Fratelli's Pizza & Rest. Corp. v Kayzee Realty Corp.
2010 NY Slip Op 04849 [74 AD3d 481]
June 8, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 25, 2010


Fratelli's Pizza and Restaurant Corp., Appellant,
v
KayzeeRealty Corp. et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Alter & Barbaro, Brooklyn (Bernard Mitchell Alter of counsel), for appellant.

Cinquemani & Green, New Rochelle (Joseph Cinquemani of counsel), forrespondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth L. Thompson, Jr., J.), entered October 8,2008, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint based on documentaryevidence, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

On March 20, 2006, plaintiff and defendant landlord entered into a lease extension, for aterm commencing June 1, 2010 and ending May 31, 2026, that provides: "Landlord shall not rent[certain specified nearby premises] to any party who offers for sale the same type of food sold by[plaintiff] and if a tenant occupying one of these premises commences the sale of prohibitive[sic] foodstuffs, landlord shall take steps necessary to have tenant cease and desist fromthose sales." The complaint seeks injunctive relief, alleging that defendant tenant occupies one ofthe premises specified in the lease extension and is selling the same type of food as plaintiff. Insupport of dismissal, defendants landlord and tenant, who appear together, rely on the fact thattheir lease, which is dated January 5, 2006 and is for the term "which shall commence onJanuary, 2005 [sic] . . . and shall expire on December 31, 2019," preexistsplaintiff's lease extension, and argue that, as a matter of law, the restrictive covenant in the leaseextension cannot be enforced against a "prior tenant," i.e., that the covenant can be enforced onlyprospectively from its March 2006 execution date, if not its June 2010 commencement date.

We hold as a matter of law that the subject restrictive covenant cannot be enforced against acompeting tenant whose lease predates the covenant's execution, absent evidence that thecompeting tenant's lease is falsely dated, or that the competing tenant, before entering into itslease, had notice of the landlord's intention to enter into the covenant (see L'Art de Jewel Ltd. v Hudson SheratonCorp., LLC, 46 AD3d 418, 420 [2007]; Key Drug Co. v Luna Park RealtyAssoc., 221 AD2d 598, 599 [1995]). It does not avail plaintiff that its complaint, liberallyconstrued, conclusorily alleges that defendant tenant is a "subsequent lessee"; i.e, that defendanttenant entered into its lease with "full knowledge" of the restrictive covenant (see Robinson vRobinson, 303 AD2d 234, 235 [2003] [factual allegations in complaint plainly contradictedby documentary evidence need not be accepted as true on motion to dismiss]). In addition,guided by the principles that restrictive covenants in leases, such as use clauses, are "strictlyconstrued against those seeking to enforce them" and that "where there are two equally plausible[*2]interpretations of a restrictive covenant, the less restrictiveinterpretation will be adopted" (Bear Mtn. Books v Woodbury Common Partners, 232AD2d 595, 596 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 808 [1997]), we find that the language of thesubject restrictive covenant is consistent with its prospective application (cf. L'Art deJewel, 46 AD3d at 419), and that the parties did not intend the covenant to apply to tenantswith preexisting leases. Concur—Andrias, Saxe and McGuire, JJ.

Tom, J.P., and Manzanet-Daniels, J., concur in a separate memorandum by Tom, J.P., asfollows: On March 20, 2006, plaintiff, a tenant of defendant Kayzee Realty Corporation under a10-year lease commencing in April 2000, entered into an agreement commencing June 1, 2010"extending" its lease "for 16 additional years" until May 31, 2026. This lease extension containsa restrictive covenant that provides: "Landlord shall not rent [certain specified nearby premises]to any party who offers for sale the same type of food sold by [plaintiff] and if a tenantoccupying one of these premises commences the sale of prohibitive [sic] foodstuffs,landlord shall take steps necessary to have tenant cease and desist from those sales." DefendantFeel the Steel Corp. (FTS) is also Kayzee's tenant under a lease commencing January 5, 2006,and is the successor of a corporation that began selling food from the same premises inSeptember 2003. The complaint alleges that FTS is selling the same type of food as plaintiff inviolation of the restrictive covenant of plaintiff's lease extension and seeks permanent injunctiverelief barring FTS from selling competing food items.

In support of their preanswer motion to dismiss the complaint, defendants relied upon a priororder that denied plaintiff's motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief, arguing collateralestoppel and, in their reply, law of the case. In opposition, plaintiff asserted that defendants wereattempting to obtain dismissal based upon the tenants' respective leases with Kayzee (CPLR3211 [a] [1]). Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the matter as "premature" on theground that the lease extension does not take effect until June 1, 2010.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the restrictive covenant of the lease extension should beconstrued as an independent covenant that takes effect immediately upon signing, not at thefuture commencement of the lease term. Even assuming, without deciding, that this is the case,the FTS lease predates plaintiff's lease extension by some two months, and the restrictivecovenant cannot be reasonably interpreted as binding upon FTS (see Key Drug Co. v LunaPark Realty Assoc., 221 AD2d 598, 599 [1995] [absent notice, restrictive covenant does notbind tenants who were occupants of their premises when the plaintiff's tenancy began]). The lawfavors free and unconstrained use of property as a matter of policy, and any restraint on the useto which premises can be put is strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce it (seeHuggins v Castle Estates, 36 NY2d 427, 430 [1975]). Moreover, under the doctrine ofcaveat emptor, plaintiff is presumed to have ascertained that the premises were suitable for itsbusiness [*3]purposes (see First Nationwide Bank v 965Amsterdam, 212 AD2d 469, 472 [1995]) and, thus, to have been familiar with the type offood sold by FTS, warranting dismissal of its claim for injunctive relief (see L'Art de Jewel Ltd. v Hudson SheratonCorp., LLC, 46 AD3d 418, 420 [2007]). Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that FTSentered into its lease with full knowledge of the restrictive covenant does not preclude dismissalsince this factual assertion is manifestly contradicted by the documentary evidence (seeRobinson v Robinson, 303 AD2d 234, 235 [2003]).


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