Rawlings v Rawlings
2008 NY Slip Op 03621 [50 AD3d 998]
April 22, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 18, 2008


John J. Rawlings, Respondent,
v
Catherine L. Rawlings,Appellant.

—[*1]Posner & Gaier, Hempstead, N.Y. (Greg Brosnan and Stephen Posner of counsel), forappellant.

Gassman, Baiamonte, Betts & Tannenbaum, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Stephen Gassman andCharlotte Betts of counsel), for respondent.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered December13, 2001, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Nassau County (Ross, J.), dated March 14, 2007, as denied those branches of her motionwhich were to enforce a provision in the parties' stipulation of settlement, which wasincorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce, requiring that the plaintiff transfer acertain individual retirement account to her within 30 days of the execution of the stipulation,and for an award of an attorney's fee.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, thosebranches of the defendant's motion which were to enforce the individual retirement accounttransfer provision in the stipulation of settlement and for an award of an attorney's fee aregranted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing todetermine the value, if any, of the subject individual retirement account at the time the plaintiffwas obligated to transfer it, and to determine the amount of the defendant's reasonable attorney'sfee, and for the entry of a money judgment accordingly.

During the pendency of their divorce action, the plaintiff husband and the defendant wifeexecuted a stipulation of settlement on August 3, 2001 settling all issues in the case. With respectto equitable distribution, the stipulation provided, inter alia, that the plaintiff possessed a FirstTrust IRA account with a stated value of $75,000, but that the assets held therein were subject tochange [*2]and were expected to be revalued to approximately$45,000 to $50,000. The stipulation further provided that the plaintiff was obligated to transferthe account to the wife "[w]ithin 30 days of the execution of this agreement."

The parties' stipulation of settlement was incorporated but not merged in their subsequentjudgment of divorce, entered December 13, 2001, which expressly directed them to comply withits terms. However, notwithstanding repeated requests by the wife and her counsel, the plaintifffailed to transfer the subject account. Indeed, he did not tender it to her until several yearsfollowing the execution of the stipulation, by which time it had become worthless. The defendantsubsequently moved, inter alia, to enforce the IRA transfer provision, to recover the reduction invalue of the account between the time it should have been transferred by the plaintiff and thetime it actually was transferred, and for an award of an attorney's fee. The Supreme Court deniedthose branches of the defendant's motion. We reverse.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendant properly moved to enforce the provisionof the stipulation requiring the transfer of the subject account (see Luisi v Luisi, 6 AD3d 398, 400[2004]; see e.g. Driscoll v Driscoll,45 AD3d 723 [2007]; Kendallv Kendall, 44 AD3d 827 [2007]; Zelenz v Zelenz, 43 AD3d 1157 [2007]). Moreover, since theparties agree that the account is now worthless, she is also entitled to recover the reduction invalue, if any, of the account since the time the plaintiff originally was required to transfer it to her(see generally Lang v Lang, 20AD3d 396 [2005]; Gomes v Gomes, 303 AD2d 454 [2003]). Accordingly, the mattermust be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing to determine the value ofthe account at that time.

Furthermore, the stipulation expressly provided that in the event either party defaulted incomplying with its terms, the defaulting party would be required to reimburse the non-defaultingparty for an attorney's fee incurred in enforcing the terms of the stipulation. Accordingly, uponremittitur, the defendant is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee under thecircumstances (see Mirkin v Mirkin,43 AD3d 1115 [2007]; Girardin v Girardin, 281 AD2d 457 [2001]). Mastro,J.P., Santucci, Eng and Belen, JJ., concur.


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