Neroni v Follender
2016 NY Slip Op 01527 [137 AD3d 1336]
March 3, 2016
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 27, 2016


[*1]
  Tatiana Neroni, Appellant, v Jonathan S. Follender etal., Respondents.

Tatiana Neroni, Pawleys Island, South Carolina, appellant pro se.

Jonathan S. Follender, PC, Arkville (Jonathan S. Follender of counsel), forrespondents.

Garry, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Tormey, J.), enteredDecember 30, 2013 in Delaware County, which, among other things, granted defendants'motion to dismiss the complaint, and (2) from an order of said court, entered April 14,2014 in Delaware County, which, among other things, partially granted defendants' crossmotion and directed plaintiff to pay costs and counsel fees.

In 2007, defendant Jonathan S. Follender (hereinafter Follender) and his law firm,defendant Jonathan S. Follender, P.C. (hereinafter the law firm), commenced a breach ofcontract action on behalf of clients of the law firm against clients of plaintiff.[FN1] The action culminated ina default judgment against plaintiff's clients and an award of sanctions for frivolousconduct against plaintiff; both determinations were affirmed by this Court (M & C Bros., Inc. vTorum, 101 AD3d 1329, 1330 [2012], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 898[2013]). Plaintiff then commenced this action against Follender, the law firm and the lawfirm's clients in the breach of contract action, alleging that Follender and the law firmcommitted fraud upon the court in that action and a subsequent special proceeding toenforce the judgment, that the clients colluded with Follender and the law firm to commitfraud, deceit and collusion in violation of Judiciary Law § 487, and thatdefendants committed defamation. Defendants moved [*2]to dismiss the complaint and sought sanctions and an orderto preclude plaintiff from bringing further litigation against them. In December 2013,after extensive motion practice and correspondence, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff'scomplaint with prejudice, sanctioned plaintiff in the amount of $2,000 for frivolousconduct and awarded injunctive relief to defendants, as well as counsel fees and costs.Plaintiff then moved for recusal and to renew and/or reargue the December 2013 order,and defendants cross-moved for, among other things, a determination of the amount ofcounsel fees and costs. In April 2014, the court denied plaintiff's motion and partiallygranted the cross motion by, among other things, setting the amount of counsel fees andcosts awarded in the December 2013 order at $8,470. Plaintiff appeals from bothorders.

Initially, and contrary to plaintiff's contention, Supreme Court was not deprived ofauthority to consider defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the notice ofmotion was personally served by Follender. Although CPLR 2103 (a) requires service tobe made by a person who is not a party to the action, a violation of this provision "is amere irregularity which does not vitiate service" where, as here, no resulting prejudice isshown (Matter of Conti vClyne, 120 AD3d 884, 886 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted], lv denied 23 NY3d 908 [2014]; see CPLR 2001). Turning to themerits, the court correctly dismissed the complaint. The first two of the four causes ofaction alleging fraud upon the court were barred by collateral estoppel, as they merelyrepeated allegations that had already been fully litigated in the prior breach of contractaction and its appeal (see Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 502 [1984];see also Matter of Capoccia, 272 AD2d 838, 847 [2000], lv dismissed 95NY2d 887 [2000]). Additionally, as the court found, none of the causes of actionalleging fraud upon the court met the requirement that a cause of action based on fraudmust be supported by "detailed factual allegations" (Boyle v Burkich, 245 AD2d609, 610 [1997]; see CPLR 3016 [b]). Even when liberally construed, plaintiff'svague allegations failed to include specific facts demonstrating that defendants'representations were intentional, were calculated to deceive the court or were part of an"unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's abilityimpartially to adjudicate a matter" (CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307, 321[2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Supreme Court properly dismissed the fifth cause of action, which alleged inconclusory terms that the law firm's clients acted in collusion with Follender and the lawfirm to commit fraud, collusion and deceit. As the court correctly determined, thecomplaint included no specific allegations whatsoever of any fraudulent statements orother wrongdoing on the clients' part, and Judiciary Law § 487, by its terms,does not apply to non-attorneys. Finally, we agree with the court that the cause of actionalleging defamation and defamation per se did not describe the alleged defamatorystatements with the requisite specificity (see CPLR 3016 [a]; Martin v Hayes, 105 AD3d1291, 1293 [2013]), that the claim was time-barred by the one-year statute oflimitations as to all but one of the statements that apparently formed the basis of theallegations (see CPLR 215 [3]), and that the remaining statement was made in thecourse of the prior court proceeding and was therefore protected by an absolute privilege(see Black v Green HarbourHomeowners' Assn., Inc., 19 AD3d 962, 963 [2005]). Plaintiff's contention thatthe court should have granted leave to amend her complaint rather than dismissing it onthe merits is unpreserved (see CPLR 5501 [a] [3]).

