| Matter of Infante v Dignan |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07296 [55 AD3d 1258] |
| October 3, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of George Infante, as Administrator of the Estate ofRosemary A. Infante, Deceased, Appellant, v Caroline R. Dignan, M.D., as Medical Examiner ofMonroe County, et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Daniel M. DeLaus, Jr., County Attorney, Rochester (Michael E. Davis of counsel), forrespondents-respondents.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the Supreme Court, MonroeCounty (Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered March 16, 2007 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78. The judgment dismissed the petition.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law without costs,the petition is granted, the determination is annulled and respondents are directed to amend thecorrected death certificate of Rosemary A. Infante forthwith to state that the manner of death wasaccidental or undetermined circumstances.
Memorandum: Petitioner, as administrator of the estate of Rosemary A. Infante (decedent),commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination that the mannerof death of decedent was suicide and to compel respondents to determine that the manner ofdeath was accidental or undetermined circumstances. It is undisputed that the death of decedentwas caused by multiple drug intoxication and that, prior to her death, decedent had severalserious medical conditions for which she took multiple prescription medications. We note at theoutset that "[a] medical examiner's determination that a decedent committed suicide is aquasi-judicial determination . . . and, hence, is reviewable in a proceeding pursuantto CPLR article 78" (Matter of Leib v Paparo, 84 AD2d 538 [1981], lv denied 55NY2d 603 [1981]).
Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition and, instead, should have granted it inasmuchas the evidence before respondents was insufficient to rebut the presumption against suicide. It iswell established that "[t]he presumption [against suicide] springs from strong policyconsiderations [and also] embod[ies] natural probability" (Schelberger v Eastern Sav. Bank,60 NY2d 506, 510 [1983]; seegenerally Green v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 48 AD3d 37, 39 [2007]). Indeed,it is "one of the strongest presumptions in the law" (Schelberger v Eastern Sav. Bank, 93AD2d 188, 190 [1983], affd [*2]60 NY2d 506 [1983]),and it "constitutes a statement of public policy of broad application rather than prescribing ameans for resolving the competing claims to justice in an individual case" (Schelberger,60 NY2d at 510). "The presumption arises in recognition of the fact that self-destruction 'iscontrary to the general conduct of [hu]mankind' " (Schelberger, 93 AD2d at 192, quotingMallory v Travelers' Ins. Co., 47 NY 52, 54-55 [1871]), and "of the truth drawn fromgeneral human experience, that death by suicide is an improbability [and] that most [individuals]cling to life" (Wellisch v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 NY 178, 184 [1944]).
Although the presumption against suicide has most commonly been applied in the context ofan action to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy (see e.g. Schelberger, 60NY2d 506, 508 [1983]; Begley v Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 1 NY2d 530, 532[1956]; Wellisch, 293 NY 178, 180 [1944]), we nevertheless conclude that it should beapplied equally in the context of this proceeding seeking review of a medical examiner'sdetermination, particularly in view of the statement of the Court of Appeals that the presumptionis to be broadly applied (see Schelberger, 60 NY2d at 510). To conclude otherwise wouldbe to fail to recognize "the underlying nature and strength of the presumption"(Schelberger, 93 AD2d at 189), and to ignore the above-quoted language of the Court ofAppeals in Schelberger and Wellisch.
In support of the petition, petitioner submitted letters from two of decedent's personalfriends, both of whom are physicians, establishing that decedent was a former nun and a deeplyreligious individual who died at her home on Easter Sunday. According to thosefriends/physicians, it was difficult for decedent to manage the schedule required for the safeadministration of the multiple prescription medications. Those medications were prescribed forserious physical conditions, including cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, and cracked ribs and vertebraeresulting from a fall. The letters of the friends/physicians also described the deep commitment ofdecedent to her two young adopted daughters and her enthusiasm about planning for theirfutures. We note in particular that one of the letters set forth that suicide would have been"unthinkable" for decedent and that she would not have exposed her children "to the horror ofdiscovering their mother dead at home nor leave them with the legacy of another abandonment."In his reply to respondents' answer, petitioner also submitted a letter from decedent's treatingpsychiatrist stating that, prior to her death, decedent was not suicidal but, rather, she was happyto have her children with her and was planning for the future.
