| People v Wade |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 05897 [86 AD3d 713] |
| July 14, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ronnie Wade,Appellant. |
—[*1] Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sise, J.), rendered June 15, 2009in Ulster County, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree.
In satisfaction of a six-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminalsale of a controlled substance in the third degree and was sentenced as a second felony offenderto a prison term of six years followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant nowappeals, contending that his plea was involuntary due to alleged misrepresentations made byCounty Court (Bruhn, J.) regarding his period of postrelease supervision.
The case law makes clear that "a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must beaware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly,voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action" (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 245[2005]; see People v Brown, 77AD3d 1053, 1054 [2010]; People vMeyers, 73 AD3d 1231, 1231 [2010]). Thus, where the sentencing court fails to apprisea defendant—prior to the imposition of sentencing—of either the mandatoryimposition of postrelease supervision or the "specific duration or range [there]of . . ., the voluntariness of the plea may be challenged on appeal even absent preservation of the issueby postallocution motion" (People v Lee, 80 AD3d [*2]1072, 1073 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 832 [2011]; see People v Murray, 15 NY3d725, 726-727 [2010]; People vGrimm, 69 AD3d 1231, 1231-1232 [2010], lv granted 14 NY3d 888 [2010]).
Here, however, defendant does not claim that the sentencing court failed to apprise him thathe would be subject to a specified period of postrelease supervision. Rather, defendant contendsthat his plea bargain included the minimum period of postrelease supervision allowable bystatute, which he asserts is 1½ years, and, therefore, the imposition of a longer termrendered his plea involuntary. Assuming, without deciding, that such a claim presents anexception to the preservation requirement, defendant's assertion that County Courtmisrepresented the term of postrelease supervision to be imposed lacks merit. The record reflectsthat defendant repeatedly was advised—both during the course of his plea and prior to theimposition of sentence—that he would be subject to three years of postrelease supervision.Under these circumstances, we decline to reverse in the interest of justice (see People vLee, 80 AD3d at 1073).
Rose, J.P., Malone Jr., Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.