| Reiser v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00941 [70 AD3d 796] |
| February 9, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Melvyn A. Reiser, Appellant, v Incorporated Village ofRockville Centre, Respondent. |
—[*1] Hammill, O'Brien, Croutier, Dempsey, Pender & Koehler, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (AntonPiotroski of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), entered March 11, 2009, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a parking lotowned and operated by the defendant, Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre. Afterdepositions were conducted, the Village moved for summary judgment dismissing the complainton the ground that it had not received prior written notice of the icy condition as required by,inter alia, Village Law § 6-628. The Supreme Court granted the motion on this ground,and we reverse.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Village relied upon the depositiontestimony of its Deputy Superintendent of Public Works. However, the Deputy Superintendentdid not unequivocally testify that the Village had no prior written notice of the subject icycondition, and he did not testify that he had conducted any search to determine whether suchnotice had indeed been received by the proper statutory designee (cf. Schutz-Prepscius v Incorporated Vil. ofPort Jefferson, 51 AD3d 657 [2008]). Under these circumstances, the DeputySuperintendent's testimony was insufficient to satisfy the Village's prima facie burden ofshowing that it had no prior written notice of the subject icy condition (see Sanatass v Town of N. Hempstead,64 AD3d 695 [2009]; Bonilla vIncorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 49 AD3d 788, 789 [2008]; Kramer v Town ofHempstead, 284 AD2d 503, 504 [2001]; LaRosa v Town of Hempstead, 237 AD2d579, 580 [1997]). Accordingly, the Village's motion for summary judgment should have beendenied. Santucci, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur.