| Matter of Shuai Yin v State of N.Y. Dept. of Taxation &Fin. |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 05285 [151 AD3d 1497] |
| June 29, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Shuai Yin, Petitioner, v State of New YorkDepartment of Taxation and Finance et al., Respondents. |
Sales Tax Defense, LLC, Deer Park (Jennifer Koo of counsel) and Meyer, Suozzi, English& Klein, PC, Garden City (Robert N. Zausmer of counsel), for petitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), forDepartment of Taxation and Finance, respondent.
Garry, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to Tax Law§ 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal sustainingsales and use tax assessments imposed under Tax Law articles 28 and 29.
Petitioner is the sole owner and president of Capital One Construction, Inc., a generalcontractor engaged in the construction of commercial and residential properties. The Division ofTaxation of respondent Department of Taxation and Finance audited the records of Capital Onewith respect to its sales and use tax liability, for the period between March 1, 2004 and February28, 2010, and issued notices of determination to petitioner and Capital One assessing sales anduse tax liability of approximately $460,000 with penalties and interest, for a total liability ofapproximately $1 million. Petitioner and Capital One disputed the notices of determination and,following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge sustained the notices in their entirety.Respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal modified by slightly reducing the aggregate amount of thesales and use tax liability and otherwise upheld the determination. Petitioner thereaftercommenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding in this Court challenging the Tribunal's [*2]determination.[FN*]
As relevant here, a sales tax is imposed on every "retail sale" of tangible personal property(Tax Law § 1105 [a]; seeMatter of Wolkowicki v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 136 AD3d 1223, 1227[2016]), and a use tax is imposed on tangible personal property purchased at retail that is notsubject to sales tax and is used within the state (see Tax Law § 1110 [a]; 20NYCRR 531.1). All purchases and sales of tangible personal property and enumerated servicesare "subject to tax until the contrary is established, and the burden of proving that any receipt. . . is not taxable . . . shall be upon the person required to collect taxor the customer" (Tax Law § 1132 [c] [1] [emphasis added]; see 20NYCRR 532.4 [b] [1], [2]). Although sales tax is generally required to be collected by sellers, acustomer who fails to pay sales tax to the person required to collect it must, instead, file theappropriate return and pay the tax directly (see Tax Law § 1133 [b]; 20NYCRR 532.1 [e]).
At the outset of the audit, the Department advised Capital One that it was required to providethe auditor with all relevant books and records, including tax returns, the general ledger, andsales and purchase invoices. However, Capital One had no ledger for part of the audit period anddid not have complete sales and purchase invoices for the entire audit period. As a result of theseand other deficiencies, the auditor determined that Capital One's records were inadequate topermit a direct audit, and resorted instead to indirect audit techniques that included the use ofrepresentative test periods to review Capital One's sales and expense records. Following thisreview, the auditor determined that Capital One's gross sales were not subject to sales tax, as thejobs it performed qualified as capital improvements to real property, but that additional tax wasdue on its purchases during the audit period, in particular on certain expense and assetpurchases.
Initially, we reject petitioner's contention that the auditor wrongly concluded that use tax wasdue on the purchase of a $35,000 automobile. Petitioner contends that the automobile wasshipped to China shortly after it was purchased and was never used in New York, but a tax returnfiled by Capital One in 2006 contradicted that claim, stating that theautomobile—described in the return as transportation equipment—was placed inthe service of Capital One's business. The sole proof produced by petitioner to demonstrate thatthe car was shipped to China was a notarized letter from the seller, dated in 2012 andunsupported by shipping records, purchase invoices or any other form of documentation. Issuesof credibility are "for the taxing authority to resolve" (Matter of Wolkowicki v New YorkState Tax Appeals Trib., 136 AD3d at 1229 n 6 [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]), and we find no error in this determination.
Next, petitioner argues that certain sales taxes assessed on invoices from a particular suppliershould be reduced by the amount of tax that the supplier should have paid. Contrary to therequirements of Tax Law § 1132 (a), however, the supplier's invoices stated that asales tax was included in the total invoice amount and did not separately set out the amount ofthe sales tax due. Under such circumstances, "the entire amount charged is deemed the sales priceof the property sold or services rendered" (20 NYCRR 532.1 [b] [3]; see Matter of Lake Grove Entertainment,LLC v Megna, 81 AD3d 1191, 1193 [2011]; Matter of Noar Trucking Co. v State[*3]Tax Commn., 139 AD2d 869, 871-872 [1988]). Aspetitioner did not sustain his burden to show that the sales tax was paid, the amount due wasproperly assessed against Capital One and petitioner (see Matter of Food Concepts v StateTax Commn., 122 AD2d 371, 373 [1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 610 [1986]; Matterof Albany-Edison Oxygen Co. v Tully, 58 AD2d 933, 934 [1977], revd on othergrounds 44 NY2d 988 [1978]; 20 NYCRR 532.1 [e]).
