| GMAC Mtge., LLC v Guccione |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 03500 [127 AD3d 1136] |
| April 29, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Formerly Known as GMACMortgage Corporation, Appellant, v Michael J. Guccione, Respondent, et al.,Defendants. |
Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Khardeen I. Shillingford andSchuyler B. Kraus of counsel), for appellant.
MacVean, Lewis, Sherwin & McDermott, P.C., Middletown, N.Y. (Kevin F.Preston and Ferol Reed-McDermott of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of theSupreme Court, Dutchess County (Brands, J.), dated March 6, 2013, which, upon itsfailure to appear at a conference on September 19, 2011, directed the dismissal of thecomplaint with prejudice, (2) an order of the same court, also dated March 6, 2013,which denied the plaintiff's motion, in effect, to vacate its default, and (3) so much of anorder of the same court dated August 27, 2013, as denied that branch of its motion whichwas pursuant to CPLR 2221 to modify the first order dated March 6, 2013, so as toreflect that the dismissal was without prejudice.
Ordered that the appeal from the first order dated March 6, 2013, is dismissed, as noappeal lies from an order entered upon the default of the appealing party (seeCPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that the second order dated March 6, 2013, is affirmed, without costs ordisbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated August 27, 2013, is reversed insofar as appealed from,on the law, without costs or disbursements, that branch of the plaintiff's motion whichwas pursuant to CPLR 2221 to modify the first order dated March 6, 2013, so as toreflect that the dismissal was without prejudice is granted, and the first order datedMarch 6, 2013, is modified accordingly.
On September 19, 2011, the Supreme Court, on the record, directed the dismissal ofthe complaint in this mortgage foreclosure action with prejudice, based upon both theplaintiff's failure to appear at a court conference scheduled for that day and the plaintiff'srepeated failure to appear at prior court conferences (see 22 NYCRR 202.27 [b];Hanscom v Goldman, 109AD3d 964, 964-965 [2013]; Wahid v Pour, 89 AD3d 1015, 1015 [2011]; Feldstein v New York State Dept.of Correctional Servs., 55 AD3d 663, 663 [2008]; cf. Bank of N.Y. v Castillo,120 AD3d 598, 599 [2014]; Feders v Lamprecht, 43 [*2]AD3d 276, 277 [2007]). In an order dated March 6, 2013,the court denied the plaintiff's motion, in effect, to vacate its default. In a separate orderof the same date, the court directed the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, uponthe plaintiff's failure to appear at the conference on September 19, 2011 (hereinafter the2013 dismissal order). The plaintiff thereafter moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2221(a) to modify the 2013 dismissal order so as to reflect that the dismissal was withoutprejudice. In an order dated August 27, 2013, the court denied that branch of theplaintiff's motion, noting that the plaintiff failed to appear for at least three court-orderedconferences after the court had previously imposed sanctions for nonappearance, hadpreviously directed the dismissal of the complaint because of the plaintiff's counsel'snonappearance, and had subsequently vacated that prior dismissal.
In seeking to vacate a default in appearing, a plaintiff must establish both areasonable excuse for its default and a potentially meritorious cause of action (seeCPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter ofNahum v Mansour, 109 AD3d 548, 549 [2013]; Feldstein v New York StateDept. of Correctional Servs., 55 AD3d at 663; Gazetten Contr., Inc. v HCO, Inc., 45 AD3d 530, 530[2007]). "Whether an excuse is reasonable is a determination within the sound discretionof the Supreme Court" (Walkerv Mohammed, 90 AD3d 1034, 1034 [2011]). Where a party asserts law officefailure, it must provide "a detailed and credible explanation of the default" (People's United Bank v LatiniTuxedo Mgt., LLC, 95 AD3d 1285, 1286 [2012] [internal quotation marksomitted]; Kohn v Kohn, 86AD3d 630, 630 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Law office failure should not be excused where a default results not from an isolated,inadvertent mistake, but from repeated neglect (see Glukhman v Bay 49th St. Condominium, LLC, 100 AD3d594, 595 [2012]; Gutman vA to Z Holding Corp., 91 AD3d 718, 719 [2012]; Chery v Anthony, 156AD2d 414, 417 [1989]). Here, based upon the repeated failure of the plaintiff's counselto appear at court conferences, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion inrejecting counsel's claim of law office failure. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish areasonable excuse for its default.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying thatbranch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, to vacate the default. However,since dismissal of an action for a default pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 does notconstitute a determination on the merits, the dismissal should have been withoutprejudice (see FarrellForwarding Co., Inc. v Alison Transp., Inc., 119 AD3d 891, 892 [2014]; Franchise Acquisitions GroupCorp. v Jefferson Val. Mall Ltd. Partnership, 73 AD3d 1123, 1123 [2010]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Eng, P.J., Austin, Cohen andBarros, JJ., concur.