| Matter of Guynup v County of Clinton |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04914 [74 AD3d 1552] |
| June 10, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Terry Guynup, Petitioner, v County of Clinton etal., Respondents. |
—[*1] O'Connell & Aronowitz, Plattsburgh (Dean C. Schneller of counsel), for respondents. Thomas A. Mitchell, Albany, for New York State Sheriffs' Association, amicuscuriae.
Kavanagh, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order ofthe Supreme Court, entered in Clinton County) to review a determination of respondent MichaelE. Zurlo which terminated petitioner's employment.
In October 2008, petitioner, a lieutenant with 14 years of service with the Clinton CountySheriff's Department, was charged pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 with misconduct,incompetence and insubordination. Specifically, on September 11, 2008, an order of protectionwas issued by Family Court, Clinton County, requiring petitioner to, among other things,surrender any firearms in his possession after his wife, in an ex parte application, alleged thattwo years earlier petitioner had brandished a rifle in the family home while intoxicated andthreatened to shoot respondent David Favro, the Clinton County Sheriff. The wife, who at thetime of her application had separated from petitioner and was seeking a divorce, claimed that shehad a brief struggle with petitioner over the weapon but was ultimately able to disarm him. WhenMajors Michael Smith and Robert Craig of the Sheriff's Department served the order requiringthat he surrender all of his firearms, petitioner was alleged to have become upset and stated "no f. . . ing way are you taking my guns. I will go home right now, load those f. . . ers and I will be waiting."[*2]
After petitioner was formally charged with four separateviolations alleging misconduct, insubordination and incompetence, the matter was referred to aHearing Officer appointed by Favro to conduct a hearing on the charges and file a reportcontaining findings of fact as well as recommendations as to what penalty, if any, should beimposed based on those factual determinations (see Civil Service Law § 75 [2]). Ahearing was conducted and a report was subsequently issued in which the Hearing Officer foundthat petitioner was guilty of insubordination and misconduct as a result of his outburst at theSheriff's Department at the time the order of protection was served and of incompetence becausepetitioner could no longer properly perform his duties within the Sheriff's Department as a resultof the order's prohibition barring him from carrying a firearm.[FN1]The Hearing Officer dismissed the charge regarding the threat that petitioner was alleged to havedirected at Favro because, if made, it occurred more than 18 months before the disciplinarycharges were filed and, as a result, was untimely (see Civil Service Law § 75[4]).[FN2]Based on these findings, the Hearing Officer recommended that petitioner be required toparticipate in an employee assistance program and be suspended without pay for 30 days.
Upon receipt of this report, Favro disqualified himself from any further participation in theproceeding and deputized respondent Michael E. Zurlo, the Clinton County Administrator,delegating to him the authority to review the report, determine if its findings were supported bysubstantial evidence and decide what penalty, if any, should be imposed upon petitioner. Zurlonot only adopted the Hearing Officer's findings that petitioner was guilty of misconduct,insubordination and incompetence, but also determined that the wife's testimony was credibleand that petitioner had, in fact, threatened Favro. As for the delay in bringing this charge, Zurlofound that petitioner had engaged in criminal conduct while struggling with his wife over thefirearm and, as a result, the statutory time period within which this proceeding had to becommenced did not apply (see Civil Service Law § 75 [4]). Zurlo rejected theHearing Officer's recommendation regarding the penalty to be imposed and, instead, directedthat petitioner be terminated from his position with the Sheriff's Department. In response,petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the legality of Zurlo'sappointment by Favro, and claimed not only that the charge regarding the threat to Favro wasuntimely, but also that Zurlo's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. SupremeCourt transferred this proceeding to this Court for our review (see CPLR 7804 [g]).
Initially, petitioner challenges Zurlo's designation by Favro claiming that he was notqualified to conduct this review because he was not an officer within the Sheriff's Department"who has authority to remove" and terminate a Department employee (Matter of Roosa v Belfiore, 69 AD3d945, 946 [2010]; see Civil Service Law § 75 [2]). However, where a civilservice proceeding has been commenced and a conflict exists that implicates the appointingauthority's ability to be fair and impartial, a third party with "supervisory authority over that[*3]particular employee" may be designated to review a HearingOfficer's report and, upon such a review, make determinations concerning the employee's status(Matter of Gomez v Stout, 13NY3d 182, 187 [2009]; see Matter of Roosa v Belfiore, 69 AD3d at 946). Here, theconflict for Favro was self-evident and required that he disqualify himself from conducting thenecessary review of the findings and recommendations made by the Hearing Officer in hisreport. In addition, the only officers within the Department, aside from Favro, who hadcommand authority over petitioner were Craig and Smith, and each was disqualified because ofhis status as a material witness who testified at the hearing. In fact, given the specifics of thecharges filed against petitioner and, in particular, the claim that he had threatened Favro, theentire Sheriff's Department was similarly affected and fundamental fairness dictated thatsomeone with responsibilities involving the Sheriff's Department but not part of its commandstructure be appointed to conduct this review. Favro not only had the authority to deputize Zurlo,the County Administrator, and make him a member of the Sheriff's Department, but also had theright to delegate to him the authority to conduct this review. In addition, Favro, in choosing theCounty Administrator, picked a County official who, pursuant to county law, had administrativeresponsibilities that clearly impacted upon the daily operation of the Sheriff's Department and itspersonnel (see Local Law No. 1 [1980] of County of Clinton §§ 2, 4; Matter of Eck v County of Delaware,36 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2007]).
