| LaMarca v Scotto Bros. Woodbury Rest., Inc. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06474 [87 AD3d 984] |
| September 13, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Elba LaMarca et al., Respondents, v Scotto BrothersWoodbury Restaurant, Inc., Doing Business as Fox Hollow,Appellant. |
—[*1] Allen H. Weiss, Lake Success, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), entered December 2, 2009, which denied itsmotion, in effect, for leave to enter judgment against the plaintiffs dismissing the action andgranted the plaintiffs' cross motion, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant toCPLR 3404 and to restore the case to the trial calendar.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion, in effect,for leave to enter judgment against the plaintiffs dismissing the action is granted, and theplaintiffs' cross motion, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the action and to restore the case tothe trial calendar is denied.
A plaintiff seeking to restore a case to the trial calendar more than one year after it has beenmarked "off," and after it has been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404, must demonstrate apotentially meritorious cause of action, a reasonable excuse for the delay in prosecuting theaction, a lack of intent to abandon the action, and a lack of prejudice to the defendants (see Vaream v Corines, 78 AD3d933 [2010]; M. Parisi & SonConstr. Co., Inc. v Long Is. Obs/Gyn, P.C., 39 AD3d 819, 820 [2007]; Basetti vNour, 287 AD2d 126, 130-131 [2001]). The plaintiff is required to satisfy all fourcomponents of the test before the dismissal can be vacated and the case restored (see Vaream v Corines, 78 AD3d933 [2010]; M. Parisi & Son Constr. Co., Inc. v Long Is. Obs/Gyn, P.C., 39 AD3d at820; Krichmar v Queens Med. Imaging,P.C., 26 AD3d 417, 419 [2006]).
Here, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy all four components of the test. The plaintiffs' conclusoryand unsubstantiated claim that they did not have the funds to pay for the trial-related expensesprior to trial was insufficient to excuse the more than two-year delay in obtaining a new trialattorney and an expert witness (see Vaream v Corines, 78 AD3d at 933-934; Leinas v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 72AD3d 905, 906 [2010]; Tate v Peninsula Hosp. Ctr., 255 AD2d 503, 504 [1998];Carter v City of New York, 231 AD2d 485 [1996]). Furthermore, the only activity duringthe two-year period between the time the case was marked off and the defendant's motion todismiss was former counsel's motion to withdraw. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffsfailed to rebut the [*2]presumption of abandonment that attacheswhen a case has automatically been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404 (see Okun v Tanners, 11 NY3d762, 763 [2008]; Krichmar v Queens Med. Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d at 419;Schwartz v Mandelbaum & Gluck, 266 AD2d 273, 274 [1999]; Dalto v 3660 ParkWantagh Owners, 275 AD2d 296 [2000]). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' cross motion, in effect,to vacate the dismissal of the action and to restore the case to the trial calendar should have beendenied, and the defendant's motion, in effect, for leave to enter judgment against the plaintiffsdismissing the action should have been granted (see Vaream v Corines, 78 AD3d at 934).Dillon, J.P., Covello, Balkin, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.