| Matter of HDV Manhattan, LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State ofN.Y. |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 08559 [156 AD3d 963] |
| December 7, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of HDV Manhattan, LLC, et al.,Petitioners, v Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York et al.,Respondents. |
Morrison & Foerster, LLP, New York City (Hollis L. Hyans of counsel) and Shafer& Associates, PC, Lansing, Michigan (Bradley J. Shafer, admitted pro hac vice), forpetitioners.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.
Clark, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to Tax Law§ 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal sustaining asales and use tax assessment imposed under Tax Law articles 28 and 29.
Petitioners, a limited liability company and its members, operate the Hustler Club, an adultestablishment that offers live, semi-nude entertainment to its patrons in Manhattan.[FN1] The club's public area iscomprised of a main stage surrounded by tables and chairs and two additional stages located onbalconies on opposite sides of the club overlooking the main stage, also with surrounding tablesand chairs. In addition, the club has 16 private rooms—four of which includepoles—where paying customers can receive private dances from entertainers. To obtain aprivate dance during the period in question, customers were required to pay a "room charge" tothe club by credit card and an additional fee directly to the entertainer, which could be paid incash or, if the customer paid by [*2]credit card, withscrip—a form of in-house currency that the club sold to its customers at a 20% markup(e.g., $100 of scrip cost $120). Customers could also use scrip to tip entertainers, floor hosts andbartenders and to purchase "table dances" from entertainers in the main area of theclub.[FN2] In addition to the20% surcharge imposed on its scrip-purchasing customers, the club charged entertainers andfloor hosts a fee to redeem the scrip paid to them by patrons. Specifically, the club collected 10%of the face value of scrip redeemed by entertainers and 30% of the face value of scrip redeemedby floor hosts. The club recorded the amount paid to it by floor hosts as "service feeincome."
In December 2008, the Department of Taxation and Finance commenced a sales and use taxaudit of the club's tax liability for the period of June 1, 2006 through November 30, 2008. At theconclusion of the audit, the Department issued separate notices of determination to eachpetitioner asserting a tax deficiency of over $4.8 million, plus penalties and statutory interest.Following conciliation conferences, the asserted tax deficiency was reduced to $2,113,204.38,plus statutory interest, and all penalties were abated. Petitioners thereafter filed petitions forredetermination with the Division of Tax Appeals, arguing that no tax deficiency existed for theaudit period. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge(hereinafter ALJ), at which the parties solely disputed whether the club's sale of scrip and theservice fee income were taxable. The ALJ found that petitioners owed taxes on both the sale ofscrip and the service fee income and sustained the notices of determination, as modified by theorders of conciliation. Petitioners filed exceptions and, following oral argument, respondent TaxAppeals Tribunal reversed that portion of the ALJ's determination holding that the amountsattributable to service fee income were taxable, but otherwise sustained the determination.Petitioners then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Tribunal'sdetermination, and we now confirm.
We begin our discussion with a reminder of the limited scope of review that this Court mayemploy in cases where, as here, the issues argued before the Tribunal involved the "specificapplication of . . . broad statutory term[s] in a proceeding in which the agencyadministering the statute must determine it initially" (Matter of American Tel. & Tel.Co. v State Tax Commn., 61 NY2d 393, 400 [1984] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; accord Matter of O'Brien vSpitzer, 7 NY3d 239, 242 [2006]; Matter of Easylink Servs. Intl., Inc. v New York State Tax AppealsTrib., 101 AD3d 1180, 1181-1182 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 858 [2013]). Insuch cases, we accord deference to the Tribunal's interpretation of the statutes at issue,administered by the Department (seeMatter of Lake Grove Entertainment, LLC v Megna, 81 AD3d 1191, 1192 [2011]; Matter of Island Waste Servs., Ltd. v TaxAppeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 77 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2010], lv denied 16NY3d 712 [2011]), and we will not disturb the Tribunal's determination if it has a rational basisand is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Great Lakes-Dunbar-Rochester vState Tax Commn., 65 NY2d 339, 343 [1985]; Matter of American Tel. & Tel. Co.v State Tax Commn., 61 NY2d at 400; Matter of Jay's Distribs., Inc. v Boone, 148 AD3d 1237, 1238[2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 918 [2017]).
