| Matter of Rodriguez v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 01546 [82 AD3d 1302] |
| March 3, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Rafael Rodriguez, as Officer of Alvin's Wine &Liquor, Inc. Petitioner, v Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.
Kavanagh, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to TaxLaw § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal which, amongother things, determined that petitioner filed a willfully false or fraudulent return with intent toevade tax.
In 1997, petitioner, who owns and operates Alvin's Wine and Liquor, Inc. in Bronx County,received notification from the Department of Taxation and Finance that it would perform anaudit of sales tax returns filed on behalf of the business for the three-year period beginning inDecember 1994. As part of the audit, petitioner was requested to provide all records regardingpurchases and sales made by the business during this three-year period, including financialstatements, journals, cash register tapes, ledgers, sales and purchase invoices, as well as copies ofsales and federal income tax returns and exemption certificates. Petitioner provided some data,but claimed that he did not have cash register receipts or sales invoices for transactionsconducted during this three-year period. Ultimately, the audit was completed and, after the BronxCounty District Attorney's office declined to initiate a criminal prosecution, the Department, inAugust 2006, issued notices of determination that concluded that the business owed $104,785.72in sales tax, plus interest and a $194,592.58 penalty for filing a fraudulent tax [*2]return. A conciliation conference was held and an order was issuedreducing the amount owed in taxes to $94,311.35, plus interest and applicable penalties.
After petitioner sought review of this determination by the Division of Tax Appeals, ahearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge who found that the Department had failedto prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner deliberately filed fraudulent tax returnson behalf of the business and any assessment sought to be imposed for additional sales taxclaimed to be owed for this time period was barred by the three-year statute of limitations(see Tax Law § 1147 [b]). The Division filed an exception to this determinationwith respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal, which subsequently reversed the Administrative LawJudge's determination, finding that clear and convincing evidence had been produced establishingthat petitioner had deliberately understated the amount of the business's sales tax liability andintentionally filed fraudulent tax returns. Petitioner then commenced this proceeding seekingreview of the Tribunal's determination.
The principal issues raised by this proceeding are whether substantial evidence exists tosupport the determination that clear and convincing evidence has been presented at the hearingthat petitioner filed fraudulent tax returns (see Tax Law § 689 [e] [1]; Matter of Revere v Commissioner ofTaxation & Fin., 75 AD3d 860, 862 [2010]; Matter of Kucherov v Chu, 147AD2d 877, 877-878 [1989]; cf. Matter of Clapes v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 34AD3d 1092, 1093-1094 [2006], appeal dismissed 8 NY3d 975 [2007]), and whether themethod used by the Department to perform the audit and calculate the amount of petitioner's taxassessment was reasonable (see Matter of Karay Rest. Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib., 274AD2d 854, 856 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 702 [2001]). Initially, we note that no directevidence has been presented establishing that petitioner filed these returns with a fraudulentintent. However, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove that a taxpayer has deliberatelyfiled a fraudulent tax return (see Matter of Nelson, 2010 WL 2345601, 2010 NY TaxLEXIS 95 [DTA No. 822547, June 3, 2010]; Matter of Wild Ginger, LLC, 2010 WL1844804, 2010 NY Tax LEXIS 71 [DTA Nos. 821633 & 821634, Apr. 29, 2010]; see alsoKorecky v C.I.R., 781 F2d 1566, 1568 [11th Cir 1986] [tax fraud "need not be established bydirect evidence, but can be shown by surveying the taxpayer's entire course of conduct anddrawing reasonable inferences therefrom"]). With that observation, we begin our analysis of theevidence introduced at the hearing with petitioner's acknowledgment that he failed, as requiredby the Tax Law, to keep records that would have assisted the Department in arriving at anaccurate assessment of the business's tax liability (see Tax Law § 1135 [a] [1];see also 20 NYCRR 533.2). Not only did petitioner not have cash register receipts fortransactions that occurred each day on the premises, but he claimed at the hearing that heroutinely tracked the daily sales activities of the business "in [his] head" by simply counting whatmoney remained in the cash register at the end of each business day.
