| Matter of Darnell C. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07405 [66 AD3d 771] |
| October 13, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Darnell C., Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers andNorman Corenthal of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal isfrom an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Elkins, J.), dated June 18, 2008,which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated May 1, 2008, made after a hearing,finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would haveconstituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminalpossession of a weapon in the third degree, and theft of services, and acts which constituted thecrime of possession of a weapon by a person under sixteen, adjudged him to be a juveniledelinquent, and placed him in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for aperiod of 12 months.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant inthe custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months is dismissedas academic, without costs or disbursements, as the placement has expired pursuant to its terms(see Matter of Joseph R., 49 AD3d651 [2008]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matterof David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish,beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult,would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and committed acts constituting the crime ofpossession of a weapon by a person under sixteen (see Penal Law § 265.03 [3];§ 265.02 [3]; § 265.05). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d 617 [2009]; Matter of Victor I., 57 AD3d 779[2008]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accordgreat deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, andobserve demeanor (see Matter of DanielR., 51 AD3d 933, 933-934 [2008]; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410[2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we [*2]are satisfied thatthe Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (seeFamily Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]).
Specifically, with respect to criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, contrary tothe appellant's contention, the Family Court properly applied the so-called "automobilepresumption" (see Penal Law § 265.15 [3]; Matter of Jonathan V., 55 AD3d 273, 278 [2008]; Matter of Tamara E., 19 AD3d489, 490 [2005]; People v O'Brien, 212 AD2d 741, 742 [1995]; People v Hines,173 AD2d 730, 730-731 [1991]). There is no merit to the appellant's contention that thepresentment agency did not offer any evidence that he had knowledge of the weapon'sdefacement and, thus, failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed acts which, ifcommitted by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon inthe third degree (Penal Law § 265.02 [3]). Pursuant to Penal Law § 265.15 (5),"[t]he possession by any person of a defaced . . . firearm . . . ispresumptive evidence that such person defaced the same" (Penal Law § 265.15 [5]; seeMatter of Gregory M., 184 AD2d 252 [1992], affd 82 NY2d 588 [1993]).
The appellant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review, and we decline toreview it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Rivera, J.P., Florio, Eng andLeventhal, JJ., concur.