Litvinov v Hodson
2010 NY Slip Op 05440 [74 AD3d 1884]
June 18, 2010
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 25, 2010


Vasiliy P. Litvinov, Respondent, v Eileen M. Hodson et al.,Defendants, and Jack Foy et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Bouvier Partnership, LLP, Buffalo (Norman E.S. Greene of counsel), fordefendants-appellants.

Daniel J. Hartman, Buffalo, for plaintiff-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y. Devlin, J.), enteredFebruary 24, 2009 in a personal injury action. The order, among other things, denied the crossmotion of defendants Jack Foy and New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is modified on the law by denying themotion in part and granting the cross motion in part and vacating the directive to disclosedocuments prepared after September 29, 2003, and by providing that the directive to disclosedocuments prepared on or before September 29, 2003 is subject to an in camera review of thosedocuments and as modified the order is affirmed without costs, and the matter is remitted toSupreme Court, Erie County, for further proceedings in accordance with the followingMemorandum: Plaintiff was injured in July 2003 when he fell while working on a porch locatedon rental property owned by defendants Eileen M. Hodson and Jeremy L. Hodson and managedby defendant Charles Renna. The property was insured under a commercial insurance policyissued by defendant New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company (NYCM). At the time ofthe accident, plaintiff was employed by Richard J. Laspro, doing business as Home Club ofAmerica. After the accident, NYCM instructed defendant Jack Foy to investigate and possiblysettle plaintiff's claims arising from the accident. On September 29, 2003, plaintiff signed arelease with respect to all claims against the Hodsons and Renna in exchange for $4,000.Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, rescission of the release based onfraud on the part of Foy and NYCM.

We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied the cross motion of Foy and NYCM forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint against them inasmuch as there is an issue of factwhether the release was indeed procured by fraud. It is well established that "a general release isgoverned by principles of contract law" (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 562[1969]), and that a release " 'should not be set aside unless plaintiff demonstrates duress,illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake' " (Schroeder v Connelly, 46 AD3d 1439, 1440 [2007]). Althoughthere is no evidence in the record that Foy made any false statements directly to plaintiff, "it isnot essential that a [*2]representation should be addresseddirectly to the party who seeks a remedy for having been deceived and defrauded by meansthereof" (Eaton Cole & Burnham Co. v Avery, 83 NY 31, 33-34 [1880]; see Desser vSchatz, 182 AD2d 478, 479-480 [1992]; John Blair Communications v Reliance CapitalGroup, 157 AD2d 490, 492 [1990]). Rather, fraud may be found " 'where a falserepresentation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff' " (Ruffing v UnionCarbide Corp., 308 AD2d 526, 528 [2003]).

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that Foy and NYCM met their initial burden on the crossmotion, we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact whether Foy made falserepresentations to plaintiff's employer, Laspro, for the purpose of inducing plaintiff's detrimentalreliance on those representations (see Eaton Cole & Burnham Co., 83 NY at 35-36).Although Laspro was not an actual agent of NYCM or plaintiff, Foy knew that Laspro wasacting as an intermediary between plaintiff and NYCM, as evidenced by the fact that the twomeetings between Foy and plaintiff were set up by Foy through Laspro and took place atLaspro's residence. Laspro testified at his deposition that Foy told him, inter alia, that NYCMhad no liability with respect to plaintiff's accident, that plaintiff did not need an attorney, and thatthe $4,000 paid by NYCM to plaintiff would be in addition to workers' compensation payments.It is undisputed that Laspro relayed that information to plaintiff before the release was signed.

We further conclude that the court erred in denying in its entirety the cross motion of Foyand NYCM with respect to the alternative relief sought by them, i.e., a protective orderconcerning the information sought in plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure, including the entireclaim file of NYCM. It is well established that an insurance company's claim file is conditionallyexempt from disclosure as material prepared in anticipation of litigation (see CPLR 3101[d] [2]; Lamberson v Village of Allegany, 158 AD2d 943 [1990]). Nevertheless, materialprepared in anticipation of litigation may be subject to disclosure upon a showing of substantialneed and the inability "without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent" of thematerial from another source (CPLR 3101 [d] [2]) and, here, plaintiff made such a showing(see Dempski v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 249 AD2d 895, 896 [1998]). In order toestablish his entitlement to rescission of the release based on fraud, plaintiff must establish, interalia, a material misrepresentation of fact and defendants' knowledge of its falsity with intent todeceive (see Liling v Segal, 220 AD2d 724, 726 [1995]). The handwritten notes made byFoy in the claim file may be the only direct evidence of his state of mind with respect to therelease, particularly in light of the fact that he testified at his deposition that he could not recallthe specifics of his conversations with plaintiff or Laspro (see Gaglia v Wells, 112 AD2d138, 139 [1985]; cf. Ainsworth v Union Free School Dist. No. 2, Queensbury, 38 AD2d770, 771 [1972]). In addition, we note that the attorney representing Foy directed him at hisdeposition not to answer questions concerning his evaluation of plaintiff's claims or thereasonableness of the settlement amount. Moreover, plaintiff is unable to obtain those notes fromany other source (see Dempski, 249 AD2d at 896).