Turning to the merits, petitioners argue that the club's sale of scrip is not taxable under TaxLaw § 1105 (f) (1) because it does not qualify as an "[a]dmission charge," asdefined in Tax Law § 1101 (d) (2), to a place of amusement. Pursuant to Tax Law§ 1105 (f) (1), a sales tax of 4% is imposed on "[a]ny admission charge. . . in excess of [10] cents to or for the use of any place of amusement in the state,except charges for admission to . . . dramatic or musical arts [*3]performances." For purposes of the statute, an "[a]dmission charge"is defined as "[t]he amount paid for admission, including any service charge and any charge forentertainment or amusement or for the use of facilities therefor" (Tax Law § 1101[d] [2]). Further, "it shall be presumed that all receipts for . . . all amusementcharges of any type mentioned in [Tax Law § 1105 (f)] are subject to tax until thecontrary is established, and the burden of proving that any . . . amusement charge. . . is not taxable [t]hereunder shall be upon the person required to collect tax or thecustomer" (Tax Law § 1132 [c] [1]).
We find no basis to disturb the Tribunal's determination that the club's receipts from the saleof scrip are taxable as admission charges to a place of amusement. As the Tribunal recognizes,the definition of admission charge in Tax Law § 1101 (d) (2), as well as the relevantregulation (see 20 NYCRR 527.10 [b] [1] [i]), establish that, for the purposes of Tax Law§ 1105 (f) (1), an admission charge includes any additional cost for entertainment oramusement that must be paid to gain access to the place of amusement—here, the privateroom.[FN3] Althoughpetitioners argued that the fee for the private room and the fee for the private dance wereseparate, they failed to come forward with evidence establishing that one fee could be paidwithout the other. The record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating that patrons could, anddid, purchase time in a private room without also purchasing a private dance from an entertainer.As such, it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that payment of both the room feeand the entertainer's fee were required to gain entry into one of the private rooms and, thus, thatboth fees constituted an admission charge. Additionally, although the record establishes thatpatrons could pay entertainers in cash, petitioners produced no evidence as to the frequency withwhich patrons would use cash, rather than purchasing scrip. In view of the foregoing, we findthat the Tribunal rationally determined that the purchase of scrip to pay for a private danceconstituted an admission charge within the meaning of Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1)(see Tax Law § 1101 [d] [2]; see generally Matter of 1605 Book Ctr. vTax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 83 NY2d 240, 245 [1994], cert denied 513 US811 [1994]; compare Fairland Amusements v State Tax Commn., 66 NY2d 932, 934-935[1985], revg 110 AD2d 952 [1985]). Relatedly, although some scrip sold to customersmay have been used to tip or to purchase table dances, petitioners failed to establish the amountof scrip sold that was attributable to these transactions. In the absence of such evidence, we willnot disturb the Tribunal's determination that all scrip sales were presumptively taxable(see Tax Law § 1132 [c] [1]).
Next, petitioners assert that, even if the sale of scrip is a taxable admission charge under TaxLaw § 1105 (f) (1), they are exempt from the amusement tax because the purchaseof scrip to pay for private dances qualifies as a charge for admission to a dramatic or musical artsperformance. While Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1) imposes sales tax on admission chargesin excess of 10 cents to any place of amusement in the state, the Legislature, "with the evidentpurpose of promoting cultural and artistic performances in local communities, . . .created an exemption that excluded from taxation admission charges for a discrete form ofentertainment—'dramatic or musical arts performances' " (Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State ofN.Y. Tax Appeals [*4]Trib., 19 NY3d 1058, 1060[2012], cert denied 571 US &mdash, 134 S Ct 422 [2013], quoting Tax Law§ 1105 [f] [1]). The taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that the exemptionapplies (see Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 19NY3d at 1060; Matter of Grace v New York State Tax Commn., 37 NY2d 193, 195[1975]; Matter of Lake Grove Entertainment, LLC v Megna, 81 AD3d at 1192).Furthermore, in matters of statutory construction, any ambiguity or uncertainty must be construedagainst the exemption and in favor of the taxing authority (see Matter of 677 New LoudonCorp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 19 NY3d at 1060; Matter of Charter Dev. Co., L.L.C. v Cityof Buffalo, 6 NY3d 578, 582 [2006]; Matter of City of Lackawanna v State Bd. ofEqualization & Assessment of State of N.Y., 16 NY2d 222, 230 [1965]).[FN4]
The parties do not dispute that the claimed exemption has, as found by the Tribunal, both avenue requirement and a content requirement. Indeed, for the purposes of Tax Law§ 1105 (f) (1), a "[d]ramatic or musical arts admission charge" is defined as "[a]nyadmission charge paid for admission to a theatre, opera house, concert hall or other hall orplace of assembly for a live dramatic, choreographic or musical performance" (TaxLaw § 1101 [d] [5] [emphasis added]). Upon review of the record, we find that theTribunal did not err in concluding that petitioners failed to come forward with sufficient proof toestablish each of these requirements.
