| Matter of Heights of Lansing, LLC v Village of Lansing |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02520 [160 AD3d 1165] |
| April 12, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of The Heights of Lansing, LLC, et al.,Appellants, v Village of Lansing et al., Respondents. |
True, Walsh & Sokoni, LLP, Ithaca (Khandikile Mvunga Sokoni of counsel), forappellants.
Barney Grossman Dubow & Troy, LLP, Ithaca (William J. Troy III of counsel), forrespondents.
Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Faughnan, J.), entered March 2,2017 in Tompkins County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 andaction for declaratory judgment, among other things, granted respondents' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the petition/complaint.
Petitioners are the owners and managers of real property located in a subdivision known asLansing Trails that is adjacent to a 19.5-acre parcel (hereinafter the subject property) that, since1989, had been classified as a business and technology district (hereinafter BTD). This zoningclassification was continued after respondent Village of Lansing first adopted a comprehensiveplan in accordance with Village Law § 7-722 in 1999 and after the comprehensiveplan was amended in 2015. In November 2016, respondents Donald Hartill, Ronny Hardaway,Gerry Monaghan, Patricia O'Rourke and John O'Neil, all members of the Village of LansingBoard of Trustees (hereinafter the Board), adopted Local Law No. 3 (2016) of the Village ofLansing (hereinafter Local Law No. 3), which rezoned the subject property as a high densityresidential district (hereinafter HDRD). Petitioners commenced this combined CPLR article 78proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge Local Law No. 3, arguing that it (1) wasadopted in violation of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8[hereinafter SEQRA]), (2) was not consistent with the comprehensive plan, and (3) constitutedillegal spot zoning. Respondents answered and then moved for summary judgment dismissing thepetition/complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the petition/complaint,[*2]and petitioners now appeal.
Initially, we reject petitioners' contention that Local Law No. 3 was enacted in violation ofSEQRA. "Judicial review of an agency determination under SEQRA is limited to whether theagency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, andmade a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination" (Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd.of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d 219, 231-232 [2007] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]). A determination "should be annulled only if it is arbitrary, capricious orunsupported by the evidence" (id. at 232).
The record confirms that prior to enacting Local Law No. 3, the Board, together with theVillage Planning Board, held a number of meetings during which public comments wereaccepted. In addition, the Board considered materials submitted by the developers intending toconstruct a 140-unit apartment complex on the subject property—including a traffic study,an engineering report and a rental housing needs study. With the benefit of such input, the Boarddeclared itself lead agency (see 6 NYCRR 617.6 [b] [1]), determined that the zoningchange was an unlisted action (see 6 NYCRR 617.2 [ak]; 617.6 [a] [1] [iv]) andcompleted the short environmental assessment form (hereinafter EAF) (see 6 NYCRR617.6 [a] [3]).
To complete the EAF, the Board concluded that the zoning change from commercial use toresidential use, as a "down zoning request," would not materially conflict with the Village'scomprehensive plan because, among other things, it was consistent with the Village'scommitment to controlled residential development and preserving the noncommercial characterof residential districts. Similarly, and because the rezoning would be consistent with existingland use, the Board determined that the zoning change (1) would have no impact on the quality orcharacter of the community, (2) would not promote the development of a critical environmentalarea, (3) would not increase energy use, (4) would not impact public or private water supplies orwastewater treatment facilities, (5) would not impact historic archaeological, architectural oraesthetic resources, (6) would not increase the potential for erosion, flooding or drainageproblems, and (7) would not create a hazard to environmental resources or human health. TheBoard also determined that there would be a minimal, though positive, impact on existing trafficpatterns because, even if the maximum number of residential units were built and occupied, thenumber of daily trips would be less than that which would be generated by continued commercialuse of the property. Similarly, the Board found that there would be a small and theoreticallybeneficial impact on the intensity of use because less land could be developed than if the subjectproperty remained zoned for commercial use. Following its review of the completed EAF, theBoard issued a negative declaration, determining that the rezoning would not have a significantadverse environmental impact (see 6 NYCRR 617.7 [b]).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that petitioners' claim that respondents' SEQRA reviewwas deficient because there was no consideration of the anticipated but not yet proposedresidential development is belied by the record. A lead agency "need not investigate everyconceivable environmental problem" during the course of SEQRA review (Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. vCommon Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 307 [2009]), and "generalizedcommunity objections or speculative environmental consequences" are not sufficient to establisha SEQRA violation (Matter of Village ofChestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 99 AD3d 918, 925-926 [2012] [citations omitted],lv dismissed and denied 20 NY3d 1034 [2013]). In our view, the Board identified andtook the requisite hard look at the areas of environmental concern prior to issuing its negativedeclaration (see Matter of Friends of theShawangunks, Inc. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Gardiner, 56 AD3d 883, 885[2008]). Supreme Court thus properly held that the SEQRA determination was not arbitrary,capricious or [*3]affected by an error of law (see Matter of Gabrielli v Town of NewPaltz, 116 AD3d 1315, 1318 [2014]; Matter of Citizens for Responsible Zoning v Common Council of City ofAlbany, 56 AD3d 1060, 1061-1062 [2008]).
Next, and contrary to petitioners' contention, the rezoning of the subject property from a BTDto an HDRD was not impermissible spot zoning nor was Local Law No. 3 adopted incontravention of the comprehensive plan (see Village Law § 7-722[11]).[FN*] As a legislativeact, a "zoning . . . amendment[ ] enjoy[s] a strong presumption of constitutionalityand the burden rests on the party attacking [it] to overcome that presumption beyond a reasonabledoubt" (Asian Ams. for Equality v Koch, 72 NY2d 121, 131 [1988]; see Matter of Rotterdam Ventures, Inc. vTown Bd. of the Town of Rotterdam, 90 AD3d 1360, 1361-1362 [2011]). A zoningamendment must, however, be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan (seeVillage Law § 7-722 [11]; Asian Ams. for Equality v Koch, 72 NY2d at131; Matter of BirchwoodNeighborhood Assn. v Planning Bd. of the Town of Colonie, 112 AD3d 1184, 1185[2013]). Accordingly, spot zoning—defined as "the process of singling out a small parcelof land for a use classification totally different from that of the surrounding area for the benefit ofthe owner of said property to the detriment of other owners"—is impermissible (Matterof Citizens for Responsible Zoning v Common Council of City of Albany, 56 AD3d at 1062[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Fundamentally, and relevant here, if a zoningamendment is consistent with the municipality's comprehensive plan, it is not spot zoning(see Terry Rice, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 63,Village Law § 7-722 at 45-46). A zoning amendment will be upheld if it isestablished that it was "adopted for a legitimate governmental purpose and . . . thereis . . . [a] reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved by the[amendment] and the means used to achieve that end" (Matter of Birchwood NeighborhoodAssn. v Planning Bd. of the Town of Colonie, 112 AD3d at 1185-1186 [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]).
The record confirms that the subject property is directly adjacent to areas zoned forresidential use and for commercial use. The Board noted that, consistent with the comprehensiveplan, rezoning the subject property from a BTD to an HDRD would create a better transitionbetween the two areas. Although petitioners argue that the proposed high-end residentialdevelopment does not further the expected need for affordable housing expressed in thecomprehensive plan, the zoning change does comport with the community's general need forrental housing and the goal—expressed in the plan—to encourage the developmentof "a broad range" of housing options, particularly for an aging population. In our view, LocalLaw No. 3 was consistent with the Village's comprehensive plan and was "calculated to benefitthe community as a whole as opposed to benefitting individuals or a group of individuals"(Asian Ams. for Equality v Koch, 72 NY2d at 131; see Matter of Daniels v VanVoris, 241 AD2d 796, 798 [1997]). Under the circumstances, petitioners have failed todemonstrate that the rezoning was arbitrary, unreasonable or unlawful (see Matter of Citizensfor Responsible Zoning v Common Council of City of Albany, 56 AD3d at 1062).
McCarthy, J.P., Clark, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs. [Prior Case History: 2017 NY Slip Op 30410(U).]
Footnote *:Because the legalissue—though not the statutory reference—was raised before Supreme Court, wereject respondents' argument that petitioners failed to preserve their argument that Local Law No.3 was enacted in violation of Village Law § 7-722 (see Geraci v Probst, 15 NY3d 336,342 [2010]).