| Matter of Frigault v Town of Richfield Planning Bd. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 04355 [128 AD3d 1232] |
| May 21, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Carol A. Frigault et al.,Respondents, v Town of Richfield Planning Board et al.,Appellants. |
Kehoe & Merzig, PC, Oneonta (David S. Merzig of counsel), for Town ofRichfield Planning Board, appellant.
Young/Sommer, LLC, Albany (J. Michael Naughton of counsel), for MonticelloHills Wind, LLC and others, appellants.
Tooher & Barone, LLP, Albany (Meave M. Tooher of counsel), for Keith C.Armstrong and others, appellants.
Douglas H. Zamelis, Cooperstown, for respondents.
Devine, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Cerio Jr., J.), entered January 23,2014 in Madison County, which granted petitioners' application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul determinations of respondent Town of RichfieldPlanning Board granting a request by respondent Monticello Hills Wind, LLC for aspecial use permit.
As detailed in our prior decision in a related proceeding (Matter of Frigault v Town ofRichfield Planning Bd., 107 AD3d 1347 [2013]), respondent Monticello HillsWind, LLC (hereinafter the applicant) sought a special use permit in connection with theproposed construction of six wind turbines and related facilities on land in the Town ofRichfield, Otsego County. In 2011, respondent Town of Richfield Planning Board(hereinafter Board) issued a negative declaration of significance under the StateEnvironmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8) and granted a special usepermit for the project. Supreme Court annulled both determinations in response to theCPLR article 78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment that followed. Uponappeal, this Court reinstated the negative declaration, but upheld the annulment of thespecial use permit on various grounds (Matter of Frigault v Town of [*2]Richfield Planning Bd., 107 AD3d at 1352-1353). Asis relevant here, this Court agreed that the Board had "failed to comply with theapplicable Town of Richfield Land Use and Building Management Ordinance"(hereinafter Land Use Ordinance), which only allows the issuance of a special use permitwhere eight enumerated conditions are met (id. at 1353).
The Board corrected the procedural deficiencies pointed to by this Court and, inSeptember 2013, issued a special use permit accompanied by detailed findings regardingthe eight conditions set forth by the Land Use Ordinance.[FN1] Petitioners commenced the presentCPLR article 78 proceeding and argued, among other things, that the special use permitwas invalid because substantial evidence did not support the Board's findings as to theconditions. Supreme Court agreed with regard to two of the conditions, granted thepetition and annulled the special use permit. This appeal by respondents ensued.
The Land Use Ordinance permits specified uses in the area where the project is to bebuilt and allows "[a]ll other uses" for which a special use permit is obtained. Contrary topetitioners' assertion, while the project is not allowed as of right in the district, the factthat it is "permitted . . . is 'tantamount to a legislative finding that [it] is inharmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect theneighborhood' " (Matter of Twin County Recycling Corp. v Yevoli, 90NY2d 1000, 1002 [1997], quoting Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board ofAppeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston, 30 NY2d 238, 243 [1972]). As such, "the burdenof proof on an owner seeking a special exception is lighter than that on an owner seekinga variance, [with] the former only being required to show compliance with anylegislatively imposed conditions on an otherwise permitted use" (Matter of RetailProp. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d 190, 195[2002]; see Matter of Feinberg v Board of Appeals of Town of Sanford, 306AD2d 593, 594 [2003]). The determination of the Board that those conditions had beenmet here will be upheld if it "has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidencein the record" (Matter ofSteenrod v City of Oneonta, 69 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2010]; see Matter ofRetail Prop. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d at196).
The parties do not dispute upon this appeal, and we agree with Supreme Court, thatthe Board's findings with regard to six of the eight conditions enumerated in the LandUse Ordinance are supported by substantial evidence. The first of the remaining twoconditions requires that the "[l]ocation, use and size of structure, nature and intensity ofoperations involved, size of site in relation to it, and location of site with respect toexisting or future streets giving access, are such that it will be in harmony with orderlydevelopment of the district." The second requires that the "[l]ocation, nature and heightof buildings, walls, fences and signs will not discourage the appropriate development anduse of adjacent land and buildings or impair their value."
With regard to those two conditions, the wind turbines are almost 500 feet tall whenthe rotor blades are fully vertical.[FN2] Notwithstanding their size, the Boardpointed out that the [*3]turbines are located in an areawhere high-voltage electric transmission lines have already altered the landscape, andnoted that other factors minimized the impact of the project upon the viewshed. Theproject will have minimal impact upon traffic after construction is completed and, giventhe economic benefits that will accrue to participating landowners, the Board found thatit would help to preserve existing uses of the surrounding properties. Moreover, theBoard cited a study in the record finding that property values would not be impacted bythe project. The Board also pointed to proof that the applicant had entered into setbackagreements with nonparticipating landowners who resided within 2,000 feet of theturbines, further ensuring that the project would not impair the use of nearby parcels ordevelopment in the zoning district. Supreme Court pointed to conflicting evidencesubmitted by petitioners with regard to both conditions but, even if that evidence wasproperly considered, "a court may not substitute its own judgment" where substantialevidence supports the determination of the Board (Matter of Retail Prop. Trust vBoard of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d at 196; accord Matter of Metro EnviroTransfer, LLC v Village of Croton-on-Hudson, 5 NY3d 236, 241 [2005]).Inasmuch as substantial evidence indeed supports the Board's findings in full, SupremeCourt erred in annulling the special use permit.
Lahtinen, J.P., Garry and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed,on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote 1:The Board hadpreviously approved the special use permit in August 2013, but revisited the issue at theurging of counsel.
Footnote 2:The Board stated that theturbines were taller than "many" structures in the Town, while Supreme Court pointed toproof in the record that their size was "unprecedented." While the Board's language wasperhaps not as precise as Supreme Court would have liked, the fact remains that theBoard recognized that the project constituted a more intense use than others in the areaand assessed it in that light.