| Matter of Westbury Laundromat, Inc. v Mammina |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 04072 [62 AD3d 888] |
| May 19, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Westbury Laundromat, Inc., et al.,Respondents, v David Mammina et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Goldstein & Rodriguez, LLP, Hempstead, N.Y. (Lawrence J. Goldstein and Mary EllenO'Brien of counsel), for respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Boardof Zoning Appeals of the Town of North Hempstead dated March 5, 2008, which, following therevocation of a building permit issued to the petitioners-plaintiffs on January 18, 2007, after ahearing, denied the application of the petitioners-plaintiffs for a use variance, and action for ajudgment declaring, in effect, that the petitioners-plaintiffs had a vested right to maintain alaundromat on the subject premises as a nonconforming use, David Mammina, DonaldMcCarthy, Paul Aloe, Mildred Little, and Chris Murray, constituting the Board of ZoningAppeals of the Town of North Hempstead, and the Town of North Hempstead appeal from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, J.), entered September 16, 2008,which, upon an order of the same court entered July 28, 2008, inter alia, in effect, granted thepetition and declared that the petitioners-plaintiffs had a vested right to maintain a laundromat onthe subject premises and reinstated the building permit.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, thepetition is denied, the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, and it is declared that thepetitioners-plaintiffs do not have a vested right to maintain a laundromat on the subject premises.
On November 13, 2006 the petitioner-plaintiff Fermin Nunez applied for a building permit torenovate the portion of his commercial building in the Town of North Hempstead in which hehad operated [*2]a laundromat before a fire substantiallydestroyed it in December 2005. During the pendency of the application before the buildingdepartment, the Town Board of the Town of North Hempstead adopted a local law, whichbecame effective January 2, 2007, changing the zoning ordinance to prohibit laundromats in theapplicable district (see Code of Town of North Hempstead § 70-195.13 [D][hereinafter the Town Code]). On January 18, 2007 the building inspector erroneously issued apermit for the nonconforming use. In reliance on the permit, Nunez completed the renovations atsubstantial cost, and requested a certificate of occupancy. On October 23, 2007 the buildingdepartment issued a notice of disapproval revoking the building permit on the ground that it wascontrary to the Town Code. Nunez applied for a use variance, which, after a hearing, was deniedby the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of North Hempstead (hereinafter the ZoningBoard).
Nunez then commenced this hybrid proceeding/action seeking a declaration, in effect, that hehad a vested right to maintain a laundromat on the subject premises, or in the alternative,challenging the Zoning Board's denial of the use variance. The Supreme Court, inter alia, ineffect, declared that Nunez had a vested right to maintain the laundromat, and reinstated thebuilding permit. We reverse.
"In New York, a vested right can be acquired when, pursuant to a legally issued permit, thelandowner demonstrates a commitment to the purpose for which the permit was granted byeffecting substantial changes and incurring substantial expenses to further the development"(Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 47 [1996]; see Matter of RC Enters. v Town ofPatterson, 42 AD3d 542, 544 [2007]). Vested rights cannot be acquired in reliance uponan invalid permit (see Matter of Natchev v Klein, 41 NY2d 833, 834 [1977]; Matter of GRA V, LLC v Srinivasan,55 AD3d 58, 61 [2008]; Incorporated Vil. of Asharoken v Pitassy, 119 AD2d404, 416-417 [1986]). "[T]he mistaken or erroneous issuance of a permit does not estop amunicipality from correcting errors, even where there are harsh results" (Matter of ParkviewAssoc. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 282 [1988]; see Town of Putnam Val. v Sacramone, 16 AD3d 669, 670[2005]).
