| Matter of Jay's Distribs., Inc. v Boone |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 01602 [148 AD3d 1237] |
| March 2, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Jay's Distributors, Inc., Petitioner, v JarryBoone, as Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, et al.,Respondents. |
Law Office of Anil K. Arora, Maywood, New Jersey (Anil K. Arora of counsel), forpetitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.
Garry, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to Tax Law§ 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal sustaining atobacco tax assessment imposed under Tax Law article 20.
Petitioner, a licensed tobacco wholesaler, is wholly owned by Kaushik Shah, who is also thesole owner of Vikisha, Inc., a tobacco wholesaler licensed in New Jersey. During the time periodpertinent here, petitioner and Vikisha stored certain tobacco products in a shared warehouse inNew Jersey. Beginning in 2007, the Department of Taxation and Finance conducted an audit ofpetitioner's tobacco tax liability for the period between March 2004 and December 2006. Uponcompletion of the audit in 2009, the Department issued a notice of determination by whichpetitioner was assessed approximately $3 million in taxes, $1.4 million in interest, and $2.2million as a penalty for fraud. Petitioner submitted a petition for revision or redetermination tothe Division of Tax Appeals. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge denied thepetition and sustained the determination. Respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal thereafter partiallysustained that determination by affirming the assessment of taxes due, but canceled the fraudpenalty, finding that the penalty should instead be based upon willful neglect. Petitioner thencommenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding in this Court.
[*2] Our function in this tax review proceeding is limited; wemust confirm the Tribunal's determination if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantialevidence (see Matter of Hwang v TaxAppeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 105 AD3d 1151, 1152 [2013]; Matter of CS Integrated, LLC v TaxAppeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 19 AD3d 886, 889 [2005]). Entities that are required tocollect sales taxes are obligated to keep full records of their sales and make them available to taxauthorities for inspection upon demand (see Tax Law § 1135 [a] [1]; [g]; Matter of Rodriguez v Tax Appeals Trib. ofthe State of N.Y., 82 AD3d 1302, 1304 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 702 [2011]).When a taxpayer's records are insufficient to permit verification of sales and a complete audit,the Department may estimate the taxes due based upon "external indices" (Tax Law§ 1138 [a] [1]). "Where, as here, an indirect audit method has been employed, thetaxpayer challenging such an audit has the burden of establishing by clear and convincingevidence that the audit method or tax assessment was erroneous" (Matter of Wolkowicki v New York StateTax Appeals Trib., 136 AD3d 1223, 1228 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]). We find that petitioner did not satisfy that burden here, and we reject the contentionthat the methods used in conducting the audit and calculating the amount of tax due werearbitrary and capricious.
The record reveals that petitioner produced some business records in response to theDepartment's demand, but that certain purchase invoices were missing and there were gaps in thesales invoice numbers. The Department's auditor determined that the sales invoices thatpetitioner did produce matched the corresponding tax reports and returns, but that a detailed auditmethodology could not be employed because of the missing records. Further, petitioner's tobaccoproduct inventory was intermingled with that of Vikisha in the shared warehouse. Licensees arerequired by statute to "maintain a secure separate warehousing facility" for tobacco products (TaxLaw § 480 [1] [d]). Here, the commingled storage violated that requirement andprevented the Department from separating petitioner's products from Vikisha's for the purpose oftracing them from purchase through importation into New York and eventual sale. The auditornoted that petitioner did not supply inventory records that might have enabled the Department totrack the flow of products through the warehouse. Accordingly, the auditor determined that atotal accountability audit of purchase and sale transactions by both petitioner and Vikisha wasrequired. Due to the high level of detail that would be necessary to track all of the varieties oftobacco products sold by the two companies during the three-year audit period, the calendar year2005 was selected as a representative test period.
The Department requested petitioner's computerized sales records for the audit, but petitionerdeclined to produce them. Shah explained at the subsequent administrative hearing thatpetitioner's computer system combined records from several business entities in such a fashionthat petitioner's individual records could not be separated. The Department thereforesupplemented petitioner's incomplete records by making third-party requests to tobacco supplierswho had made sales to petitioner and Vikisha. The responses revealed that the records receivedfrom petitioner and Vikisha were incomplete in many respects; they showed, among other things,that multiple sales had taken place of products for which no purchase invoices had been providedto the Department, and that at least one supplier had made purchases from Vikisha and/orpetitioner that were not reflected in the sales information that they had produced. The third-partyresponses revealed that petitioner and Vikisha had purchased far more tobacco products than theyreported having sold. The investigation also revealed several "circular" transactions in whichpetitioner and/or Vikisha had made sales of tobacco products to other distributors and then hadbought them back almost immediately for the same price; the auditor testified that thesetransactions were highly unusual and could indicate a scheme to avoid payment of tobaccotaxes.
In the absence of inventory records, it was impossible to determine what had become of[*3]the unaccounted-for products; based upon the auditor'sexperience with the high perishability and short shelf life of tobacco products, the Departmentpresumed that the missing products had been sold rather than retained in inventory. New Jerseyhad conducted an audit of petitioner's tobacco product inventory between 2002 and 2006 and hadfound no additional tax due. Accordingly, the Department concluded that the unaccounted-forproduct purchases that exceeded the total reported sales in New Jersey and New York had notbeen sold in New Jersey, but had instead been imported into New York and sold there. Thus,after deducting all transactions upon which taxes had been paid in New York and New Jersey,the Department estimated a total monthly sum based upon the unaccounted-for purchases,extrapolated that amount to the entire audit period, and estimated the resulting tax due.
Shah and petitioner's accountant testified at the administrative hearing, conceding thatpetitioner's tobacco products were commingled with those of Vikisha in the shared warehouseand that petitioner was unable to provide all of the sales records that the Department requested,but nevertheless asserting that all necessary records to permit a full audit were made availableand that no tobacco products were ever sold in New York without payment of proper taxes.However, petitioner's witnesses were unable to explain the discrepancies discovered by theDepartment in petitioner's records, nor did they show that the products that had not beenaccounted for were retained in inventory or otherwise disposed of without selling them in NewYork. Considering the record evidence as a whole, we find that the methods used to calculatepetitioner's tax assessment were "reasonably calculated to reflect the taxes due" (Matter ofIanniello v New York Tax Appeals Trib., 209 AD2d 740, 742 [1994]; accord Matter ofWolkowicki v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 136 AD3d at 1229-1230), and thatpetitioner did not "meet its heavy burden" to establish that the methods used were unreasonableor inaccurate (Matter of Hwang v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 105 AD3d at1153-1154).[FN*]Accordingly, the Tribunal properly upheld the tax assessment.
We reject petitioner's challenge to the penalty imposed pursuant to Tax Law§ 481 (1) (a) (i) and (ii). The Tribunal canceled the penalty originally imposed forfraud on the ground that the Department had not established the necessary willful intent(see Tax Law § 481 [1] [a] [iv]). The Tribunal further found that where, ashere, the Department gives notice in its answer to a taxpayer of its intention to assert a latepayment penalty as an alternative to a fraud penalty, the burden shifts to the Department to provethe taxpayer's willful neglect, and that the Department met this burden by demonstrating thatpetitioner's underpayment had resulted from "a conscious, intentional failure or recklessindifference" (United States v Boyle, 469 US 241, 245 [1985]; see Tax Law§ 481 [1] [a] [i], [ii], [iii]). The Tribunal premised its willful neglect determinationon petitioner's failure to maintain a separate and secure warehouse for its tobacco products,despite the statutory requirement that it do so, as well as the multiple deficiencies identified in itsbooks and records, such as its failures to keep separate electronic records for each related entity,to properly document transfers between petitioner and Vikisha, and to maintain all of its purchaseinvoices. This Court's review of this issue is limited to ensuring that "the penaltydetermination[*4][is] supported by substantial evidence and is notarbitrary or capricious" (Matter of CS Integrated, LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of State ofN.Y., 19 AD3d at 889). Upon review of the administrative record, we find no basis to annulthe Tribunal's determination that a penalty for willful neglect was appropriate.
Petitioner further asserts that the sum of the penalty was not properly recalculated in accordwith the statute (see Tax Law § 481 [1] [a] [i], [ii]), and that the Departmentcontinued to demand payment of the fraud penalty and subsequently demanded an increased sum.Respondent Commissioner of Taxation and Finance concedes that petitioner was mistakenlybilled for the fraud penalty, as a result of an administrative error. At oral argument, theCommissioner represented to this Court that the penalty has been recalculated in accord with thestatutory directive and that petitioner's counsel has been informally advised of the newlycalculated amount. The Commissioner further asserts that collection efforts have been suspendedduring this proceeding and that, when they resume, petitioner will receive formal notification ofthe corrected penalty amount. Given these circumstances, we perceive no need to remit forrecalculation. Finally, petitioner's contention that it is entitled to counsel fees pursuant to 22NYCRR 130-1.1 for respondents' alleged bad faith in failing to correct the penalty error earlier isnot properly before this Court, as it was raised for the first time in petitioner's reply brief (see Matter of Rosenfelder [CommunityFirst Holdings, Inc.—Commissioner of Labor], 137 AD3d 1438, 1440[2016]).
McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Rose and Aarons, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *:Petitioner asserts that theDepartment should be equitably estopped from basing its determination upon petitioner'simproper use of the shared warehouse, as the Department allegedly took no action whenpetitioner reported this shared usage within its 2002 license application. However, this contentionwas not raised at the administrative level and may not be considered by this Court (see Matterof Karay Rest. Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib., 274 AD2d 854, 856 [2000], lv denied 96NY2d 702 [2001]).