| Matter of Menon v New York State Dept. of Health |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 04760 [140 AD3d 1428] |
| June 16, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Sean Menon et al., Respondents, v NewYork State Department of Health, Appellant. |
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jonathan D. Hitsous of counsel),for appellant.
Marvin Newberg, Monticello, for Sean Menon and another, respondents.
Stoloff & Silver, LLP, Monticello (Richard A. Stoloff of counsel), forWanaksink Lake Club, Inc., respondent.
Aarons, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGuire, J.), entered May14, 2015 in Sullivan County, which granted petitioners' application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent denying a waiver ofcertain regulatory requirements as applied to petitioners Sean Menon and DawnMenon.
In 2011, petitioners Sean Menon and Dawn Menon (hereinafter collectively referredto as petitioners) found a property lot located on the shore of Wanaksink Lake inSullivan County on which they wanted to construct a vacation house. Prior to making anoffer for the lot, petitioners proceeded to determine whether such construction would befeasible. Sean Menon (hereinafter Menon) spoke with John Konefal, the president ofpetitioner Wanaksink Lake Club, Inc., the organization that governed the use ofproperties in the lake community, who advised him that construction of a new houseneeded approval of the Lake Club and the Town of Thompson's Zoning Board ofAppeals. Petitioners thereafter bought the property. The Lake Club approved petitioners'proposed construction plan, but the Zoning Board conditioned its grant of the necessaryarea variances upon respondent's approval of the proposed well and septic system.
In September 2013, Menon and his engineer, D. Randel Wasson, met with GlennIlling, [*2]an engineer in respondent's district office, andthey discussed the construction project as well as any potential waivers that might beneeded. In December 2013, Illing preliminarily reviewed a plan from Wasson andprovided comments so that Wasson could submit a revised plan. In May 2014, petitionerssubmitted a plan to respondent that proposed the construction of a three-bedroom houseon the lot, which is approximately 50 feet wide and 200 feet long as measured from thelake's shoreline. Petitioners also submitted a waiver application seeking to exempt theproposed water supply system from complying with respondent's regulations setting forththe minimum separation distances applicable to individual well and septicsystems.[FN1] Theapplication detailed each proposed distance that was noncompliant with respondent'sregulations and compared them to what respondent's regulations required. While Menon,Wasson and Illing had further discussions about the waiver application, Illingsubsequently forwarded petitioners' application and file to respondent's Division ofEnvironmental Health Protection for review based upon an allegation by Konefal thatIlling was not properly handling the matter.
In a December 4, 2014 letter addressed to Konefal, respondent's Director of theDivision of Environmental Health Protection wrote that "this vacant property is too smallto be developed for a new home of any size. For this reason, the requested specificwaiver . . . cannot be issued." In a separate letter dated December 5, 2014,Illing advised Menon that the waiver application was denied on the sole ground that "thevacant property is too small to be developed for a new home of any size." Petitioners andthe Lake Club thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annulrespondent's determination. Supreme Court granted the petition. Respondentappeals.[FN2]
Respondent may grant a waiver of its separation requirements pertaining toindividual water supply systems if an applicant demonstrates that (1) a hardship or othercircumstance making it impractical to comply with respondent's regulations exists, and(2) the requested waiver is consistent with respondent's overall protective purpose ofensuring water safety (see 10 NYCRR 75.3 [d]; 75.6 [b]). A court should defer toan agency's determination and only when such determination is arbitrary, capricious orirrational should it be annulled (see Matter of Dugan v Liggan, 121 AD3d 1471, 1473[2014]; Matter of O'Connor vGinsberg, 106 AD3d 1207, 1210 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 864[2013]).