First, with respect to the venue requirement, it was incumbent on petitioners to establish thatthe private rooms constituted "a theatre, opera house, concert hall or other hall or place ofassembly" (Tax Law § 1101 [d] [5]). In our view, the Tribunal properly reasonedthat, based on the evidence proffered by petitioners, the private room lacked the commoncharacteristics of the settings described in Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1).[FN5] Petitioners' failure to satisfy thevenue requirement forecloses application of the claimed exemption.
In any event, even if petitioners satisfied the venue requirement, we would nonetheless findthat petitioners did not meet the content requirement of Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1). TheTribunal's determination that "petitioners have failed to credibly depict the private danceexperience in sufficient detail to establish that experience as dramatic or choreographic" isrational and supported by substantial evidence. Petitioners presented testimony from twowitnesses who were qualified as experts in dance choreography. Each expert witness opined that,based upon their respective personal observations and interviews with various entertainers, theprivate dances constituted "live dramatic, choreographic or musical performance[s]" (Tax Law§ 1101 [d] [5]; see Tax Law § 1105 [f] [1]). However, theirtestimony did not specifically describe the private dances, which were characterized as being"very similar" to table dances, and did not address the particular dance moves observed tablesideor in private rooms. In addition, while one of the club's entertainers testified that she performedroutines in the private rooms, [*5]particularly in the few privaterooms that included poles, she also stated that dancing did not always occur in the private rooms.She asserted that, sometimes, she would have a conversation with the customer, allow thecustomer to cry, convince the customer to get on the pole or do "whatever ma[de] the time go byas fast as possible." In short, the record as a whole failed to clearly depict the type of activity thattook place in the private rooms.
Furthermore, the Tribunal discredited the descriptions given by petitioners' expert witnessesas to the private dances, on the basis that they were working for the club at the time that theyreceived the private dances and the entertainers who gave the private dances were aware of thatfact. The Tribunal's credibility determinations in this regard lie within its exclusive province and,as the reason proffered by the Tribunal for discrediting the expert testimony is supported by therecord and has a rational basis, we are without authority to disturb it (see Matter of 677 NewLoudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 19 NY3d at 1060-1061; Matter of DiMaria v Ross, 52 NY2d 771, 772 [1980]; Matter of Halloran v Kirwan, 28 NY2d689, 691 [1971]). Finally, although petitioners' expert witnesses testified that the entertainers'performances were dramatic because they dressed in costume and assumed a certain personawhile working, we cannot say that the Tribunal acted irrationally in concluding that "a moreformal or structured performance is necessary to qualify as dramatic for purposes of theexemption" in Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1) (see Tax Law § 1101 [d][5]; 20 NYCRR 527.10 [d] [2] [stating that "(d)ramatic and musical arts performances do notinclude variety shows, magic shows, circuses, animal acts, ice shows, aquatic shows and similarperformances"]). Considering the foregoing, we find no basis to disturb the Tribunal'sdetermination that the club's sale of scrip did not qualify for an exemption under Tax Law§ 1105 (f) (1).
Petitioners further challenge the Tribunal's determination that the club's sale of scrip isalternatively taxable under Tax Law § 1105 (f) (3), as "charges of a roof garden,cabaret or other similar place in the state." A "[c]harge of a roof garden, cabaret or other similarplace" means "[a]ny charge made for admission, refreshment, service, or merchandise at a roofgarden, cabaret or other similar place" (Tax Law § 1101 [d] [4]) and, under thepertinent regulation, includes charges for "music or entertainment . . . [or] service"(20 NYCRR 527.12 [b] [1]). The phrase "roof garden, cabaret or other similar place," in turn,means "[a]ny . . . place which furnishes a public performance for profit, but notincluding a place where merely live dramatic or musical arts performances are offered inconjunction with the serving or selling of food, refreshment or merchandise, so long as suchserving or selling of food, refreshment or merchandise is merely incidental to such performances"(Tax Law § 1101 [d] [12] [emphasis added]; see 20 NYCRR 527.12 [b][2]).