A medical examiner has the statutory responsibility and legal authority to "fully investigatethe essential facts concerning the death" (County Law § 674 [2]). Here, respondent DeputyMedical Examiner asserted in an opposing affirmation that he based his conclusion thatdecedent's death was a suicide primarily on the toxicology finding of a high heart bloodconcentration of Fluoxetine, a drug commonly known as Prozac. He also stated that he "becameaware" that decedent had a history of depression, was under the care of a psychiatrist and hadbeen hospitalized within the past six months for a prescription drug overdose, but he did notindicate the source of that information. Further, there is no indication in the record that heinterviewed decedent's family, friends or psychiatrist, that he considered decedent's religiousbackground, that he reviewed records concerning decedent's medical history, or that he evaluatedthe circumstances immediately preceding decedent's death. Indeed, respondents indicated in theiranswer to the petition that they were unaware that decedent was taking prescription medicationfor various medical conditions, although such information was available to them had they madeappropriate efforts to obtain it. We note in addition that the medication determined byrespondents to be present in decedent's body at an exceedingly high level was an antidepressant,although a narcotic pain reliever and a sleeping aid that had been prescribed for decedent wouldseem to have been a more likely choice for an intentional and lethal overdose.
In Schelberger, the Court of Appeals wrote in the context of a jury trial that "afinding of [*3]suicide is warranted only if the jury is satisfiedfrom the evidence, and taking into account the presumption against suicide, that no conclusionother than suicide may reasonably be drawn" (60 NY2d at 510). We conclude that the sameprinciple should be applied in reviewing a medical examiner's determination of the manner ofdeath. Here, the determination was based upon the autopsy and toxicology report as well asinformation concerning the scene of the death, i.e., that there were prescription medicationbottles on the floor near decedent, some of which were opened. We nevertheless conclude,however, based on the record before us, that the evidence from which the determination wasmade failed to rebut the presumption against suicide, and thus that the determination is arbitraryand capricious (cf. Leib, 84 AD2d 538 [1981]).
All concur except Scudder, P.J., and Hurlbutt, J., who dissent and vote to affirm in thefollowing memorandum.
Scudder, P.J., and Hurlbutt, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent because, in our view,Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition in reliance on the decision of the First Departmentin Matter of Mitchell v Helpern, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with nowriting (17 AD2d 922 [1962], affd 14 NY2d 817 [1964]). The petition inMitchell sought the same relief sought by petitioner herein, i.e., the expungement of theMedical Examiner's finding that the manner of death was suicide and the entry "in the recordsthat it was accidental" (id.). The standard of review applied by the First Department inMitchell was whether the determination of the cause of death was "arbitrary," i.e.,whether "no reasonable [person] would be expected to make it" (id.). The FirstDepartment determined that, although a reasonable view of "the medical and other facts" couldlead in the alternative to a finding of accident or suicide, or a finding that the cause of death wasunknown, a finding of suicide could not be considered arbitrary "even if . . . itmight be assumed [that the Medical Examiners] were mistaken" (id.). The FirstDepartment's reasoning in Mitchell comports with the well-established principle that thelimited role of the court in a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus to review isto determine "whether the agency determination was arbitrary and capricious or affected by anerror of law" (Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77NY2d 753, 758 [1991]; see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. ofCity of N.Y., 93 NY2d 361, 363 [1999]). Where there is a rational basis for theadministrative determination, it must be sustained (see Arrocha at 363; Matter ofBambeck v State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, Off. of Rent Admin., 129 AD2d 51,57-58 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 615 [1988]). The majority, however, ignores andindeed vitiates that fundamental rule of judicial deference to administrative determinations byimposing on a medical examiner the evidentiary presumption against suicide when exercising hisor her statutory function of determining "the cause of death, or . . . the means ormanner of death" (County Law § 674 [3] [a]).
