Matter of Nathan O. v Jennifer P.
2011 NY Slip Op 07336 [88 AD3d 1125]
October 20, 2011
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 7, 2011


In the Matter of Nathan O., Respondent,
v
Jennifer P. et al.,Appellants. (And Another Related Proceeding.)

—[*1]Matthew J. Mann, Latham, for appellants.

King, Adang, Aprey, Strickland & Thompson, L.L.P., Saratoga Springs (Joshua A. Silver ofcounsel), for respondent.

McCarthy, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Family Court of Saratoga County (Hall, J.),entered May 5, 2010, which, in two proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act articles 5 and 6,denied the motion of respondent Jennifer P. to dismiss the petitions, and (2) from an order of saidcourt, entered June 18, 2010, which, among other things, granted petitioner's application, in twoproceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act articles 5 and 6, to adjudicate petitioner as the father of achild born to respondent Jennifer P.

Up until at least April 6, 2009, petitioner and respondent Jennifer P. (hereinafter the mother)engaged in a sexual relationship, although they dispute when that relationship ended. Inmid-April 2009, the mother engaged in a sexual relationship and began cohabiting withrespondent Uwe P. The mother married Uwe P. in June 2009 and gave birth to a child onDecember 6, 2009. At the time of the birth, Uwe P. was listed as the child's father on the birthcertificate.

Shortly after the child's birth, petitioner filed two petitions seeking a declaration of paternityand either custody or visitation. Uwe P. cross-petitioned for a declaration of paternity. FamilyCourt denied the mother's motion to dismiss the petitions and ordered the parties and [*2]child to submit to DNA testing, with the results sealed pendingfurther proceedings. During a hearing to address whether the presumption of legitimacy shouldpreclude DNA testing (see Family Ct Act § 532 [a]), the parties consented tounsealing the DNA test results, which revealed a high likelihood that petitioner was thebiological father. The parties then stipulated to an order of parenting time for petitioner, subjectto respondents' right to appeal the court's ruling on jurisdiction and standing. Over respondents'objections, Family Court declared that petitioner is the father of the child, entered an order offiliation to that effect, and dismissed Uwe P.'s paternity petition. Respondents appeal.[FN*]

Family Court has "exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings to establish paternity"(Family Ct Act § 511; see NY Const, art VI, § 13 [b] [5]). Respondentsargue that the court has no jurisdiction to determine paternity of a child born to a marriedwoman. This argument is based upon statutory definitions of "child," "mother" and "father"limiting those terms to situations involving "a child born out of wedlock" (Family Ct Act §512). Respondents' interpretation, however, cannot be harmonized with other aspects of FamilyCt Act article 5. For example, their interpretation is belied by the statutory phrase "presumptionof legitimacy of a child born to a married woman" (Family Ct Act § 532 [a]); the use of theword "married" would be unnecessary and superfluous under respondents' view. Considering thebroad grant of jurisdiction in the NY Constitution and in Family Ct Act § 511, along withthe numerous cases where courts have addressed paternity of children born to married mothers(see e.g. Matter of Mark T. v JoyannaU., 70 AD3d 1068 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 715 [2010]; Matter of SharonGG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466, 467 [1983], affd 63 NY2d 859 [1984]), and theconflict between the definitions in Family Ct Act § 512 and other aspects of Family Ct Actarticle 5, we hold that Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to address the paternity of achild born to a married woman.

As a "person alleging to be the father," petitioner had standing to commence a paternityproceeding (Family Ct Act § 522; see Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95AD2d at 467). Family Ct Act § 523 only requires the petition to allege that a certainindividual is the father of the subject child. "A party seeking paternity testing under the Family CtAct need not provide factual support for the allegations of paternity or nonpaternity; he or sheneed only articulate some basis for them," sufficient to show that a nonfrivolous controversyexists regarding paternity (Matter ofGutierrez v Gutierrez-Delgado, 33 AD3d 1133, 1134 [2006] [citations omitted]; seeProwda v Wilner, 217 AD2d 287, 289 [1995]). Here, in his application filed less than amonth after the child's birth, petitioner alleged that he engaged in a sexual relationship with themother during the probable time of conception, that the mother was not married at that time, andthat he is the child's father. This information was sufficient to commence the paternityproceeding.

Respondents consented—during the middle of a hearing—to Family Courtunsealing the [*3]DNA test results. Upon learning of thoseresults, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order of visitation to petitioner, subject torespondents' reservation of the right to appeal based on the court's ruling regarding jurisdictionand standing. In light of their consent, with this limited reservation of rights, respondents havewaived their argument that Family Court was required to conduct a full hearing concerning thechild's best interests (see Family Ct Act § 532 [a]) before issuing an order offiliation. Hence, we will not address that argument.

Mercure, J.P., Malone Jr., Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal fromthe order entered May 5, 2010 is dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the order entered June18, 2010 is affirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *: Because the May 2010 orderdenying the mother's motion to dismiss the petitions is a nonfinal order, respondents cannotappeal from that order as of right (see Family Ct Act § 1112 [a]). Although we aredismissing the appeal from that order, upon the appeal from the June 2010 final order weconsider respondents' arguments as they pertain to the May 2010 order (see Matter ofBeaudoin v William HH., 157 AD2d 995, 995-996 [1990]).


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