Vilomar v Castillo
2010 NY Slip Op 03914 [73 AD3d 758]
May 4, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 30, 2010


Gilberto Vilomar, Respondent,
v
Francisco A. Castillo,Appellant.

[*1]Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Sullivan Law Firm, New York, N.Y.[Timothy M. Sullivan], of counsel), for appellant. David S. Kritzer, Huntington, N.Y., forrespondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from so much ofan order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J.), entered October 9, 2009, asdenied those branches of his motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff'sclaims of serious injury under the permanent loss of use, the permanent consequential limitationof use, and the significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) on theground that the plaintiff did not sustain any such serious injuries within the meaning of thatstatute.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and those branches ofthe defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims ofserious injury under the permanent loss of use, the permanent consequential limitation of use,and the significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) on the groundthat the plaintiff did not sustain any such serious injuries within the meaning of that statute aregranted.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain aserious injury under the permanent loss of use, permanent consequential limitation of use, andsignificant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Toure v AvisRent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957[1992]; see also Giraldo vMandanici, 24 AD3d 419 [2005]). The limitation noted by the defendant's examiningorthopedic surgeon in his affirmed medical report concerning the plaintiff's right knee wasinsignificant (see Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 236 [1982]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Initially, the reports of Dr.Kenneth B. Chapman failed to raise a triable issue of fact because they were unaffirmed (seeGrasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 [1991]; Mora v Riddick, 69 AD3d 591 [2010]; Singh v Mohamed, 54 AD3d 933[2008]; Patterson v NY AlarmResponse Corp., 45 AD3d 656 [2007]; Verette v Zia, 44 AD3d 747 [2007]; Nociforo v Penna, 42 AD3d 514[2007]; Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268 [1992]).

The affirmation of Dr. Stanley Liebowitz was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, asDr. Liebowitz relied on the unsworn records and reports of others in arriving at his determination(see Giannini v Cruz, 67 AD3d638 [2009]; Sorto v Morales,55 AD3d 718, 719 [2008]; Malave v Basikov, 45 AD3d [*2]539, 540 [2007]; Furrs v Griffith, 43 AD3d 389, 390 [2007]; see also Friedmanv U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 AD2d 266, 267 [1995]). The plaintiff failed to proffer anycompetent objective medical evidence that revealed the existence of significant limitations in thecervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine that were contemporaneous with the subjectaccident (see Bleszcz v Hiscock, 69AD3d 890 [2010]; Taylor vFlaherty, 65 AD3d 1328 [2009]; Fung v Uddin, 60 AD3d 992 [2009]; Gould v Ombrellino, 57 AD3d608 [2008]; Kuchero vTabachnikov, 54 AD3d 729 [2008]; Ferraro v Ridge Car Serv., 49 AD3d 498 [2008]). Without suchcontemporaneous findings, the plaintiff could not and did not raise a triable issue of fact underthe permanent loss, permanent consequential limitation of use, or significant limitation of usecategories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Jack v Acapulco Car Service, Inc., 72AD3d 646 [2010]; Bleszcz v Hiscock, 69 AD3d at 891; Taylor v Flaherty, 65AD3d at 1328-1329; Ferraro v Ridge Car Serv., 49 AD3d at 498).

The affirmed medical reports of Dr. Steven Brownstein also failed to raise a triable issue offact. The mere existence of a torn tendon, or even a herniated or bulging disc, is not evidence ofa serious injury in the absence of objective evidence of the extent of the alleged physicallimitations resulting from the injury and its duration (see Magid v Lincoln Servs. Corp., 60 AD3d 1008 [2009]; Washington v Mendoza, 57 AD3d972 [2008]; Cornelius v CintasCorp., 50 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2008]; Shvartsman v Vildman, 47 AD3d 700 [2008]; Tobias v Chupenko, 41 AD3d 583[2007]; Mejia v DeRose, 35 AD3d407 [2006]; Yakubov v CG TransCorp., 30 AD3d 509 [2006]; Cerisier v Thibiu, 29 AD3d 507 [2006]; Bravo v Rehman, 28 AD3d 694[2006]; Kearse v New York City Tr.Auth., 16 AD3d 45 [2005]; Diaz v Turner, 306 AD2d 241 [2003]). Theplaintiff's affidavit failed to meet this requirement (see Luna v Mann, 58 AD3d 699 [2009]; Washington vMendoza, 57 AD3d at 973). Rivera, J.P., Florio, Miller, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.


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