| Hayes v Village of Middleburgh |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 04487 [140 AD3d 1359] |
| June 9, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Gary Hayes, Appellant, v Village of Middleburgh,Respondent. |
Thomas F. Garner, Middleburgh, for appellant.
FitzGerald Morris Baker Firth, PC, Glens Falls (John D. Aspland Jr. of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), enteredSeptember 4, 2014 in Schoharie County, which denied plaintiff's motion to vacate a priororder of the court.
In February 2000, plaintiff purchased a vacant parcel of land located at the southernterminus of a dead-end street (Baker Avenue) in the Village of Middleburgh, SchoharieCounty, intending to cultivate a garden and to grow produce for both personalconsumption and sale. The parcel was separated from Baker Avenue by a small stream,commonly known as Stony Creek. Prior to purchasing the property, plaintiff was awarethat a bridge, which previously spanned Stony Creek and afforded access between BakerAvenue and the parcel, had fallen into disrepair and was not suitable for vehiculartraffic.[FN1] Thiswas of no particular concern to plaintiff, however, as he intended to salvage certainportions of the structure and restore the bridge to a usable state. Plaintiff completed hisrestoration efforts in June 2008.
Not long after plaintiff finished work on the bridge, a neighboring property ownerallegedly began parking what plaintiff described as "a small fleet of motor vehicles at theend of Baker Avenue," thereby obstructing plaintiff's access to the bridge and renderinghis parcel landlocked. When plaintiff complained, the neighbor purportedly advised himthat, according to [*2]defendant's representatives,defendant had abandoned the southernmost portion of Baker Avenue and, therefore, theneighbor could utilize the approximately .03 miles at issue in any manner he wished.Plaintiff's subsequent and informal efforts to address the asserted abandonment, as wellas his attempts to assign responsibility for future maintenance of and/or repairs to therestored bridge, proved to be unsuccessful. As a result, plaintiff commenced this actionin February 2010 seeking, among other things, a declaration that Baker Avenue is apublic road, an order compelling defendant to maintain both Baker Avenue and thebridge, compensatory damages for moneys expended by plaintiff in repairing the bridgeand, in the absence of the requested declaration, money damages for the diminution invalue of his property. Defendant answered and raised various affirmative defenses,including governmental immunity.
Supreme Court (Devine, J.) scheduled the matter for a pretrial settlement conferenceon January 27, 2012, but neither plaintiff nor his attorney appeared on that date. Theconference was rescheduled for February 6, 2012 but, again, neither plaintiff nor hisattorney were present. As a result, Supreme Court dismissed the complaint withprejudice. When defendant's counsel circulated a proposed order, plaintiff's counselobjected to Supreme Court's dismissal of the complaint, in response to which SupremeCourt scheduled another conference for March 12, 2012—expressly indicatingthat no further adjournments would be entertained. Although plaintiff appeared on thatdate, his attorney did not. Two days later, Supreme Court's previously signed orderdismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice was entered, and such order, together withnotice of entry, was served upon plaintiff's attorney on or about March 16, 2012.
More than two years later, plaintiff filed a "writ of error"—followed by amotion to vacate—seeking to vacate Supreme Court's order dismissing hiscomplaint.[FN2]Defendant opposed this motion contending, among other things, that plaintiff shouldhave appealed from the underlying order and, having failed to do so, could not now beheard to complain. Supreme Court (Connolly, J.) denied plaintiff's motion to vacate,citing 22 NYCRR 202.27 (b). This appeal by plaintiff ensued.
