| Matter of Fuentes v Planning Bd. of the Vil. of Woodbury |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 01837 [82 AD3d 883] |
| March 8, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Michael Fuentes, Respondent, v PlanningBoard of the Village of Woodbury, Appellant. |
—[*1] Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone, LLP, Goshen, N.Y. (Jay R. Myrow of counsel), forrespondent.
In a hybrid proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination ofthe Planning Board of the Village of Woodbury denying Michael Fuentes's application for theremoval of a restriction on a plat map, and action for declaratory relief, the Planning Board of theVillage of Woodbury appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Slobod,J.), dated November 30, 2009, which, in effect, granted the petition, annulled the determination,and remitted the matter to the Planning Board of the Village of Woodbury for a newdetermination.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioner/plaintiff, Michael Fuentes, purchased two undeveloped lots at a tax sale. Afteracquiring title, he reviewed the plat map and learned that the lots were designated "Open Area 'A'" and "Open Area 'B,' " and were subject to a map notation stating that they were "not approvedfor building lots." Interpreting this as an indication that the lots had not been approved forbuilding at the time the plat map was approved, Fuentes sought amendment of the map andpermission to build from the Planning Board of the Village of Woodbury (hereinafter thePlanning Board). The Planning Board denied his application, interpreting the map note asmandating that the lots in question were to remain open space in perpetuity, and finding thatremoval of the map notation not was not in the public interest.
A court reviewing a CPLR article 78 petition may not disturb the decision of a municipalbody charged with determining land use questions unless that body's decision is arbitrary andcapricious, lacks a rational basis, or is an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Gebbie v Mammina, 13 NY3d 728, 729 [2009]; Matter of Shuttle Contr. Corp. v PlanningBd. of the Inc. Vil. of Great Neck, 73 AD3d 789 [2010]; Matter of Home Depot, U.S.A. v Town Bd.of Town of Hempstead, 63 AD3d 938, 938-939 [2009]; Matter of Spears v Town of CortlandtPlanning Bd., 44 AD3d 866, 867 [2007]; Matter of Filipowski v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of GreenwoodLake, 38 AD3d 545, 546 [2007]; Matter of Olivieri v Planning Bd. of Town ofGreenburgh, 229 AD2d 584 [1996]). As we have recently stated, "[a] local planning boardhas broad discretion in reaching its determination on applications for subdividing property, andjudicial review is [*2]limited to determining whether the actiontaken by the board was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Shuttle Contr.Corp. v Planning Bd. of the Inc. Vil. of Great Neck, 73 AD3d at 789).
Town Law § 278 permits a town to approve a cluster development, but requires that itsplanning board nevertheless act in accordance with the zoning regulations and the regulations ithas established (see Town Law § 278 [3]; Matter of Bayswater Realty &Capital Corp. v Planning Bd. of Town of Lewisboro, 76 NY2d 460, 467 [1990]). Here, theTown of Woodbury adopted a local ordinance implementing Town Law § 278, but, inapproving the subdivision in question, the Planning Board did not act in conformity with therequirements for a cluster development. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the designation of themap as a "cluster plan," a cluster development could not have been created in this instance(see Town Law § 278 [3] [b], [c]; Matter of Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp.v Planning Bd. of Town of Lewisboro, 76 NY2d at 467). Consequently, the Planning Board'sconclusion that development of the subject lots was prohibited due to their inclusion as openspace in a cluster development lacked a rational basis.
Nevertheless, a planning board has the authority to restrict development, provided that it doesso in such a way as to give notice to all interested parties (see Matter of Hoffmann vGunther, 245 AD2d 511, 513 [1997]). In so doing, however, a board may not rely on minutesof meetings to establish the meaning of a restriction, for an interested party is not required toconsult such documents (id.).
Here, the note on the map, which Fuentes properly concedes is part of his chain of title(see generally Town of Brookhaven v Dinos, 76 AD2d 555, 562 [1980], affd 54NY2d 911 [1981]), states only that subject lots "are not approved for building lots."Notwithstanding the Planning Board minutes indicating that it intended for the lots to remainundeveloped, the Planning Board failed to make this restriction clear in any document whichbecame part of Fuentes's chain of title (id.). Thus, although the Planning Board couldproperly enforce the language recorded on the plat map (see O'Mara v Town of Wappinger, 9 NY3d 303, 309 [2007];Patten Corp. v Association of Prop. Owners of Sleepy Hollow Lake, 172 AD2d 996, 999[1991]; Town of Brookhaven v Dinos, 76 AD2d at 562), the language contained thereondoes not adequately convey a perpetual restriction on development of these lots (see generallyPatten Corp. v Association of Prop. Owners of Sleepy Hollow Lake, 172 AD2d at999-1000). Accordingly, the Planning Board's conclusion that the plat map contained a perpetualrestriction on the development of the subject lots lacked a rational basis.
Finally, as the Supreme Court correctly noted, the Planning Board's finding that removing therestriction recorded on the map would be detrimental to the public welfare was conclusory andnot supported by the record. Accordingly, and notwithstanding its powers to act in the interest ofthe public (see Village Law § 7-730 [1]), the Planning Board's findings thatpermitting development of lots "[would] not substantially serve the public convenience, safetyand welfare, and [would] be detrimental to the neighborhood and the environment," and that itwould not be "in the interest of the health, safety and welfare of Village residents for therestrictions on these lands to be lifted," lacked a rational basis and, thus, the Supreme Courtproperly, in effect, granted the petition and annulled the determination (see Matter of HomeDepot, U.S.A. v Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead 63 AD3d at 939; Matter of Filipowskiv Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Greenwood Lake, 38 AD3d at 547; Matter of International Innovative Tech.Group Corp. v Planning Bd. of Town of Woodbury, N.Y., 20 AD3d 531, 533 [2005]).Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.