We reject petitioner's contention that no sales tax was due on invoices issued by two otherentities because they represented materials provided by subcontractors who were performingcapital improvement work. Initially, no documentation in the record provides factual support forpetitioner's claim that the invoices reflected capital improvements. Further, the sales taxexemption for materials purchased from a contractor or subcontractor during capitalimprovements applies to the end customer only, not to transactions between contractors andsubcontractors (see Tax Law § 1115 [a] [17]; see generally Matter ofLake City Manufactured Hous. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 184 AD2d 33, 35-36[1992]; Pyramid Co. of Auburn v Chu, 177 AD2d 970, 970-971 [1991]). Contrary topetitioner's argument, a contractor's responsibility to pay a sales tax on materials is not affectedby 20 NYCRR 541.5 (d) (1) (iii), which, by its terms, has no bearing on the purchase of materialsas opposed to charges for services. Instead, the Tax Law defines sales to contractors orsubcontractors "for use or consumption in erecting structures or buildings, or building on, orotherwise adding to, altering, improving, maintaining, servicing or repairing real property" asretail sales subject to sales and use tax (Tax Law § 1101 [b] [4] [i]; see 20NYCRR 541.1 [b]).
Next, the record does not support petitioner's claim that certain invoices reflected nontaxablerental deposits on cylinders. The invoices make no reference to deposits, but instead list types ofcylinders, unit prices, and the numbers of cylinders shipped and returned. In contrast, the recordincludes another invoice—conceded by the Department to reflect a nontaxabledeposit—which specifically identifies an amount paid as a propane tank deposit. Welikewise reject petitioner's claim that two invoices should not have been included in the March2008 test period for construction material expenses on the ground that the dates on the invoiceswere outside that time period. The auditor explained that she examined transactions duringMarch 2008, rather than invoices dated during that month, and the general ledger entriescorresponding to both invoices, as well as a canceled check pertaining to one of them, are datedduring that time period. Accordingly, both of these determinations are "rationally based upon andsupported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Ingle v Tax Appeals Trib. of the Dept. of Taxation & Fin. ofthe State of N.Y., 110 AD3d 1392, 1393 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]).
Petitioner further contends that payments to two suppliers in the total amounts of $70,000and $190,000, respectively, were nontaxable cash exchanges rather than purchases. However,petitioner acknowledged that his bookkeeper had falsified purchase invoices related to thepayments to one of the suppliers. Petitioner submitted no documentation other than the fabricatedinvoices to support his claim that some of the cash was used for nontaxable purchases of autoparts that were intended for resale, although ultimately not resold, and this Court defers to theTribunal's resolution of such matters of credibility (see id.). Many of the receipts andother documents that petitioner submitted to support his claims that the remainder of the cashwas spent in nontaxable transactions were barely legible, written in another language, orunidentified, and most made no reference to the payment of tax. Petitioner thus failed to meet his"burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the . . . tax assessment[was] erroneous" (Matter of Lombard v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 197AD2d 799, 800 [1993]; accord Matter ofHwang v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 105 AD3d 1151, 1153[2013]).
[*4] As for petitioner's challenge to thepenalty and interest imposed by the Department, a taxpayer may be relieved of a penalty if afailure to pay was "due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect" (Tax Law§ 1145 [a] [1] [iii]). Petitioner argues, among other things, that some of the missingrecords resulted from the theft of company computers, and further, that, in part as a result of alanguage barrier, petitioner believed in good faith that Capital One was not liable for sales anduse taxes. However, the computers were stolen in September 2007, and the test periods in whichdeficient record-keeping was revealed all fell after that time. Neither ignorance of the law nor thegood faith advancement of a reasonable legal theory constitutes reasonable cause in the absenceof the taxpayer's efforts to ascertain the proper tax liability (see Matter of CBS Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 56 AD3d908, 911 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 703 [2009]; Matter of Rubin v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 29 AD3d1089, 1091-1092 [2006]). It was petitioner's burden to demonstrate that the penalty wasimproper (see Matter of Cook v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 222 AD2d 962,964-965 [1995]), and, in view of Capital One's failures to maintain adequate records, file salestax returns or attempt to ascertain the position of the Department in this regard, we find no basison which to disturb the imposition of a penalty (see Matter of Felix Indus. v State of N.Y.Tax Appeals Trib., 183 AD2d 203, 206-207 [1992]).
Peters, P.J., Devine, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *:Capital One initially joined inthe CPLR article 78 proceeding, but, upon the Department's motion, this Court dismissed thepetition as to Capital One due to its failure to post a deposit or an undertaking (see TaxLaw § 1138 [a] [4]) and allowed petitioner to file an amended petition solely on hisown behalf.