Moreover, petitioner retained an accountant to prepare and file these returns, even though hedid not have records that would accurately track the amount of sales made in the business duringthis period. Petitioner admits learning, albeit belatedly, that many of the entries made in thesereturns by the accountant were estimates not based on hard data, and acknowledges never filingamended returns designed to address these errors and correct them. Simply stated, petitioner'sfailure to produce reliable records regarding sales activities in the business during this periodhampered the Department's efforts to determine exactly what petitioner owed in sales tax and,more importantly, rendered it unable to verify petitioner's claim that he acted in good faith whenhe filed these tax returns. As a result, the Department was compelled to employ an indirect auditmethodology to determine the gross income generated by the business and, in particular, the[*3]income it derived from the sale of merchandise made duringthis three-year period. This audit included an analysis of relevant entries made by petitioner in hisfederal income tax returns as well as an examination of purchase invoices obtained by theDepartment from wholesalers who sold merchandise to the business during this time period.Using this data, the Department determined that petitioner spent $1,321,000 for merchandise forthe business during this three-year audit period, or more than three times what he claimed that thebusiness grossed in sales ($406,018) for the same time period.
No one disputes that serious errors were made in these tax returns and that they did notaccurately reflect the business's sales tax liability for this period. Petitioner also does not denythat he derived a significant financial benefit from the errors made in these tax returns, butdisavows any responsibility for them. Instead, he places full blame for any errors or mistakesmade in these tax returns on the accountant he retained to prepare them. Petitioner explains thathe is an "unsophisticated" businessman who routinely left the details surrounding tax mattersinvolving the business to others. However, petitioner has been a sole proprietor who has operatedhis own business for some time prior to the audit and, before opening this liquor store, ownedand operated a small grocery store. This evidence—the failure to provide reliable records,the significant difference that exists between what petitioner spent for merchandise and what heclaimed in these tax returns to have sold in the business for the identical time period, thefinancial benefit he derived from these false returns, and his failure to remedy these errors afterhe became aware of them—when considered as an integrated whole, provides a substantialbasis for the Tribunal's conclusion that petitioner willfully and intentionally filed false sales taxreturns for the purpose of deliberately underreporting the sales tax owed by his business for theaudit period (see Matter of AAA Sign Co., Tax Appeals Tribunal [DTA No. 800496,June 22, 1989]).
Petitioner also argues that the method used to determine his tax assessment did not take intoaccount certain factors that, if included in the Department's calculation, would have resulted in a"significant reduction of the estimated total sales and subsequent assessment." These factorsinclude, among others, pilferage and breakage of inventory, lower prices the business was forcedto charge for its merchandise because of the neighborhood in which it was located, the "bill andhold" process that petitioner claims he was compelled to use in the daily operation of his businessand the Department's refusal as part of the audit to inventory the merchandise that was on thepremises. Of course, it was petitioner's inability to produce reliable records that forced theDepartment to employ this audit methodology, and any complaints he may have had about it haveto be viewed in that context (see Tax Law § 1135 [a] [1]; 20 NYCRR 533.2;Matter of Center Moriches Monument Co. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 211AD2d 947, 947 [1995]; see also Matter of Roebling Liqs. v Commissioner of Taxation &Fin., 284 AD2d 669, 671-672 [2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 637 [2001], certdenied 537 US 816 [2002]; Matter of Hygrade Casket Corp. v Commissioner of Taxation& Fin., 212 AD2d 843, 845 [1995]). Moreover, the burden is on petitioner to establish byclear and convincing evidence that the selected method and the resulting assessment wasunreasonable (see Matter of Karay Rest. Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib., 274 AD2d at 856;Matter of Center Moriches Monument Co. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 211AD2d at 948), and simply because " 'a different audit methodology might provide a more preciseestimate of tax liability' " does not mean that the method used was unreasonable (Matter of MacLeod v Megna, 75 AD3d928, 930 [2010], quoting Matter of Petak v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 217AD2d 807, 809 [1995]).
In that regard, petitioner, in addition to his own testimony, submitted an affidavit from aprior employee of a supplier who stated that petitioner had problems with deliveries made during[*4]the audit period. Significantly, petitioner failed to submit anydocumentary evidence to support his assertions regarding pilferage, breakage, reduced markupand limited sales (see Matter of Skiadas v State Tax Commn., 95 AD2d 971, 972[1983]). In our view, he has not met his burden to show that the methods used by the Departmentin its audit and its calculation of the tax assessment were unreasonable (compare Matter ofGrecian Sq. v New York State Tax Commn., 119 AD2d 948, 950 [1986]; Matter ofRistorante Puglia v Chu, 102 AD2d 348, 350-351 [1984]).
Peters, J.P., Spain, Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.