| Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06965 [99 AD3d 918] |
| October 17, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge et al.,Respondents-Appellants, v Town of Ramapo et al., Appellants-Respondents, et al.,Respondents/Defendants. |
—[*1] Joseph J. Haspel, Goshen, N.Y., for respondent/defendant-appellant-respondent MosdosChofetz Chaim, Inc. Zarin & Steinmetz, White Plains, N.Y. (Michael D. Zarin and Jody T. Cross of counsel), forpetitioners/plaintiffs-respondents-appellants.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination ofthe Town Board of the Town of Ramapo dated June 15, 2004, issuing a negative declarationpursuant to the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL article 8), regardingthe enactment of Local Law No. 9 (2004) of the Town of Ramapo, subsequently repealed andsuperseded by Local Law No. 10 (2004) of the Town of Ramapo, and to review a determinationof the Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo dated November 30, 2004, issuing a negativedeclaration pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act regarding the application ofYeshiva Chofetz Chaim of Radin for site plan approval to construct adult student housing, andaction for a judgment declaring, among other things, that Local Law No. 9 (2004) of the Town ofRamapo is unconstitutional, (1) Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc., appeals from stated portions of ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.), entered March 1, 2010, which,inter alia, granted that branch of the amended petition which sought to annul the determinationdated November 30, 2004, issuing a negative declaration with respect to the application for siteplan approval to construct adult student housing on a site known as the Nike Site, and determinedthat Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc., did not acquire vested rights to its building permit, (2) theTown of Ramapo, the Town Board of the Town of Ramapo, the Planning Board of the Town ofRamapo, and the Board of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo separately appeal from so much ofthe same judgment as granted that branch of the amended petition which sought to annul thedetermination issuing a negative declaration with respect to the application for site plan approvalto construct adult student housing on the Nike Site, and failed to vacate a temporary restrainingorder dated September 11, 2007, as amended, and (3) the petitioners/plaintiffs cross-appeal, aslimited by their brief, from so [*2]much of the same judgment asdenied those branches of the petition which sought review of the determination of the TownBoard of the Town of Ramapo dated June 15, 2004, enacting Local Law No. 9 (2004) of theTown of Ramapo, on the grounds that it violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act,the General Municipal Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law, and because the Town Board ofthe Town of Ramapo lacked authority to enact that local law, and declared that Local Law No. 9(2004) of the Town of Ramapo and the provisions of Local Law No. 10 (2004) of the Town ofRamapo, which incorporated the provisions of Local Law No. 9 (2004) of the Town of Ramapo,do not constitute impermissible spot zoning.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the sixth, seventh, ninth, andtenth decretal paragraphs thereof, and substituting therefor provisions denying that branch of theamended petition, as set forth in the thirteenth cause of action, which sought to review thedetermination dated November 30, 2004, issuing a negative declaration pursuant to the StateEnvironmental Quality Review Act with respect to the application for site plan approval toconstruct adult student housing on the Nike Site, that determination is confirmed, the thirteenthcause of action is dismissed on the merits, and the temporary restraining order dated September11, 2007, as amended, is vacated; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealedand cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs payable by the petitioners/plaintiffs to the Townof Ramapo, the Town Board of the Town of Ramapo, the Planning Board of the Town ofRamapo, and the Board of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo.
This case involves a challenge to an enactment by the Town of Ramapo of zoning provisionsknown as the Adult Student Housing Law (hereinafter the ASHL), permitting the erection andmaintenance of multi-family housing for adult married students, pursuant to special permit, inresidential zones located in unincorporated areas of the Town. First enacted in June 2004 asLocal Law No. 9 (2004) of the Town of Ramapo (hereinafter LL No. 9), the ASHL affected fourparcels of real property, including an area known as the Nike Site. In November 2004, LL No. 9,along with the Town's entire zoning law, was repealed, and replaced with a new zoninglaw—Local Law No. 10 (2004) of the Town of Ramapo (hereinafter LL No.10)—which incorporated the provisions of LL No. 9. The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafterthe petitioners) also challenged the Town's enactment of LL No. 10 and the granting ofpermission to construct 60 units of adult student housing on the Nike Site based, inter alia, onalleged violations of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL article 8; hereinafterSEQRA). The petitioners' contentions focus primarily upon the facts that LL No. 9 was adoptedby the Town Board of the Town of Ramapo (hereinafter the Town Board) after the issuance of anegative declaration under SEQRA adopted June 15, 2004, and that the site plan for the Nike Sitewas approved by the Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo (hereinafter the Town PlanningBoard) after the issuance of a negative declaration adopted November 30, 2004. A negativedeclaration is "a written determination by a lead agency that the implementation of the action asproposed will not result in any significant adverse environmental impacts" (6 NYCRR 617.2 [y]).
The Nike Site was purchased in 1997 by Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim of Radin (hereinafter theYeshiva), the predecessor-in-interest to Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. (hereinafter Mosdos). Priorto the enactment of the ASHL, the Yeshiva applied for site plan approval to use the Nike Site asa religious school and community center, with dormitories consisting of 44 units in the 12pre-existing residential buildings. On July 3, 2003, the County of Rockland Department ofPlanning (hereinafter the Rockland County Planning Department) disapproved the project, citinga letter dated July 3, 2003, from the Village of New Hempstead, which described the project as a"housing development" for persons of a particular faith, and citing concerns relating to traffic andcommunity character.
Meanwhile, the Town had authorized the preparation of an updated Comprehensive Plan,which had not been substantially revised since 1978, in order to address, inter alia, zoning in theunincorporated areas of the Town. The Town retained an independent consulting firm, whichprepared a Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement. After a public hearing, a proposal foradult student housing for married students and their families while the students continued theirpostsecondary education was added to the final version of the [*3]Comprehensive Plan adopted on January 29, 2004. TheComprehensive Plan noted that "a critical consideration" was the need to provide "a properbalance between the need for married student housing and the community's interest inminimizing impacts to neighboring areas."
Thereafter, in accordance with the new Comprehensive Plan, the Town considered a specificzoning amendment, later enacted as LL No. 9, to "permit adult student housing as a conditionaluse [by special permit] in all residential zones," as an accessory to an approved postsecondaryeducational institution on the same site. With respect to this proposal, an environmentalassessment form (hereinafter the EAF) was prepared, which stated that the proposal "will notresult in any large and important impact(s) and, therefore, is one which will not have a significantimpact on the environment." The EAF identified the four potential sites for such development,which included the Nike Site, and stated that "[e]ach site identified will require a completeenvironmental review as part of the standard site plan approval process." With respect to theNike Site, the EAF noted that it was adjacent to a "public school site with thick vegetativebuffers to the south and west." Since the Nike Site was an "island site" located on the Town'sborder with the Villages of New Hempstead and Wesley Hills, the EAF concluded that it was"not possible to create a buffer from the Village boundaries." With respect to traffic, the EAFstated that "[s]ince the students by definition are full time, most of them will remain on site forthe majority of the day," generating fewer vehicle trips than the general population.
The Rockland County Planning Department recommended modifications to this proposedamendment to the zoning law, which were, for the most part, adopted. On June 15, 2004, theTown Board, as lead agency, issued a negative declaration, which determined that enactment ofthe ASHL was a Type I action for the purposes of review under SEQRA, which presumptivelydoes not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement (hereinafter EIS) (see6 NYCRR 617.4) and, upon review of the EAF, concluded that "the proposed action will notresult in any significant adverse impacts on the environment." After adopting the negativedeclaration, the Town Board unanimously adopted LL No. 9.
Thereafter, a draft of the Town's comprehensive new zoning law was completed, as well as aDraft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement referable to the comprehensive rezoning.After a public hearing on September 27, 2004, a Final Supplemental Environmental ImpactStatement (hereinafter the FSEIS) was adopted by the Town Board in a resolution datedNovember 22, 2004, along with a SEQRA Findings Statement. Upon the adoption of the FSEISand the SEQRA Findings Statement, the new comprehensive zoning law, which was known asLL No. 10, and which incorporated the provisions of LL No. 9, was unanimously adopted by theTown Board.
Meanwhile, prior to the adoption of LL No. 9 and LL No. 10, the Yeshiva had filed a revisedsite plan referable to the Nike Site, and an EAF with respect to the revised site plan. On April 15,2004, the Rockland County Planning Department disapproved the site plan as "premature,"noting that, although the Town had acknowledged the need for adult student housing in the newComprehensive Plan, it had not addressed the issue with appropriate zoning regulations.
