| Tarone v Tarone |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00677 [59 AD3d 434] |
| February 3, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Gregory J. Tarone, Appellant, v Madeleine K. Tarone,Respondent. |
—[*1] John Ray, Miller Place, N.Y. (Robert R. Meguin of counsel), for respondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the husband appeals (1), in part by permission,from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Stack, J.), dated October31, 2007, which, inter alia, after a nonjury trial, directed that the wife be awarded the sum of$25,000, representing her equitable share of the $50,000 homestead exemption of the maritalresidence, and maintenance in the sum of $20,000 per year for three years, and denied thatbranch of his motion which was to impose a constructive trust upon certain personal property,(2), by permission, from an order of the same court dated December 10, 2007, which awardedthe wife an attorney's fee in the sum of $57,500, and (3), as limited by his brief, from so much ofan order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Diamond, J.), dated January 15, 2008, as, upongranting the wife's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) to set aside so much of the orderof the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Stack, J.), dated October 31, 2007, as awarded her thesum of only $25,000, increased her equitable distribution award from the sum of $25,000 to thesum of $53,500.[*2]
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order datedOctober 31, 2007 as directed that the wife be awarded the sum of $25,000, representing herequitable share of the $50,000 homestead exemption of the marital residence, is dismissed, asthat portion of the order was superseded by the order dated January 15, 2008; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated October 31, 2007 is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it isfurther,
Ordered that the order dated December 10, 2007 is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated January 15, 2008 is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it isfurther,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the wife.
The husband's reliance on a stipulation of settlement dated January 15, 2003, is misplaced, asthis Court specifically vacated that stipulation on a prior appeal (see Tarone v Tarone, 25 AD3d779, 780 [2006]).
"The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of maritalproperty . . . , and unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised thatdiscretion, its determination should not be disturbed" (Saleh v Saleh, 40 AD3d 617, 617-618 [2007] [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion inequitably distributing the parties' assets.
"It is axiomatic that the amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to thesound discretion of the trial court and every case must be determined on its unique facts"(Mazzone v Mazzone, 290 AD2d 495, 496 [2002]). The court may order maintenance insuch amount as justice requires, considering, among other factors, the standard of living of theparties during the marriage, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, thehealth of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of theparty seeking maintenance to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law§ 236 [B] [6]; DiBlasi v DiBlasi,48 AD3d 403, 404 [2008]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]).
Here, the husband reported earning up to $300,000 per year during the marriage, and thewife testified that she was attempting to revive her opera career, after having taken significanttime off during the marriage. Under these circumstances, the court's award of maintenance in thesum of $20,000 per year for three years was a provident exercise of its discretion.
"The evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sounddiscretion of the trial court" (Lodovicov Lodovico, 51 AD3d 731, 732 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The trialcourt is in the best position to evaluate the factors integral to determining counsel fees(id.). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the wifean attorney's fee, and in awarding the wife such a fee in the sum of $57,500.
The husband's remaining contentions are either not properly before us or without merit.Mastro, J.P., Miller, Carni and McCarthy, JJ., concur.