People v Votaw
2021 NY Slip Op 00341 [190 AD3d 1162]
January 21, 2021
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 3, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Jonathan Votaw, Appellant.

Steven M. Sharp, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Vincent Stark of counsel), for respondent.

Aarons, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), rendered May17, 2019 in Albany County, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

In 2018, a state trooper made a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by defendant, the soleoccupant, who was operating the vehicle without a license. A subsequent K-9 search of thevehicle resulted in several alerts for narcotics. Among other things, a cell phone on the vehicledashboard was found with a quantity of heroin secreted in the battery compartment. Hiddenbehind the center console, troopers also found a plastic bag containing waxed baggies of heroinand a plastic bag containing a substance that field-tested positive for cocaine. Defendant wasarrested and charged by indictment with two counts of criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree based upon his possession of cocaine, and criminal possession of acontrolled substance in the third and seventh degrees based upon his possession of heroin.

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds (seeCPL 30.30). The People opposed the motion, indicating that a superseding indictment wasexpected shortly based upon forensic laboratory results establishing that the substance that hadfield-tested positive for cocaine was heroin. The People thereafter obtained a six-countsuperseding indictment on February 1, 2019, charging defendant with four counts of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree and two counts of criminal possession ofa controlled substance in the seventh degree—all of which were based upon his possessionof heroin in the vehicle. Supreme Court then denied defendant's motion to dismiss the originalindictment, finding that the People's April 12, 2018 declaration of readiness for trial at thearraignment on that indictment had not been illusory.[FN*]

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant, in 2019, pleaded guilty to criminal possessionof a controlled substance in the third degree under count 3 of the superseding indictment,admitting that he had knowingly possessed the heroin found in the cell phone batterycompartment with the intent to sell it. Under the terms of the plea agreement, defendantwithdrew all motions, waived further hearings on his pending motions and was required to waivehis right to appeal. In exchange, Supreme Court imposed the agreed-upon six-year prisonsentence to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision, as an acknowledged secondfelony offender. Defendant appeals.

We affirm. Contrary to defendant's arguments, his combined oral and written waiver ofappeal was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 559-561, 564 [2019]; People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337,340-341 [2015]; People v Lopez, 6NY3d 248, 256 [2006]). To that end, an appeal waiver was recited as a condition of the pleaagreement. Supreme [*2]Court made clear its separate anddistinct nature and answered defendant's questions. Defendant, assisted by counsel, also signed awritten waiver. As such, defendant's appeal waiver was valid (see People v Burnett, 186 AD3d 1837, 1837-1838 [2020])."[G]enerally, an appeal waiver will encompass any issue that does not involve a right ofconstitutional dimension going to the very heart of the process" (People v Lopez, 6 NY3dat 255 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) and, consequently, we have held that astatutory speedy trial claim is precluded by a valid appeal waiver (see People v Harrison, 176 AD3d1262, 1264 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1016 [2019]; People v Gardiner, 159 AD3d1233, 1234 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1082 [2018]; People v Devino, 110 AD3d 1146,1147 [2013]). We agree with the First Department that the enactment of CPL 30.30 (6) does notalter that analysis (see People vPerson, 184 AD3d 447, 447 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1069 [2020]; see also People v Acosta, 189 AD3d508, 508 [2020]). Accordingly, we find that, prospectively—for judgments rendered afterJanuary 1, 2020—"the phrase 'shall be reviewable' in CPL 30.30 (6) unequivocally directsthat appellate review of a CPL 30.30 claim shall no longer be forfeited by a guilty plea," but that"neither that phrase, nor any other language in the statute, precludes a voluntary waiver"(People v Person, 184 AD3d at 448, quoting CPL 30.30 [6]). As a consequence, we holdthat defendant's statutory speedy trial claim is precluded by his valid appeal waiver.

Defendant appears to further argue that his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated.Although this claim survives a guilty plea and waiver of appeal (see People v Callahan,80 NY2d 273, 282 [1992]), it is unpreserved for our review because it was not raised beforeSupreme Court (see People v Grays,179 AD3d 1149, 1150 [2020]; People v Marshall, 173 AD3d 1257, 1258 [2019]; People vGardiner, 159 AD3d at 1234; People v Grumberg, 153 AD3d 1525, 1526-1527 [2017]).Moreover, in the absence of a motion on this ground before Supreme Court, "the record has notbeen sufficiently developed to permit adequate review of this issue" (People v Grumberg,153 AD3d at 1527; see People v Grays, 179 AD3d at 1150). Finally, the plea agreementwas not impermissibly conditioned on waiving any constitutional speedy trial claim so as to fallwithin the mode of proceedings exception to the preservation rule (compare People v Hanley, 20 NY3d601, 605 n 2 [2013]; People v Blakley, 34 NY2d 311, 313-315 [1974]; People v Wright, 119 AD3d 972,973-974 [2014]). We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find that none hasmerit.

Egan Jr., J.P., Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that thejudgment is affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote *:Although defendant filed anomnibus motion directed at the original indictment and thereafter directed at the supersedingindictment, defendant's statutory speedy trial motion was directed at the original indictment anddeclaration of readiness and was not recast against the superseding indictment.


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