Sang Seok Na v Greyhound Lines, Inc.
2011 NY Slip Op 07623 [88 AD3d 980]
October 25, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 7, 2011


Sang Seok Na, Appellant,
v
Greyhound Lines, Inc., et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Paul H. Schietroma, New York, N.Y. (Powers & Santola, LLP [Michael J. Hutter], ofcounsel), for appellant.

Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford, P.C., New York, N.Y. (William G. Ballaine and JanineBrown of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Schulman, J.), entered October 14, 2010, which denied hismotion, in effect, to vacate the automatic dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3404 and torestore the action to the trial calendar.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A plaintiff seeking to restore a case to the trial calendar more than one year after it has beenmarked "off," and after it has been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404, must demonstrate theexistence of a potentially meritorious cause of action, a reasonable excuse for the delay inprosecuting the action, a lack of intent to abandon the action, and a lack of prejudice to thedefendant (see Vidal v Ricciardi, 81AD3d 635 [2011]; Leinas v LongIs. Jewish Med. Ctr., 72 AD3d 905, 906 [2010]; Strancewilko v Martin, 50 AD3d 671 [2008]; Basetti vNour, 287 AD2d 126, 131 [2001]).

Here, even though the plaintiff retained new counsel eight months after the action had beenautomatically dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404, incoming counsel's explanation, inter alia, thathe did not know that a note of issue had been filed and the matter had been stricken from the trialcalendar, was not a reasonable excuse for the further two-year-and-two-month delay between thetime he was retained and the present motion to vacate the dismissal and to restore the action tothe trial calendar (see Gajek v HamptonBays Volunteer Ambulance Corps., Inc., 77 AD3d 885, 886 [2010]; Pullem v Townof Babylon, 253 AD2d 805 [1998]; Hoenig v Stetefeldt, 127 AD2d 632 [1987];Berger v Colrick, 20 AD2d 639, 640 [1964]). Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to rebutthe presumption of abandonment that attached after the automatic dismissal. Other than minimalactivity by prior counsel regarding the case, there was no other activity in the case during the twoyears and 10 months following its dismissal and the plaintiff's present motion to restore (see Vaream v Corines, 78 AD3d933 [2010]; Bornstein v ClearviewProps., Inc., 68 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2009]; Shah v Carlton Gardens Hous. Co.,286 AD2d 432, 433 [2001]; Fico v Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 248 AD2d 432, 433[1998]). Moreover, since the subject accident occurred more than nine years prior to the date thatthe plaintiff made his motion, the [*2]defendants, under thecircumstances of this case, would be prejudiced if the action were restored to the trial calendar(see Vidal v Ricciardi, 81 AD3d at 636; Gajek v Hampton Bays VolunteerAmbulance Corps., Inc., 77 AD3d at 886; Bornstein v Clearview Props., Inc., 68AD3d at 1035; Krichmar v Queens Med.Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d 417, 419 [2006]). Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion wasproperly denied. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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