In support of the revised site plan, and in response to traffic concerns, the Yeshiva submitteda "Traffic Impact Study" prepared by an engineering consultant, which concluded that the project"will not result in a significant negative impact on the area roadways." The study noted that therewas a problematic unsignalled intersection at Grandview Avenue and Union Road/NewHempstead Road, which was currently operating at the highest level of delay, "level F," duringthe morning peak hour, and would continue to operate at level F during the morning peak hourwhether or not the project was built. However, the additional traffic generated from the Nike Siteproject at this particular intersection was estimated at 16 vehicles during the morning peak hourand 16 vehicles during the evening peak hour, or 1.5% of the total, which was less than theexpected normal growth of 2% per year. In November 2004, the Traffic Impact Study wasupdated with respect to the Grandview Avenue and Union Road/New Hempstead Roadintersection, to note that overall traffic volume was similar to traffic volume documented in theoriginal study, and that the project [*4]would not have adetrimental impact on the intersections that were evaluated.
On November 30, 2004, after a public hearing, the Town Planning Board adopted a negativedeclaration which characterized the Nike Site plan as an "unlisted" action for purposes of reviewunder SEQRA, that is, an action for which there is no presumption as to whether an EIS shouldor should not be prepared and circulated. The negative declaration cited the traffic impactstudies, which indicated that "the proposed housing will not have a detrimental impact onGrandview Avenue or the other intersections evaluated," and stated that "[b]y its nature as a selfcontained educational facility, traffic is minimized." The negative declaration further noted that"[t]o facilitate circulation along Grandview Avenue, a barrier separated, off road, bus stop hasbeen proposed to allow traffic to continue while buses load and unload." With respect tocommunity character, the negative declaration stated that the site plan provided forsix-to-eight-foot-long plantings along the front and rear lot lines, and layers of Norway sprucesalong the side yards, to isolate the site from its neighbors. On the frontage along GrandviewAvenue, the site plan provided for a decorative metal fence between two stone pillars. The ASHLpermitted the construction of 75 dwelling units pursuant to special permit, but the site plan wasfor only 60 units.
The instant hybrid proceeding and action challenging LL No. 9 was commenced in October2004, and, upon repeal of that law, an amended petition was filed in December 2004, challengingthe superseding law, LL No. 10. In support of the amended petition, the petitioners submitted anaffidavit from a professional engineer, stating that, in his opinion, adult student housing wouldgenerate two to five times the traffic of single-family housing. He noted that there was norequirement in the ASHL that resident students take courses at the school on the Nike Site, andthat, therefore, the adult students could take courses elsewhere, such as Rockland CountyCommunity College, which would require a vehicular commute to school.
In an order and judgment entered August 23, 2005, the Supreme Court dismissed theproceeding insofar as asserted on behalf of the Villages of Chestnut Ridge, the Village ofMontebello, the Village of Pomona, the Village of Wesley Hills, Milton Shapiro, and SonyaShapiro, on the ground that the villages lacked the capacity to sue, and the villages and theShapiros lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the two remainingpetitioners had standing, and granted them a preliminary injunction during the pendency of theproceeding and action barring any approvals or issuances of building permits, and barring anyconstruction at the Nike Site or any other site pursuant to LL No. 10. The preliminary injunctionlapsed when those petitioners failed to post an undertaking. The other petitioners appealed to thisCourt, and thereafter moved in this Court to enjoin all construction work pending appeal. Thatmotion was denied by decision and order on motion of this Court dated August 22, 2006. Whilethe appeal was pending, the 60 units were 99% completed.
On appeal, this Court modified the order and judgment, and reinstated the causes of actionchallenging LL No. 9, LL No. 10, and the Nike Site plan (see Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45 AD3d74 [2007]). Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued a memorandum decision dated December8, 2009, addressing the merits of the petitioners' contentions. The Supreme Court reasoned thatthe Town's issuance of a negative declaration with respect to LL No. 9 was not arbitrary andcapricious since, inter alia, the "existing traffic level was found to have minimal negative impact"with respect to the Nike Site and another affected site, and impacts to community characterwould be small to moderate, since density would be limited to 16 units per acre. The SupremeCourt further concluded that the Town did not violate SEQRA in its environmental review priorto the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan and the ASHL, as incorporated in LL No. 10.
With respect to the site plan for the Nike Site, the Supreme Court concluded that, althoughthe water and sewer studies were adequate, the Town Planning Board, as lead agency, "failed toadequately address relevant potential impacts from the site, in particular, the character of thecommunity and the impact on traffic." The Supreme Court explained that it was remitting thematter to the Town Planning Board for preparation and circulation of an environmental impactstatement. Further, the Supreme Court rejected Mosdos's claim that it had acquired vested rights[*5]in its building permit for the Nike Site, explaining thatMosdos was aware that the petitioners had moved for injunctive relief. On March 1, 2010, theSupreme Court entered judgment in accordance with the decision.
On appeal, Mosdos contends that, contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, itacquired vested rights in its building permit, pursuant to which the construction at the Nike Sitewas substantially completed during this litigation. As a consequence, Mosdos contends that thepetitioners' arguments with respect to the Nike Site plan have been rendered academic (see Matter of Citineighbors Coalition ofHistoric Carnegie Hill v New York City Landmarks Preserv. Commn., 2 NY3d 727, 730[2004]; Matter of Dreikausen v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 98 NY2d165, 174 [2002]). This contention is without merit. Although the preliminary injunction issued bythe Supreme Court lapsed owing to the failure of several of the petitioners to post the requiredundertaking, the remaining petitioners sought injunctive relief in this Court, which was denied.Thus, these petitioners put Mosdos on notice that construction was undertaken at its own risk (see Matter of Schupak v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town of Marbletown, 31 AD3d 1018, 1020 [2006]; Matter of E & J Sylcox Realty, Inc. v Townof Newburgh Planning Bd., 12 AD3d 445, 446 [2004]).
Turning to the merits, the Town Planning Board, as lead agency, determined that the site planapplication was an "[u]nlisted action" (6 NYCRR 617.2 [ak]). If an action is designated a Type Iaction, there is "the presumption that it is likely to have a significant adverse impact on theenvironment and may require an EIS" (6 NYCRR 617.4 [a] [1]). However, an unlisted actiondoes not involve that presumption (see Matter of Terrace Manor Civic Assn. v Town of N.Hempstead, 301 AD2d 534, 535 [2003]). An environmental impact statement is onlyrequired if the "proposed action included the potential for at least one significant adverseenvironmental impact" (Matter ofCenter of Deposit, Inc. v Village of Deposit, 90 AD3d 1450, 1453 [2011]). "[W]here thelead agency, after taking a 'hard look' at relevant environmental concerns, determines that theproject will have no significant adverse environmental impacts, and issues a negative declarationto that effect, the EIS may be dispensed with as unnecessary, even for a Type I action" (Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Poquott vCahill, 11 AD3d 536, 540 [2004]).
"Judicial review of a lead agency's negative declaration is limited to 'whether the agencyidentified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a "hard look" at them, and made a"reasoned elaboration" of the basis for its determination' " (Matter of New York CityCoalition to End Lead Poisoning v Vallone, 100 NY2d 337, 348 [2003], quoting Matterof Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417 [1986]). The issuebefore the court is whether the negative declaration was affected by an error of law, arbitrary andcapricious, or an abuse of discretion (seeMatter of Baker v Village of Elmsford, 70 AD3d 181, 187 [2009]). Upon judicialreview, "a court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the agency on substantivematters" (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 571 [1990]).
In making its determination, the Town Planning Board was not required to accept theopinions of the petitioners' experts over those of its own consultants (see Matter of Thorne v Village ofMillbrook Planning Bd., 83 AD3d 723, 725-726 [2011]). Further, generalizedcommunity objections (see Matter ofHells Kitchen Neighborhood Assn. v City of New York, 81 AD3d 460, 462 [2011]) orspeculative environmental consequences (see Matter of Chinese Staff & Workers' Assn. v Burden, 88 AD3d425, 433 [2011], affd 19 NY3d 922 [2012]) are insufficient to challenge the Town'senvironmental review. Although a negative declaration adopted "without reference to anyempirical or experimental data, scientific authorities, or any explanatory information, andconsist[ing] of conclusory statements" may be annulled (Matter of Serdarevic v Town of Goshen, 39 AD3d 552, 554[2007]), and strict compliance with the procedural requirements of SEQRA is mandated (seeMatter of New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v Vallone, 100 NY2d at 347-348;Matter of Riverso v Rockland CountySolid Waste Mgt. Auth., 96 AD3d 764 [2012]), "[a]n agency's responsibility underSEQRA must be viewed in light of a 'rule of reason' " (Matter of Neville v Koch, 79NY2d 416, 425 [1992]).