We affirm. "At any scheduled call of a calendar or at any conference,. . . [i]f the defendant appears but the plaintiff does not, the judge maydismiss the action" (22 NYCRR 202.27 [b]; see Bank of N.Y. v Castillo, 120 AD3d 598, 599 [2014])."In order to vacate a dismissal pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, [a] plaintiff [is] requiredto demonstrate a reasonable excuse for [his or her] failure to appear and a potentiallymeritorious cause of action" (Bank of N.Y. v Mohammed, 130 AD3d 1419, 1420 [2015][citations omitted]; see FoleyInc. v Metropolis Superstructures, Inc., 130 AD3d 680, 680 [2015]). Casesevaluating the propriety of a dismissal under 22 NYCRR 202.27 routinely referenceCPLR 5015 (a) (1) (see e.g. Foley Inc. v Metropolis Superstructures, Inc., 130AD3d at 680; Mazzio vJennings, 128 AD3d 1032, 1032 [2015]; GMAC Mtge., LLC v Guccione, 127 AD3d 1136, 1138[2015]; Hagen-Meurer vBalakhane, 127 AD3d 1020, 1020 [2015]), upon which the parties here alsorely. CPLR 5015 provides, in relevant part, that a court may vacate a judgment or orderupon the ground of "excusable default, if such motion is made within one year afterservice of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry upon themoving party" (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see Mathew v Mathew, 137 AD3d 1086, 1087 [2016]; Yung Chong Ho v Uppal, 130AD3d 811, 812 [2015]; City of Albany Indus. Dev. Agency v Garg, 250AD2d 991, 993 [1998])—provided the defaulting party demonstrates both areasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a [*3]potentially meritorious cause of action (see Wright v City ofPoughkeepsie, 136 AD3d 809, 809 [2016]; Yong U Lee v Huan Wen Zhang, 133 AD3d 651, 651[2015]). "A motion to vacate a prior judgment or order is addressed to the court's sounddiscretion, subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion"(Pritchard v Curtis, 101AD3d 1502, 1503 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of McLaughlin, 111AD3d 1185, 1186 [2013]).
Here, the record reflects that a copy of Justice Devine's order dismissing plaintiff'scomplaint with prejudice, together with notice of entry, was served upon plaintiff'scounsel on or about March 16, 2012. Inasmuch as plaintiff did not move to vacate thatorder until more than two years later, plaintiff's motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) (1) clearly was untimely (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Alexander v New York City Tr.Auth., 70 AD3d 876, 877 [2010]; Terlizzese v Robinson's Custom Serv., Inc., 25 AD3d 547,548 [2006]). While it is true, as plaintiff points out, that Supreme Court retains inherentauthority to vacate its own judgment or order "in the interest of justice, even where thestatutory one-year period under CPLR 5015 (a) (1) has expired" (Mathew vMathew, 137 AD3d at 1087 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Borst v International PaperCo., 121 AD3d 1343, 1348 [2014]), plaintiff's motion papers fail to articulateany reasonable excuse for his more than two-year delay in bringing the underlyingmotion to vacate. Moreover, even if we were to consider plaintiff's belated explanationfor such delay—namely, that he was under the mistaken impression that he had toawait resolution of the attorney disciplinary proceeding before bringing the motion tovacate—we still would be unable to conclude that Supreme Court abused itsdiscretion in denying plaintiff's motion. Simply put, plaintiff has not offered a reasonableexcuse for his failures to appear in the first instance, nor has he made any attempt todemonstrate that he has a potentially meritorious cause of action. Under thesecircumstances, and regardless of whether the underlying motion is evaluated under 22NYCRR 202.27 or CPLR 5015, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denyingplaintiff's motion to vacate. To the extent that plaintiff argues on appeal that "SupremeCourt should have modified [the] prior order to reflect that the matter was only dismissedwithout prejudice," we need note only that plaintiff never asked Supreme Court for thisalternative relief or moved to modify the underlying order (compare GMAC Mtge.,LLC v Guccione, 127 AD3d at 1137-1138) and, as such, cannot now be heard tocomplain. The parties' remaining arguments have been examined and found to be lackingin merit.
Garry, J.P., Lynch, Clark and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1:According to plaintiff,the bridge was damaged in the early to mid-1980s when firefighters attempted to drive afire truck across the bridge in response to a fire on the property.
Footnote 2:In the interim, plaintifffiled a disciplinary complaint against his attorney, which culminated in counsel'sone-year suspension from the practice of law.