Respondent premised its denial of petitioners' waiver application on a bare statementthat the property was too small for the construction of a house of any size. Whilerespondent was not required to set forth any findings of fact (see Matter of Office Bldg. Assoc.,LLC v Empire Zone Designation Bd., 95 AD3d 1402, 1404 [2012]), it wasnonetheless required to approve or [*3]deny the waiverapplication based upon the criteria specified in its own regulations (see 10NYCRR 75.3 [d]; 75.6 [b]). The denial here, however, did not mention a hardship orother circumstance encountered by petitioners that made it impractical to comply withrespondent's regulations, and there was no conclusion as to how petitioners' proposedwell and septic system or the proposed distances delineated in the May 2014 waiverapplication were not consistent with the regulations' purpose. Where, as here, no formalhearing was conducted, we are limited to the ground invoked by respondent—i.e.,the property lot was too small to construct a house of any size—and if we believethat such basis is insufficient or improper, we cannot sustain the determination bysubstituting what we deem to be a more appropriate or proper basis (see Matter ofParkmed Assoc. v New York State Tax Commn., 60 NY2d 935, 936 [1983];Matter of Office Bldg. Assoc., LLC v Empire Zone Designation Bd., 95 AD3d at1404). Given that respondent did not mention or discuss the required factors as set forthin its own regulations in denying petitioners' waiver application, we cannot conductmeaningful review of the rationality of respondent's determination (see Matter of Figel v Dwyer,75 AD3d 802, 804 [2010]; Matter of Gallo v State of N.Y., Off. of Mental Retardation &Dev. Disabilities, 37 AD3d 984, 986 [2007]; Matter of Fromer[Commissioner of Labor], 268 AD2d 707, 709 [2000]; cf. Matter of Segal vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Bethel, 191 AD2d 873, 874 [1993]).
Respondent contends that Illing's affidavit submitted in response to the petitionsufficiently articulated the basis for its determination by explaining why the property'ssmall size did not warrant granting the waiver application. While a responsive affidavitthat was not part of the administrative record may be considered in certain circumstances(see e.g. Matter of Kirmayer vNew York State Dept. of Civ. Serv., 24 AD3d 850, 852 [2005]), it must comefrom an affiant with "firsthand knowledge of the decision-making process undertaken bythe [agency]" (Matter of Office Bldg. Assoc., LLC v Empire Zone DesignationBd., 95 AD3d at 1405). Illing did not have such firsthand knowledge of the processby which the waiver application was denied, as the matter had been removed from hishands and referred to the Division of Environmental Health Protection. The letter thatdenied the waiver application was signed by that office's director; Illing's onlyinvolvement was to notify Menon of the decision after it was made and supply him witha copy of the denial letter. As Illing did not participate in the decision to deny the waiverapplication, his affidavit cannot supply the missing rationale for the decision (seeid. at 1406; Matter of Weillv New York City Dept. of Educ., 61 AD3d 407, 409 [2009]).
Moreover, even if we found that the affidavit could be considered, we nonethelessdisagree with respondent (seeMatter of Greece Town Mall, L.P. v New York State, 105 AD3d 1298, 1300[2013]). In his affidavit, Illing explained how the amount of bedrooms, but not how thesize of the property lot or proposed house, correlated to the sufficiency of a well andseptic system.[FN3]We further note that, throughout the application process, which included site visits anddiscussions with petitioners and Wasson, Illing never commented about the size of thepurchased lot or proposed house as being a prohibitive factor in granting or denying awaiver application. In sum, respondent's denial "sheds no light upon the manner in which[petitioners'] proof was deemed to be deficient [and] falls far short of delineating theparticular grounds for [respondent's] determination" (Matter of Office Bldg. Assoc.,LLC v Empire Zone Designation Bd., 95 AD3d at 1405). Therefore, the matter mustbe remitted to respondent for reconsideration of petitioners' application (see Matter ofFigel v Dwyer, 75 AD3d at 804-805; cf. Matter of Hudson Riv. Val., LLC v Empire Zone DesignationBd., 115 AD3d 1035, 1038 [2014]).
[*4] Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs, and matter remitted to respondent for reconsideration ofpetitioners' application.
Footnote 1:Respondent is chargedwith supervising and regulating the "sanitary aspects of water supplies and sewagedisposal" (Public Health Law § 201 [1] [l]) and has promulgatedregulations to minimize the risk of water contamination by, among other things, requiringminimum distances separating well and septic systems from each other and frompotential sources of contamination (see 10 NYCRR 75.4, 75.5; 10 NYCRRAppendix 5-B, § 5-B.2 [c]; table 1).
Footnote 2:Because there is nodispute that petitioners have standing to commence this proceeding, it is unnecessary toaddress whether the Lake Club has organizational standing (see New York StateUnited Teachers v State of New York, — AD3d &mdash, &mdash, 2016 NYSlip Op 03572, *2 [2016]).
Footnote 3:Respondent's guidelinesstate that "[s]eptic tank capacities shall be based on the number of household bedrooms"(10 NYCRR Appendix 75-A.6 [a] [1]).