In setting aside the negative declaration with respect to the Nike Site plan, the SupremeCourt identified two issues of environmental concern: traffic and community character. TheSupreme Court's conclusion that the negative declaration with respect to the Nike Site plan was[*6]arbitrary and capricious is inconsistent with its conclusionthat the negative declaration with respect to LL Law No. 9 was not arbitrary and capricious,based, inter alia, on findings with respect to the Nike Site and another affected site that the"existing traffic level was found to have minimal negative impact," and impacts to communitycharacter would be small to moderate, since density would be limited to 16 units per acre.
The Supreme Court cited the fact that the Rockland County Planning Department raisedconcerns with respect to those issues, which was a relevant consideration (see Matter ofScenic Hudson v Town of Fishkill Town Bd., 258 AD2d 654, 656-657 [1999]). However,the Rockland County Planning Department disapproved the Nike Site plan in April 2004 as"premature," prior to the updated traffic study that was completed in November 2004. Theoriginal and updated traffic impact studies submitted to the Town Planning Board, and cited in itsnegative declaration, indicated that the project would not have a significant detrimental impact,and the projected increase in traffic at the problematic intersection of Grandview Avenue andUnion Road/New Hempstead Road at peak hours would equate to an increase in traffic of lessthan 1.5%, representing less that the normal background traffic growth expected of 2% per year.In addition, the Nike Site plan contained a mitigating feature, consistent with the special permitrequirements of the ASHL, for a barrier-separated, off-road bus stop to facilitate circulationalong Grandview Avenue while school buses are loading. The petitioners' expert's concern thatthe educational facility was not as self-contained as it purported to be, since the adult studentscould take courses elsewhere, such as Rockland County Community College, and that this mightrequire a vehicular commute to school, was purely speculative (see Matter of Chinese Staff &Workers' Assn. v Burden, 88 AD3d at 433).
With respect to community character, we note that the educational facility on the Nike Site isnext to a public school and storage facility. The Town's border with the Village of Wesley Hills,which was the only party with standing to challenge the site plan, is located across GrandviewAvenue, which is a county road. Significantly, the site plan minimized any adverse impacts oncommunity character by providing for substantial landscaping and aesthetic design (see Matter of East Moriches Prop. Owners'Assn., Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhaven, 66 AD3d 895, 896 [2009]). Further,the restriction of residential use to adult, married full-time students, their spouses, their children,and faculty members insured that the Nike Site retained its character as an educational institution,and did not become a "housing development." Under the circumstances of this case, the TownPlanning Board gave "due consideration to pertinent environmental factors" (Akpan vKoch, 75 NY2d at 571), and adopted a negative declaration based upon reasoned elaboration.
With respect to the challenge to the adult student housing provisions of the Town's zoninglaw, those provisions were enacted twice, once as LL No. 9, and then as part of LL No. 10, whichrepealed and superseded LL No. 9. The Town Board, as lead agency, concluded that theenactment of LL No. 9 was a Type I action. It adopted a negative declaration, upon concludingthat the local law had no significant adverse impact on the environment, and, thus, declined toprepare an EIS.
An EIS may usually be dispensed with in connection with a Type I action (see Matter ofIncorporated Vil. of Poquott v Cahill, 11 AD3d at 540). Further, since LL No. 9 was repealedand superseded by provisions of LL No. 10, the question of whether SEQRA procedures werefollowed in the enactment of LL No. 9 is not determinative of this controversy (see Matter ofYoung v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, 89 NY2d 846, 849 [1996]; Matter ofCitizens to Save Minnewaska, Socy. for Preserv. & Restoration of Ulster County Envt. v UlsterCounty, 85 AD2d 794 [1981]). LL No. 10 was enacted after a full environmental review,based upon several EISs, including the FSEIS, which responded to the comments made at apublic hearing, as well as written comments submitted to the Town Board. Moreover, theSupreme Court correctly concluded that there was no improper segmentation of environmentalreview (see Matter of Settco, LLC v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 305 AD2d 1026,1027 [2003]; Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow,292 AD2d 617, 620-621 [2002]).
Mosdos's contentions with respect to its counterclaims are beyond the scope of its limitednotice of appeal, and the counterclaims remain pending and undecided. Therefore, those [*7]contentions are not properly before this Court (see 111-38 Mgt. Corp. v Benitez, 70AD3d 911, 912 [2010]; Siegel vLandy, 34 AD3d 556, 557 [2006]; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536, 542-543 [1979]).
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit, or need not be addressed in light of ourdetermination. Angiolillo, J.P., Belen, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.