The Tribunal explicitly found that the club furnished public performances for profit throughits offerings of stage dances and table dances and, therefore, qualified as a cabaret or similarplace within the meaning of Tax Law § 1105 (f) (3). This finding is certainlysupported by the record, as there was ample testimony that entertainers would perform on one ofthree public stages in the main area of the club or tableside at one of the many tables surroundingthe stages, all of which were viewable to patrons who paid general admission into the club.Accordingly, the Tribunal rationally concluded that the club is a cabaret or other similarplace—that is, a place which furnishes public performances for profit (see TaxLaw §§ 1105 [f] [3]; 1101 [d] [12]; Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. vState of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 85 AD3d at 1346). Additionally, given that "charges of a. . . cabaret or other similar place" include service and entertainment charges(see Tax Law § 1101 [d] [4]; 20 NYCRR 527.12 [b] [1]), the revenuegenerated from the sale of scrip—which could be used to tip or purchase table dancesand/or private dances—is properly taxable under Tax Law § 1105 (f)(3).
[*6] Petitioners argue, however, that the sale ofscrip qualifies for the exclusion set forth in Tax Law § 1105 (f) (3) because it is "aplace where merely live dramatic or musical arts performances are offered in conjunction withthe serving or selling of . . . refreshment or merchandise" and "such serving orselling . . . is merely incidental to such performances" (Tax Law§ 1101 [d] [12]). The Tribunal found that, while public performances for profitwere offered in the main area of the club, the club also offered nonpublic performances in theform of private dances in one of the club's 16 private rooms, which were viewable only to thepaying customer. This finding is both rational, as the Tribunal afforded the word "public" itsplain and ordinary meaning in reaching its conclusion that the private dances were nonpublicperformances, and fully supported by the record. Considering that, as established by the record,the private dances made up a significant portion of the club's "entertainmentofferings,"[FN6] a rationalbasis exists for the Tribunal's further determination that, even if the stage performances and tabledances were live dramatic or musical arts performances, the club did not "merely" offer suchperformances, so as to bring the sale of scrip within the ambit of the exclusion (Tax Law§ 1101 [d] [12]). As such, we discern no basis on which to disturb the Tribunal'sdetermination that the exclusion set forth in Tax Law § 1105 (f) (3) isinapplicable.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by petitioners' various constitutional arguments (seegenerally Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 85 AD3d at1346-1347)—many of which are, in essence, a repetition of challenges that werepreviously raised by petitioners and rejected by the First Department (see CMSG Rest. Group, LLC v State ofNew York, 145 AD3d 136 [2016], appeal dismissed and lv denied 29 NY3d 929[2017], cert denied 583 US — [Oct. 30, 2017]). Petitioners' remaining argumentsare either unpreserved, rendered academic or lacking in merit.
McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote 1:Although the caption of thisproceeding has not been amended, the limited liability company that owns the Hustler Club isnow known as CMSG Restaurant Group, LLC.
Footnote 2:Scrip could not be used to payfor entry into the club, beverages or merchandise.
Footnote 3:There is no dispute that a privateroom at the club constituted a "place of amusement" under Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1)(see Tax Law § 1101 [d] [10]; 20 NYCRR 527.10 [b] [3] [i]; Matter of1605 Book Ctr. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 83 NY2d 240, 245 [1994], certdenied 513 US 811 [1994]; Matterof 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 85 AD3d 1341, 1343[2011], affd 19 NY3d 1058 [2012], cert denied 571 US &mdash, 134 S Ct 422[2013]).
Footnote 4:While petitioners argue that theexception found in Tax Law § 1105 (f) (1) is an exclusion, rather than anexemption, the Court of Appeals has treated this particular exception as an exemption (seeMatter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 19 NY3d at 1060).
Footnote 5:Given that the venue requirementwas plainly in issue, we are unpersuaded by petitioners' assertion that the Tribunal improperlyraised the question of whether the private rooms were public or communal in nature.
Footnote 6:We note that one of the club'sentertainers also testified that, in addition to performing on stage and providing table dances andprivate dances, she would entertain customers by flirting or conversing with them.