Here, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Town Code, the building permit issued toNunez was invalid. Town Code § 70-209 provides that "[n]o building which has beendamaged by fire . . . shall be repaired, rebuilt or used except in conformity with theprovisions" of the zoning ordinance. The use to which Nunez placed his property had beenterminated by the fire in December 2005 and there was no legal nonconforming use in existenceat the time of the enactment of the new ordinance (see Town Code § 70-208 [B]).Nunez was required to rebuild the premises in conformity with the zoning ordinance which, as ofJanuary 2, 2007, prohibited laundromats (see Town Code § 70-195.13 [D];§ 70-209). The building permit was, thus, invalid when issued on January 18, 2007 andvested rights could not be acquired in reliance upon it (see Matter of Natchev v Klein, 41NY2d at 834; Matter of GRA V, LLC v Srinivasan, 55 AD3d at 61; Incorporated Vil.of Asharoken v Pitassy, 119 AD2d at 416-417).
Contrary to Nunez's contention, the circumstances do not warrant application of the "specialfacts" exception. "A court will apply the zoning ordinance currently in existence at the time adecision is rendered unless 'special facts' are present to demonstrate that the municipality actedin bad faith and unduly delayed acting upon an application while the zoning law was beingchanged" (Matter of Greene v ZoningBd. of Appeals of Town of Islip, 25 AD3d 612, 612 [2006]; see Matter of Pokoik vSilsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 [1976]; seeMatter of Jul-Bet Enters., LLC v Town Bd. of Town of Riverhead, 48 AD3d 567[2008]). Here, the building permit was issued approximately two months after Nunez made hisapplication, and he failed to adduce evidence that the Town acted in bad faith or unduly delayedaction on his permit application until after the [*3]enactment ofthe new zoning law (see Matter of Home Depot U.S.A. v Village of Rockville Ctr., 295AD2d 426, 429 [2002]; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd. of Town of Babylon,117 AD2d 665, 667 [1986]; cf.Matter of Mamaroneck Beach & Yacht Club, Inc. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. ofMamaroneck, 53 AD3d 494, 497 [2008]). Accordingly, Nunez failed to establish avested right in the nonconforming use, and he was required to apply for a use variance.
"Generally, a court may set aside a local zoning board's determination considering a varianceapplication only if the zoning board acted illegally, arbitrarily, abused its discretion, orsuccumbed to generalized community opposition, and must sustain the determination if it has arational basis in the record" (Matter ofRamundo v Pleasant Val. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 41 AD3d 855, 858 [2007]; seeMatter of Jul-Bet Enters., LLC v Town Bd. of Town of Riverhead, 48 AD3d at 567). "Toqualify for a use variance premised upon unnecessary hardship there must be a showing that (1)the property cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for permitted purposes as currentlyzoned, (2) the hardship resulted from unique characteristics of the property, (3) the proposed usewould not alter the character of the neighborhood, and (4) the alleged hardship was notself-created" (Matter of Miller FamilyLtd. Partnership v Trotta, 23 AD3d 389, 389-390 [2005]; see Town Law§ 267-b [2] [b]). With regard to the first element, the applicant must establish that "nopermissible use will yield a reasonable return" (Matter of Village Bd. of Vil. of Fayetteville vJarrold, 53 NY2d 254, 258 [1981]) by means of "proof, in dollars and cents form, of allmatters bearing upon the return available under existing zoning" (id. at 258 [1981];see Matter of Ferruggia v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Warwick, 233 AD2d 505,506-507 [1996]).
Here, Nunez failed to present any evidence that he would be unable to receive a reasonablereturn if he personally operated a conforming business or rented the premises to a conformingbusiness, and thus, he failed to establish the first element in support of his application for a usevariance (see Matter of Ferruggia v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Warwick, 233AD2d 505, 506-507 [1996]; Matter of Elichar Realty Corp. v Town of Eastchester, 150AD2d 444, 445 [1989]). While Nunez's expert did opine that rental of the premises would yieldonly a modest return and that market conditions suggested difficulties in attracting renters, a "usevariance may not be granted merely because the zoning ordinance proscribes the highest and bestuse of the land, or because the variant use will yield a higher return than those permitted by thezoning regulations" (Matter of Governale v Board of Appeals of Town of Brookhaven,121 AD2d 539, 540 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of ElwoodProps. v Bohrer, 216 AD2d 562, 563 [1995]). Accordingly, the Zoning Board'sdetermination had a rational basis and should not have been disturbed. Mastro, J.P., Skelos,Santucci and Hall, JJ., concur.