In view of plaintiff's history of repeatedly raising the same frivolous issues in thecurrent case and the previously-mentioned breach of contract action, and of having beensanctioned for this behavior, Supreme Court did not err in enjoining her from bringingany further litigation against defendants without court permission (see Bell v NewYork Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 250 AD2d 496, 496 [1998], appealdismissed 92 NY2d 876 [1998], appeal and lv [*3]dismissed 93 NY2d 920 [1999]; Braten vFinkelstein, 235 AD2d 513, 514 [1997]). For the same reasons, the court did notabuse its discretion in determining that an award of sanctions was appropriate (seeMatter of De Ruzzio v De Ruzzio, 287 AD2d 896, 896-897 [2001]; Matter ofJemzura v Mugglin, 207 AD2d 645, 646-647 [1994], appeal dismissed 84NY2d 977 [1994]).[FN2] Contrary to plaintiff's claim, she wasafforded the requisite notice of the basis for a potential award of sanctions and areasonable opportunity to be heard; defendants' notice of motion requested sanctions forplaintiff's frivolous conduct, and—after a considerable delay in which she soughtadjournments and raised various other arguments—plaintiff responded to therequest in her opposing affidavit (see Shields v Carbone, 99 AD3d 1100, 1101-1102[2012]).

Supreme Court also properly awarded counsel fees and costs pursuant to CPLR8303-a based upon its determination that plaintiff knew or should have known that herclaims lacked merit (see Smullens v MacVean, 183 AD2d 1105, 1107-1108[1992], lv dismissed 85 NY2d 995 [1995]; Patane v Griffin, 164 AD2d192, 196-197 [1990], lvs denied 77 NY2d 810 [1991]), and the amount of theaward was properly based upon defendants' showing of the hours expended and thereasonableness of the law firm's hourly rate (see Matter of Gamache v Steinhaus, 7 AD3d 525, 527[2004]). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, no formal evidentiary hearing on the amountof the award was required, as plaintiff was afforded an appropriate opportunity to beheard when the court directed defendants to submit an affidavit detailing the amount oftheir counsel fees and costs and provided plaintiff with an opportunity to submit anopposing affidavit (see Grasso v Mathew, 187 AD2d 758, 758 [1992]). Wefurther note that plaintiff's opposing affidavit included no request for an evidentiaryhearing on the amount of the award.

As for the remaining issues, to the extent that plaintiff's motion sought reargument,the denial of such a motion is not appealable (see Schillaci v Sarris, 122 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2014]).Further, as plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of new facts or a change in thelaw that would alter the previous determination, the motion for renewal was properlydenied (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]). To the extent that plaintiff's motion for recusalwas based on new events occurring after the court issued an order denying plaintiff'sprevious motion for the same relief in September 2013, we agree with the court that nobasis was shown for legal disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14.In the absence of such a disqualification, "a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal," andwe find no indication of bias or prejudice and no abuse of discretion in the court'sdetermination that it could give fair consideration to the case (Matter of Barney v VanAuken, 97 AD3d 959, 960 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted], lv denied 20 NY3d 856 [2013]). Plaintiff's remaining arguments havebeen considered and found to be without merit.

McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders areaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Plaintiff's clients wereinitially represented by plaintiff's husband, former attorney Frederick J. Neroni, prior to2011 (see Matter of Neroni,86 AD3d 710, 711 [2011], appeal dismissed and lv denied 17 NY3d 851[2011]).

Footnote 2:During the pendency ofthis appeal, plaintiff was suspended from the practice of law for two years for frivolousconduct in several cases, including the previously maintained action for breach ofcontract (Matter of Neroni,135 AD3d 97, 101 [2015]).


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.