We thus conclude that the court should have granted in part the cross motion of Foy andNYCM and should have denied in part plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure inasmuch as themotion is overly broad to the extent that it sought NYCM's entire claim file. Plaintiff is entitledonly to documents in the claim file that were prepared from the date of the accident until andincluding the date of execution of the release, because anything prepared for the claim file afterthe release was executed is not relevant to plaintiff's claims (see id.). We thereforemodify the order accordingly, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for an in camera reviewof those documents prepared on or before the date of execution of the release to determine whatdocuments are material and necessary in the prosecution of plaintiff's action and whatdocuments, if any, should be shielded from disclosure on the ground of privilege (seeCPLR 3101 [d] [2]; Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank, 78 NY2d 371, 378[1991]).[*3]

All concur except Scudder, P.J., and Smith, J., whodissent and vote to reverse in accordance with the following memorandum.

Scudder, P.J., and Smith, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, wewould grant the cross motion of New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company and itsagent, Jack Foy (collectively, defendants), for summary judgment dismissing the complaintagainst them.

Several months after injuring his arm in an accident at the home of defendants Eileen M.Hodson and Jeremy L. Hodson, plaintiff signed a release of all claims against the Hodsonsarising from the accident. During his deposition testimony, plaintiff acknowledged that he readand understood the entire release before signing it, i.e., he understood that by signing it he wouldreceive $4,000, and he admitted that he received that sum of money.

"Where, as here, the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a releaseis a 'jural act' binding on the parties" (Booth v 3669 Delaware, 92 NY2d 934, 935[1998]; see Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 563-564 [1969]; Marlowe vMuhlnickel, 294 AD2d 830, 831 [2002]). A release "should never be converted into astarting point for renewed litigation except under circumstances and under rules which wouldrender any other result a grave injustice. It is for this reason that the traditional bases for settingaside written agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake, must beestablished or else the release stands" (Mangini, 24 NY2d at 563). Here, we reject thecontention of plaintiff that his consent was the result of mutual mistake, mistake on his own part,or fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Foy.

With respect to plaintiff's allegation of mutual mistake, we note the well-establishedprinciple that a "contract or stipulation entered into under a mutual mistake of fact is subject torescission if such mutual mistake existed at the time the contract was entered into and is sosubstantial that the agreement does not represent a true meeting of the parties' minds" (Carney v Carozza, 16 AD3d 867,868-869 [2005]). We conclude, however, that plaintiff failed to establish that such a mistakeexisted inasmuch as, in support of that contention, he alleges only that he now believes that hisclaim is worth more than he received, and that he did not know that his workers' compensationcarrier would assert a claim against the settlement proceeds. Those allegations do not concernmutual mistake but, rather, they concern an alleged unilateral mistake on the part of plaintiff, andthose allegations in any event also are insufficient to raise an issue of fact whether the releaseshould be rescinded based on plaintiff's unilateral mistake. The fact that plaintiff "may not haveunderstood collateral consequences of the release without pursuing the matter further with hisworkers' compensation insurer is of no moment insofar as [defendants are] concerned"(Elliott v Gehen, 105 AD2d 1112, 1113 [1984], affd 64 NY2d 832 [1985]), and"plaintiff cannot avoid the release by now claiming that he did not understand its terms"(Finklea v Heim, 262 AD2d 1056, 1057 [1999]). It is well settled that "a mere unilateralmistake on the part of [plaintiff] with respect to the meaning and effect of the release. . . does not constitute an adequate basis for invalidating a clear, unambiguous andvalidly executed release" (Booth, 242 AD2d 921, 922, affd 92 NY2d 934).

Plaintiff's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Foy are similarlyinsufficient to raise an issue of fact whether the release should be rescinded. "A party seeking toset aside a release on the ground of fraud bears the burden of establishing 'a materialmisrepresentation of fact, made with knowledge of its falsity, with intent to deceive, justifiablereliance and damages' . . . The plaintiff's allegations of fraud[ ] are, on their face,insufficient" (Liling v Segal, 220 AD2d 724, 726 [1995]). Here, "[t]he fraudulentmisrepresentations alleged by [plaintiff] were not made by [defendants] and [plaintiff has]produced no evidence that [defendants] participated in the alleged fraud" (Downes vAran, 229 AD2d 1025 [1996], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 89 NY2d 911[1996]; see Key Bank v Ryan, 132 AD2d 220, 222-223 [1987]). Finally, although "aunilateral mistake induced by fraud will support a claim for rescission . . . ,plaintiff's [*4]claims of fraud are insufficient, as previouslynoted" (Angel v Bank ofTokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., 39 AD3d 368, 369-370 [2007]).

Consequently, inasmuch as defendants met their initial burden with respect to the validity ofthe general release and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, Supreme Court erred indenying the cross motion of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint againstthem (see Seff v Meltzer, Lippe,Goldstein & Schlissel, P.C., 55 AD3d 592 [2008]; Marlowe, 294 AD2d at 831).In view of our determination with respect to the cross motion, we conclude that plaintiff's motionto compel disclosure with respect to defendants is moot. We therefore would reverse the order,grant the cross motion, dismiss the complaint against defendants, and dismiss plaintiff's motion.Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.


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