| People v Haddock |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 00108 [80 AD3d 885] |
| January 13, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JohnHaddock, Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Brittany L. Grome, Law Intern), forrespondent.
Lahtinen, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lamont, J.), rendered May 15,2009 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of failure to registerunder the Sex Offender Registration Act.
Defendant is a risk level three sex offender required to register under the Sexual OffenderRegistration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). He has been convicted several times forfailing to register; one conviction was reversed (People v Haddock, 48 AD3d 969, 971 [2008], lv denied 12NY3d 854 [2009]). Upon being released from his most recent incarceration in March 2007,defendant refused to provide a correction counselor with information about where he planned toreside. Shortly thereafter, police learned that he had been residing, unregistered, in the City ofAlbany for a period exceeding 10 days. He was indicted on one count of failing to register(see Correction Law §§ 168-f, 168-t) and, following a jury trial, convicted ofthe charged crime. Supreme Court sentenced him to 1 to 3 years in prison. Defendant appeals.
Where, as here, defendant contends that his conviction is not supported by legally sufficientevidence, "we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, and will not disturb aconviction as long as the evidence at trial establishes 'any valid line of reasoning and permissibleinferences that could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder' "(People v Lynch, 95 NY2d 243, 247 [2000] [brackets omitted], quoting People vWilliams, 84 NY2d 925, [*2]926 [1994]). The Peopleproduced proof through various witnesses establishing that defendant's prior sex-relatedconviction made him subject to the registration requirements, he had knowledge of theserequirements since he was informed thereof upon his most recent release from prison, hethereafter lived in Albany for a period exceeding 10 days without reporting his address, and hehad a prior conviction for failing to register. All elements of the crime were established by legallysufficient evidence.
The double jeopardy arguments advanced by defendant are without merit. His earlierconviction for failing to register that we reversed (People v Haddock, 48 AD3d at 969)involved acts that long predated—and thus were separate and distinct from—the actsconstituting the current crime (see e.g.Matter of Martinucci v Becker, 50 AD3d 1293, 1294 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d709 [2008]). Defendant's further argument that double jeopardy was implicated because hisunderlying sex crime occurred before the Sex Offender Registration Act was enacted is anargument that we have previously considered and found unavailing (see e.g. People v Szwalla, 61 AD3d1289, 1290 [2009]).
Supreme Court did not err in denying defendant's request to represent himself. Thereasonableness of a trial court's decision regarding an application to proceed pro se is notmeasured solely by a particular colloquy, but includes all relevant aspects of the record prior tothe decision (see People v Thomas,73 AD3d 1223, 1224 [2010], lv dismissed 15 NY3d 779 [2010]). After juryselection and prior to opening statements, defendant stated that he wanted to represent himself.Throughout pretrial hearings and the proceedings to that point in the trial, defendant wasrepeatedly disruptive, had numerous outbursts, continually disregarded the court's instructions,constantly interrupted proceedings, often broke into profanity-laced diatribes, and evinced noability to present even a minimally cogent defense or to conduct himself in a manner that wouldpermit a fair and orderly trial.
Review of the record reveals that defendant received meaningful representation. He failed todemonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanation for his counsel's purportedshortcomings, including his decision to withdraw certain peremptory challenges (see People vColon, 90 NY2d 824, 826 [1997]; see generally People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; Peoplev Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion with thesentence it imposed and there are no extraordinary circumstances meriting a reduction ofdefendant's sentence (see People vSieber, 26 AD3d 535, 536 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 853 [2006]). Theremaining arguments have been considered and found unavailing.
Peters, J.P., Rose, Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.