| Matter of Keegan JJ. (Amanda JJ.) |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 02700 [72 AD3d 1159] |
| April 1, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Keegan JJ., a Child Alleged to be PermanentlyNeglected. Cortland County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Amanda JJ.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Ingrid Olsen-Tjensvold, Cortland County Department of Social Services, Cortland, forrespondent. Kelly M. Corbett, Law Guardian, Fayetteville.
Kavanagh, J. Appeals from two orders of the Family Court of Cortland County (Campbell,J.), entered May 20, 2009, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toSocial Services Law § 384-b, to adjudicate respondent's child to be permanently neglected,and terminated respondent's parental rights.
Respondent's son (born in 2007) was removed from her care pursuant to Family Ct Act§ 1027 when he was two months old and placed with his maternal great aunt after reportshad been received by the State Central Registry that the child had been repeatedly exposed toviolent physical altercations between respondent and male acquaintances that often required the[*2]intervention of the police.[FN1]After a neglect petition was filed respondent, without admitting any wrongdoing, consented tothe entry of a finding of neglect (see Family Ct Act § 1051 [a]), as well as adispositional order that continued the child in the aunt's care. In order to regain custody of herson, the dispositional order, entered in February 2008, required respondent to, among otherthings, meet regularly with her caseworker, keep the caseworker advised of her current address,participate in and complete various programing, maintain a safe and stable household for at leastsix months and "[w]ork toward full employment so that she [could] provide herself and the childwith basic necessities."
In January 2009, petitioner commenced this proceeding alleging that respondent had failedto comply with many of the conditions contained in the dispositional order and, as a result, hadpermanently neglected her child (see Social Services Law § 384-b). Afterconducting a fact-finding hearing, Family Court found that respondent, despite petitioner'sdiligent efforts to reunite her with her child, had failed to fully cooperate in the preparation of aplan for the child's future. A dispositional hearing was held and Family Court determined that thechild's best interests required that respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent nowappeals.
Initially, respondent argues that Family Court's determination that she failed to plan for herchild's future is not supported by the record (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7][c]). We disagree. Petitioner established during the fact-finding hearing that despite its diligentefforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship,[FN2]respondent persistently failed to "participate in plans for the child's future for the statutorilyestablished period" (Matter of KaytlinTT., 61 AD3d 1085, 1086 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 709 [2009]; see Matter of Anastasia FF., 66 AD3d1185, 1186 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 716 [2010]), and did not, "[a]t the very least,. . . take meaningful steps to address the issues" that led to the child's removal fromher home (Matter of Eric G., 59AD3d 785, 787 [2009]).
We note from our review of this record that respondent, throughout the relevant time period,continued to pursue relationships with men who physically abused her. In addition, she failed tofaithfully adhere to her mental health regimen and did not complete programing designed tocounsel her as to the threat that domestic violence posed to her child and their family [*3]unit.[FN3]Furthermore, respondent refused to submit to a urine test and did not complete programsdesigned to address the issue of substance abuse. In addition, while the child has spent the lastyear with the aunt and by all accounts has thrived in her care, respondent, after being evictedfrom her federally subsidized apartment, has failed to establish a permanent residence and washomeless when this proceeding was commenced (see Matter of Audrey I., 57 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2008], lvdenied 12 NY3d 704 [2009]).
Moreover, at the time of the hearing, respondent remained ineligible to take the GED examand did not cooperate with petitioner in its efforts to find her suitable employment. In addition,during this period respondent, while on probation, was arrested for numerous petit criminaloffenses and ultimately received a 60-day jail sentence. Based on these facts, Family Court'sfinding that respondent had not made a meaningful effort to address those issues that led to theinitial finding of neglect enjoyed ample support in the record (see Matter of Isaiah F., 55 AD3d1004, 1006 [2008]; Matter ofMelissa DD., 45 AD3d 1219, 1220-1221 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 701[2008]; Matter of Andrew Z., 41AD3d 912, 912-913 [2007]).
Next, respondent argues that Family Court should have suspended its judgment and givenher an opportunity to demonstrate that she could provide a safe and stable home for her childbefore terminating her parental rights. Again, we disagree. A judgment terminating parentalrights may be suspended if the court concludes that "it is in the best interests of the child to allowthe parent additional time to improve parenting skills and demonstrate his or her fitness to carefor the child" (Matter of Kayla KK.[Tracy LL.], 68 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Family Ct Act § 631 [b];Matter of Anastasia FF., 66 AD3d at 1187; Matter of Joshua BB., 27 AD3d 867, 869 [2006]). Here, there is nofactual basis that would support the conclusion that the child's best interests would be served bydelaying the termination of respondent's parental rights. Her conduct since the finding of neglectwas first entered and her persistent failure to comply with the conditions contained in the court'sdispositional order demonstrate that she remains, as noted by a licensed clinical psychologistwho examined her, "a poor candidate for benefitting from services." Finally, the child's overallcondition as previously noted has greatly improved since he has been placed with the aunt and itis impossible to ignore the risk to his welfare that would almost certainly exist if he werereturned to respondent's care (seeMatter of Raine QQ., 51 AD3d 1106, 1107 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 717[2008]; Matter of Jayde M., 36AD3d 1168, 1170 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 809 [2007]). For these reasons, FamilyCourt's determination that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's bestinterests is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Nevaeh SS. [Valerie L.],68 AD3d 1188, 1189-1190 [2009]; Matter of Carlos R., 63 AD3d 1243, 1246 [2009], lvdenied 13 NY3d 704 [2009]; Matter of Laelani B., 59 AD3d 880, 882 [2009]; Matter of Faith R., 56 AD3d 982,984-985 [2008]; Matter of Isaiah F., 55 AD3d at 1006-1007).
Cardona, P.J., Peters, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders areaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote 1: One report claimed thatrespondent, in violation of an order of protection, allowed a man in her home who had threatenedher with a knife. In another, it was claimed that respondent had sustained a concussion as theresult of being assaulted by a male acquaintance.
Footnote 2: Respondent has not taken issueon this appeal with Family Court's determination that petitioner made diligent efforts tostrengthen her relationship with the child (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7][a]). In that regard, we agree with Family Court that petitioner established, by clear andconvincing evidence, that it "made relevant and meaningful efforts to assist respondent inresolving the circumstances that led to the removal of the children in order to reunite the family"(Matter of Eric G., 59 AD3d785, 786 [2009]; see Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 86 [1989]).
Footnote 3: The mother participated in, butdid not complete, the Aid to Victims of Violence Program. She did, however, complete aparenting class.