As for the charges, we do find that substantial evidence exists establishing that petitionerwas guilty of misconduct and insubordination based on his reaction when ordered by Sheriff'sDepartment officials to surrender his firearms, as well as incompetence because he was no longerable to legally carry a firearm and, therefore, could not properly perform his duties within theSheriff's Department (see Matter ofSindoni v County of Tioga, 67 AD3d 1183, 1184 [2009]; Matter of Perryman v Village of SaranacLake, 64 AD3d 830, 834 [2009]; Matter of Longton v Village of Corinth, 57 AD3d 1273, 1274[2008], lv denied 13 NY3d 709 [2009]). However, we agree with the Hearing Officerthat the charge alleging that petitioner threatened Favro was untimely and should have beendismissed. In that regard, Civil Service Law § 75 (4) requires that a removal ordisciplinary proceeding be commenced within 18 months after the acts that form the basis of thecharges have occurred, unless the conduct in question involves the commission of a crime (see Matter of Langler v County ofCayuga, 68 AD3d 1775, 1776 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Town of Minerva Town Bd., 65 AD3d 788,789 [2009]; Matter of McKinney vBennett, 31 AD3d 860, 861 [2006]; Matter of Wade v Town of Ticonderoga TownBd., 256 AD2d 860, 861 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 804 [1999]). Here, the threatpetitioner is alleged to have uttered occurred more than two years before any charge was filed.However, respondents contend that in the struggle with his wife over the firearm, petitionercommitted the crimes of menacing in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the seconddegree, thereby rendering the statutory time limits within which such a charge may be broughtinapplicable to this proceeding.
To have committed the crime of reckless endangerment, evidence must be presented thatpetitioner, during the struggle with his wife, "recklessly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] asubstantial risk of serious physical injury to another person" (Penal Law § 120.20).Serious physical injury is defined as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death"(Penal Law § 10.00 [10]). Here, no evidence was presented establishing that, during thestruggle, the rifle was loaded with ammunition or that petitioner threatened his wife with it. Infact, petitioner not only denies that a struggle took place, but testified that the rifle he is allegedto have brandished was not loaded and that live ammunition was not kept in the family home.Absent some evidence to the contrary, and none was presented at the hearing, the crime of [*4]reckless endangerment on these facts could not have beencommitted. As for the crime of menacing, proof must be presented that petitioner, during thestruggle, intentionally placed or attempted to place another person in fear of death, imminentserious physical injury or physical injury (see Penal Law § 120.15). Petitionernever threatened his wife during the struggle—in fact, what threats he is alleged to havemade were directed at Favro, who was not present and only learned of them two years later whenthe wife made her claim in Family Court. As a result, even if the wife's testimony regarding thethreats and ensuing struggle are fully accepted, the crimes of reckless endangerment andmenacing were not committed by petitioner and the statutory exception to the 18-month ruledoes not apply. Therefore, this charge alleging that petitioner had threatened Favro must bedismissed as untimely.
Finally, Zurlo never specified the penalty to be imposed for each charge for which he foundpetitioner guilty. Given that the principal charge filed against petitioner—the threat toFavro—has been dismissed, the matter must be remitted for redetermination of the penaltyto be imposed on those charges of which petitioner now stands guilty (see Matter of Bayer v New York StateDept. of Labor, 28 AD3d 865, 867 [2006]; Matter of Rounds v Town of Vestal, 15 AD3d 819, 823 [2005]).As a result of the remittal, petitioner's challenge to the penalty imposed as being excessive isacademic.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determinationis modified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as found petitioner guilty of disciplinarycharge two and as imposed a penalty; matter remitted to respondents for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, confirmed.
Footnote 1: Shortly after the order wasserved, Family Court granted petitioner's request that it be amended to allow him to carry afirearm while on duty with the Sheriff's Department.
Footnote 2: A fourth charge was filedagainst petitioner alleging that he had made derogatory public comments about the Sheriff'sDepartment, but was dismissed when no evidence was presented at the hearing to support thischarge.