do not suffice to support an inferencethat the Club discriminated against plaintiff based on her age (see Ji Sun Jennifer Kim vGoldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d 18, 26 [1st Dept 2014][dismissing a hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff "cites only isolatedremarks or incidents" that "a reasonable person would consider . . . nothingmore than petty slights" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Melman v Montefiore Med.Ctr., 98 AD3d 107, 126 [1st Dept 2012] ["stray, marginally age-related remarks. . . , none of which concerned an employment decision," did not create anissue as to whether the defendant's reasons for its actions were pretextual]). Plaintiff'sdeposition testimony about these remarks was exceedingly vague; she claimed that Crossmade remarks of this kind "frequently" but did not describe the context in which Crossmade them. Cross, for her part, avers that, on two occasions when she and plaintiff wereworking very late, [*5]she remarked to plaintiff that shelooked "tired" and should go home. So far as disclosed by the record, Cross made theseremarks to plaintiff and no one else; there is no indication that Cross communicated theremarks to other members of the Club's board who participated in the Club's employmentdecisions.[FN5]
Even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Cross'sremarks about plaintiff looking "tired" simply do not give rise to a reasonable inferenceof discriminatory intent on the part of the Club.[FN6] Yet, given the lack of anything elsefrom which to draw such an inference to support a prima facie case of agediscrimination, plaintiff's case—and the majority's affirmance of the denial ofdefendants' summary judgment motion—rest entirely on these ostensiblyinnocuous and inoffensive remarks. In my view, Cross's remarks, even as described byplaintiff, simply cannot bear this weight.
To be sure, there are workplace remarks that give rise to an inference ofdiscriminatory bias that is reasonable or even strong (see Sandiford v City of New York Dept. of Educ., 94 AD3d593, 595 [1st Dept 2012] ["testimony regarding . . . repeatedderogatory remarks regarding gays and lesbians was sufficient to raise a question of factas to . . . unlawful discriminatory practices"], affd 22 NY3d 914[2013]). It is outlandish, however, to place in the same category as such offensivecomments a supervisor's asking an employee about her energy level during a late night atthe office, particularly when the record is otherwise devoid of evidence to support aninference of discriminatory bias (cf. Weiss v JPMorgan Chase & Co., 332Fed Appx 659, 664-665 [2d Cir 2009] [a stray remark could be viewed as indicative ofage-related bias when "consider(ed) . . . in the context of the otherevidence"]). It is simply fanciful for the majority to assert that such anodyne remarks"directly reflect age-based discriminatory bias" (emphasis added) and couldreasonably be construed as "implying that plaintiff . . . was infirm." Peopleof any age can become tired when working late, and asking an employee if she wouldlike to go home to get some rest after a long day at the office is not, so far as I am aware,a tort. I am astonished that the majority allows an age discrimination case to go to trialwhen the record contains not a scrap of evidence besides these comments to support aninference of discriminatory intent.
Allowing an action for age discrimination as weak as this one to go to trialessentially turns the Human Rights Law into a right of action for any discharged ordemoted employee within a protected class who feels that the employer undervalued hisor her performance, whether or not any rational inference of invidiousdiscrimination—as opposed to disagreements over the quality of the employee'sperformance—arises from the circumstances of the employer's action. Further,denying the employer summary judgment notwithstanding the absence of any rationalbasis for inferring discriminatory intent will have the perverse effect of discouragingemployers [*6]from hiring individuals within classesprotected under the Human Rights Law. In nonetheless affirming the denial of summaryjudgment in this matter, the majority's decision threatens to turn a court considering anemployment discrimination case into "a super-personnel department that reexamines anentity's business decisions" (Baldwin v Cablevision Sys. Corp., 65 AD3d 961, 966 [1stDept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 14 NY3d 701 [2010]).Because this is not the purpose of the Human Rights Law, I respectfully dissent.[Prior Case History: 40 Misc 3d 1233(A), 2013 NY Slip Op 51409(U).]
Footnote 1:I note that the federalanalogue of the New York City Human Rights Law for these purposes, the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act of 1967, protects "individuals who are at least 40years of age" (29 USC § 631 [a]).
Footnote 2:In its decision, SupremeCourt acknowledged that none of the statements on which plaintiff relies "implies that[she] was being treated differentially because of her age" and that such statements "areinsufficient, standing alone, to support an inference of age discrimination" (40 Misc 3d1233[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51409[U], *3-4 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]). Unfortunately,Supreme Court failed to recognize that, since nothing else in the record gives rise to aninference of age discrimination, defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissingthe action, regardless of any disputes about how well plaintiff performed her job.
Footnote 3:While plaintiff naturallydisagrees with defendants' account of the perceived deficiencies in her performance as aClub employee, disputes about the quality of plaintiff's performance are not legallyrelevant, given the lack of any basis for inferring that the Club demoted or fired plaintiffwith discriminatory intent. In the absence of circumstances from which discriminatoryintent can reasonably be inferred, an employer's adverse action against an employee isnot actionable under the Human Rights Law, even if the fairness of the employer'sappraisal of the value of the employee's services is subject to reasonable dispute. TheHuman Rights Law does not give courts a general mandate to review the businessjudgment of nondiscriminatory employment decisions. Contrary to the majority'sstatement, I make no implication that defendants' assertions about plaintiff's workperformance are "established facts" rather than disputed allegations.
Footnote 4:I see no merit inplaintiff's assertion that she was replaced, not by the 53-year-old Cross, but by a womanin her twenties who assumed, upon plaintiff's termination, three tasks that plaintiff hadperformed (registering new members, processing dues payments, and ordering officesupplies). The record establishes that the bulk of plaintiff's responsibilities passed to thenew executive director upon plaintiff's demotion from that position to that of officemanager. Again, when plaintiff was terminated a month after her demotion, the Club didnot hire anyone to replace her as office manager.
Footnote 5:Since there is noevidence that Cross communicated the remarks to the Club's board, the record offers nosupport for the majority's assertion that the remarks "implicitly suggest[ed] that theboard should view Cross herself, at 53, as a member of a younger age group than thatin which she placed plaintiff" (emphasis added). The majority, taking the remarks as anindication of bias, simply speculates that Cross made comments of similar import to othermembers of the Board.
Footnote 6:There is no basis for themajority's accusation that I "fail[ ] to abide" by the requirement that, on a summaryjudgment motion, the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ofthe motion. In some cases, the probative value of the evidence relied upon by theopponent of the motion is so slight that, even when viewed in the light most favorable tothat party, that evidence fails to raise a triable issue. This is such a case.