We note in addition that the majority improperly relies on information set forth in documentsthat were submitted in support of the petition. Those documents were created approximately fourmonths after the final determination of suicide was made and thus could not have beenconsidered by the Deputy Medical Examiner in determining the manner of death. It is beyondcavil that "[j]udicial review of [an] administrative determination[ ] is confined to the facts andrecord adduced before the agency [or individual responsible for the determination]" (Matterof Yarbough v Franco, 95 NY2d 342, 347 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of World Buddhist Ch'An JingCtr., Inc. v Schoeberl, 45 AD3d 947, 951 [2007]).
We further note that the majority implicitly concedes that the facts disclosed to respondentDeputy Medical Examiner by the autopsy, the toxicology report and the investigation at the scenereasonably support the determination that the manner of death was suicide yet, after applying thepresumption against suicide to those facts, the majority nevertheless concludes that thedetermination is arbitrary and capricious. To be sure, the presumption against suicide is a strongone, and where it applies, i.e., in a contested evidentiary hearing such as the trial of an action torecover the proceeds of a life insurance policy, "a finding of suicide is warranted only if[*4]'no conclusion other than suicide may reasonably be drawn' " (Green v William Penn Life Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 48 AD3d 37, 40 [2007], mot to dismiss appeal denied 10 NY3d 892[2008], quoting Schelberger v Eastern Sav. Bank, 60 NY2d 506, 510 [1983]). Nothing inSchelberger or any other authority suggests, however, that the presumption againstsuicide should be applied by a medical examiner in discharging his or her administrative functionof determining "the means or manner" of an unattended death (County Law § 674 [3] [a];see also §§ 671, 673). The "public policy of broad application" languagequoted by the majority from Schelberger was used in that decision only in the context ofrejecting the contention of the defendant bank that issued the life insurance policy that, for policyreasons, the presumption against suicide should be revised (see Schelberger, 60 NY2d at510). Further, in our view, the statements in Matter of Leib v Paparo (84 AD2d 538[1981], lv denied 55 NY2d 603 [1981]) characterizing a medical examiner'sdetermination of suicide as "quasi-judicial" and noting that the presumption against suicide "wasovercome" are simply erroneous dicta, given that the Leib decision cites and indeedfollows Mitchell.
Finally, we note that, not only does the majority's decision utterly conflict with theblack-letter rule that an administrative determination that has a rational basis must be leftundisturbed, it also effectively precludes a medical examiner from performing his or heradministrative function, which is "to impart objective information to the appropriate authoritiesfor the benefit of the public at large" (Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95, 103[2000]). The majority is requiring a medical examiner to apply the presumption against suicide,but only in the rarest of cases will the evidence before a medical examiner yield no reasonableinference other than suicide (see e.g. Green, 48 AD3d at 40; Matter of Wiktorowicz vKimberly-Clark Corp., 99 AD2d 903, 904 [1984], lv denied 62 NY2d 605 [1984];Matter of Forbrick v Riverbay Corp., 87 AD2d 936, 937 [1982]). Thus, the practicaleffect of the majority's decision is that, in most cases, the outcome of a medical examiner'sdetermination will be foreordained, thus preventing the medical examiner from objectivelydetermining the cause of death or the means or manner of death pursuant to County Law §674 (3) (a). Here, the facts set forth in the verified petition, the letters and affidavit attached tothe petition, and the attachments to petitioner's brief on appeal all suggest that respondents'determination of suicide may well be mistaken, but they cannot and do not render thatdetermination arbitrary or irrational (see Mitchell, 17 AD2d 922 [1962]). In our view,rather than bringing this proceeding, petitioner should have sought a redetermination byrespondents based on those facts (see generally Lauer, 95 NY2d at 98). We thereforewould affirm the judgment. Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Centra, Fahey and Peradotto,JJ.