| Parra v Hughes |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 09898 [79 AD3d 1113] |
| December 28, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Carlos Parra et al., Appellants, v James F. Hughes et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Kim, Patterson & Sciarrino, P.C., Bayside, N.Y. (Jerome D. Patterson of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an orderof the Supreme Court, Queens County (Hart, J.), dated May 24, 2010, which denied their motionfor summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs' motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.
The instant action arises out of a five-car motor vehicle accident that occurred on the upperlevel of the Verrazano Narrows Bridge on July 6, 2008. The plaintiff Carlos Parra was operatingthe second vehicle, in which the plaintiff Maria Parra was a passenger, and the defendant Tyler J.Hughes (hereinafter the defendant) was operating the fourth vehicle, which was owned by thedefendants James Hughes and Jill Hughes. At the time of the accident, traffic had apparentlycome to a stop, when the defendant's vehicle struck the vehicle in front of him, pushing it into theback of the plaintiff's vehicle.
"A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case ofnegligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut theinference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision" (Volpe v Limoncelli, 74 AD3d 795,795 [2010]; see DeLouise v S.K.I.Wholesale Beer Corp., 75 AD3d 489, 490 [2010]; Staton v Ilic, 69 AD3d 606 [2010]; Lampkin v Chan, 68 AD3d 727[2009]; Klopchin v Masri, 45 AD3d737, 737 [2007]; see also Abbott v Picture Cars E., Inc., 78 AD3d 869 [2d Dept2010]).
Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby tendering their affidavits, wherein they stated that they had been at a stop in traffic on thebridge when their vehicle was struck in the rear by another vehicle, which had been pushed intothem by the defendant's vehicle. In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.The [*2]defendant submitted an affidavit wherein he stated thathe "was attempting to change lanes and merge into my destination lane when the vehicle [in frontof him] came to an abrupt stop." However, the defendant's claim that the vehicle immediately infront of him made a sudden stop, standing alone, was insufficient, under the circumstances of thiscase, to rebut the presumption of negligence (see Volpe v Limoncelli, 74 AD3d 795 [2010]; Staton v Ilic, 69 AD3d 606 [2010];Lampkin v Chan, 68 AD3d 727[2009]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs' motion for summaryjudgment on the issue of liability. Mastro, J.P., Florio, Dickerson, Belen and Lott, JJ., concur.