| Matter of Ashley P. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05403 [74 AD3d 1075] |
| June 15, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Ashley P., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow andAndrew Shapiro of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals arefrom (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated April 6,2009, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant committed an act which, if committed byan adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree, and (2) anorder of disposition of the same court dated July 6, 2009, which, upon the fact-finding order andafter a dispositional hearing, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her onprobation for a period of 12 months under stated terms and conditions.
Ordered that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs ordisbursements, as the fact-finding order was superseded by the order of disposition and isbrought up for review on the appeal from the order of disposition; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matterof David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621[1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the finding that the appellant committedan act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault inthe third degree (see Matter of ChristianM., 37 AD3d 834 [2007]; Matter of Shaheed W., 298 AD2d 204 [2002];Matter of Kristie II., 252 AD2d 807, 807-808 [1998]; Matter of Marcel F., 233AD2d 442, 443 [1996]; People v Thomas, 215 AD2d 603 [1995]). Moreover, infulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accordgreat deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see Matter ofDaniel R., 51 AD3d 933, 933-934 [2008]; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410[2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here,we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight ofthe evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; Matter of Christian M., 37AD3d at 834; Matter of Marcel F., 233 AD2d at 443; People v Thomas, 215AD2d at 603-604; cf. People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).[*2]
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining theproper disposition (see Matter ofWaleek W., 40 AD3d 868, 869 [2007]). Here, the Family Court providently exercisedits discretion in determining that a period of 12 months probation was the least restrictivealternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the appellant and the need to protectthe community (see Matter of AshantiB., 62 AD3d 790, 791 [2009]; Matter of Erika R., 55 AD3d 740 [2008]; Matter of Beniquwa D., 33 AD3d420 [2006]; Matter of CindyA., 31 AD3d 440 [2006]), and in light of the seriousness of the offense and theappellant's school attendance and academic problems (see Matter of Summer D., 67 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2009]; Matter of Marlon B., 51 AD3d436, 437 [2008]). Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur.