| People v Ryan |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00600 [59 AD3d 751] |
| February 5, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric D. Ryan,Appellant. |
—[*1] Derek P. Champagne, District Attorney (Glenn MacNeill of counsel), forrespondent.
Malone Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Franklin County (Rogers, J.),rendered March 21, 2008, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attemptedassault in the second degree.
Defendant agreed to plead guilty to attempted assault in the second degree in satisfaction ofa four-count indictment. Under the terms of the plea agreement, he waived his right to appealand was to receive a sentence of 1 to 3 years in prison. During the plea colloquy, defendantdenied striking the victim, but admitted that he wished to plead guilty to the crime in order tominimize his prison exposure. County Court accepted defendant's guilty plea. At sentencing,however, defendant moved to withdraw the plea contending that his allocution was factuallyinsufficient. County Court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon termof imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.
Preliminarily, we note that although defendant's challenge to the factual sufficiency of hisplea is precluded by his valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sinclair, 48 AD3d 974, 974 [2008]; People v Feller, 25 AD3d 881[2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 812 [2006]), his claim that the plea was involuntary bothsurvives such waiver and is preserved for our review by virtue of his motion to withdraw his plea(see People v Quinones, 51 AD3d1226, 1227 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 938 [2008]; People v Lee, 34 AD3d 982[2006]). Turning to the merits, the record reflects that after defendant initially denied striking thevictim, County Court questioned [*2]him further and ultimatelyelicited what the parties characterize as an Alford plea. Defendant contends that suchplea was involuntary and that he failed to appreciate that his responses to County Court'sinquiries would, in fact, constitute a plea of guilty.
Significantly, we have recognized that "[a]n Alford plea may only be allowed whenit is the product of a voluntary and rational choice and there is strong evidence of defendant'sguilt before the court" (People vWashington, 51 AD3d 1223, 1223-1224 [2008]; see Matter of Silmon v Travis,95 NY2d 470, 475 [2000]; People vMatthie, 34 AD3d 987, 989 [2006], lvs denied 8 NY3d 805, 847 [2007]). Here,the record establishes that, during the plea colloquy, an Alford plea was never mentionedby either the parties or County Court. In fact, after defendant denied striking the victim and thecourt began questioning him, it does not appear that defendant realized that his responses werebeing considered by the court as part of a guilty plea. Indeed, defendant expressed confusionduring the court's questioning. On the record before us, we cannot conclude that defendant madea voluntary and rational choice to enter an Alford plea. Therefore, we find that CountyCourt abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea (cf. People vWashington, supra; People v Matthie, 34 AD3d at 989).
Mercure, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed,on the law, motion granted and matter remitted to the County Court of Franklin County forfurther proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.