| Grandeau v South Colonie Cent. School Dist. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05239 [63 AD3d 1484] |
| June 25, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| David Grandeau, Individually and as Parent of Michael Grandeau,an Infant, Appellant, v South Colonie Central School District et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] The Mills Law Firm, L.L.P., Clifton Park (Christopher K. Mills of counsel), forrespondents.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.), entered August 7, 2008 inAlbany County, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint.
Plaintiff's eight-year-old son climbed onto the top of a set of monkey bars at defendants'playground and then attempted to swing from there down to the ground. Unfortunately, he losthis grip, landed on his left arm and fractured it. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that,among other things, defendants had not maintained a thick enough layer of surfacing material onthe ground beneath the bars to cushion the fall and prevent the type of injury sustained by hisson. Defendants moved for summary dismissal, asserting that, even if more of the surfacingmaterial had been used, it would not have prevented the injury. Focusing on proximate cause,Supreme Court granted defendants' motion, finding that plaintiff failed to raise a question of factas to whether the paucity of surfacing material had contributed to his son's injury. Plaintiff nowappeals.
While proximate cause generally presents a question of fact, summary judgment is [*2]appropriate where the record shows that the alleged neglect couldnot have played a role in causing the injury (see Russo-Martorana v Theophilakos, 46 AD3d 1047, 1048[2007]; Abair v Town of N. Elba,35 AD3d 935, 936 [2006]). Here, defendants presented the affidavit of a biomedicalengineer who had inspected the playground, reviewed applicable industry standards, andanalyzed the forces and cushioning capacity of the surfacing material involved. Based on theweight of plaintiff's son and the height of the bars, the expert computed the force applied to theson's arm when he struck the ground, noted that this force was more than twice what it wouldhave been if the bars had been used properly and opined that, given such force, additionalsurfacing material would not have prevented or reduced the severity of the injury. This proofshifted the burden to plaintiff to demonstrate that additional surfacing material would haveprevented or lessened the severity of his son's injury (see Valenti v Exxon Mobil Corp., 50 AD3d 1382, 1384 [2008];Ellis v County of Albany, 205 AD2d 1005, 1007 [1994]).
To that end, plaintiff presented the opinions of a school safety consultant and an emergencyroom physician. The consultant merely referred to the opinions summarized in plaintiff's expertdisclosure, which includes statements that defendants failed to maintain the depth and quality ofcushioning material specified in the Consumer Product Safety Commission's Handbook forPublic Playground Safety, and that this and other omissions were the proximate causes of theinjury sustained by plaintiff's son. He did not, however, purport to provide any factual orscientific basis for these statements. Plaintiff's second expert opined that, based upon his clinicalexperience and intuition, it was "probable" that the child would have sustained less severeinjuries if the apparatus had been lower and the cushioning had been deeper. Since these experts'opinions are purely conclusory and fail to address the detailed physical analysis by defendant'sexpert, they have no probative force and are, therefore, insufficient to raise a question of fact asto proximate cause (see Romano v Stanley, 90 NY2d 444, 451-452 [1997]; Butler v City of Gloversville, 52 AD3d896, 898 [2008]; Stocklas v AutoSolutions of Glenville, Inc., 9 AD3d 622, 624 [2004], lv dismissed and denied 4NY3d 738 [2004]).
Nor can we agree with plaintiff that his son's injury was caused by defendants' failure towarn of the alleged latent danger posed by the surfacing material, as he has offered no probativeevidence that the alleged danger played a role in causing the injury (see Sobti v Lindenhurst School Dist.,35 AD3d 439, 439 [2006]). Finally, inasmuch as there is no showing that defendants'alleged omissions interfered with the public's right to make proper use of the playground, there isno merit in plaintiff's alternate contention that the condition of the monkey bars constituted anactionable public nuisance (see Haire vBonelli, 57 AD3d 1354, 1358 [2008]; Reid v Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A.,189 AD2d 954, 957 [1993]).
Peters, J.P., Spain, Kane and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs. [See 2008 NY Slip Op 32199(U).]