| People v Allen |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07853 [89 AD3d 742] |
| November 1, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Keagan Russel Allen, Appellant. |
—[*1] William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Joan H. McCarthy of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Hayes, J.),rendered April 3, 2008, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree,upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after ahearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physicalevidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, those branches of the defendant's omnibusmotion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officialsare granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, DutchessCounty, for the purpose of entering an order in its discretion pursuant to CPL 160.50.
The defendant was charged by indictment with criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and unlawfulpossession of marihuana.
At the suppression hearing, a New York State Trooper testified that on June 22, 2007, atapproximately 3:45 a.m., he observed the defendant's vehicle approaching from the oppositedirection with its high beams on. The high beams caused the State Trooper to squint his eyes ashe was driving. As a result, the State Trooper turned his vehicle around, followed the defendant'svehicle, and then pulled the defendant over. The State Trooper's partner approached thedefendant's vehicle, and from his position outside that vehicle, observed a handgun protrudingfrom beneath the driver's seat of the defendant's car. Following a search of the defendant'svehicle, the State Troopers recovered, inter alia, the handgun, cocaine, and marihuana.
The County Court, after a hearing, denied those branches of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.Specifically, the County Court found that the defendant's high beams hindered the State Trooper'svision so as to provide probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated Vehicle andTraffic Law § 375 (3). Thereafter, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to criminalpossession of a weapon [*2]in the second degree.
The defendant appeals, challenging, among other things, the hearing court's suppressionruling. We reverse.
A police officer may lawfully stop a vehicle based upon probable cause that there has been aVehicle and Traffic Law violation (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 348-349[2001]; People v Johnson, 83 AD3d733 [2011]; People v Sluszka,15 AD3d 421, 423 [2005]). To establish a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3), the People must show (1) the use of high beams when an approaching vehicle is within 500feet, and (2) interference with the vision of that driver by reason of such high beams (seePeople v Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 395 [1960]). We agree with the defendant's contention that inorder to constitute interference, a defendant's use of high beams must "hinder or hamper thevision of [the] approaching motorist" so as to actually have an effect upon the other driver'soperation of his or her vehicle (id. at 395). For example, in People v Meola, theCourt of Appeals found sufficient proof of interference where a State Trooper testified that thedefendant's high beams caused the officer to reduce his speed (id. at 395-396).
Here, by contrast, the proof adduced at the suppression hearing was insufficient todemonstrate that the defendant's use of his high beams affected the State Trooper's operation ofhis vehicle. Although the State Trooper was caused to squint, the defendant's high beams did nothinder or hamper the vision of the State Trooper so as to affect the operation of his vehicle.
We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the Court of Appeals in Meoladetermined that merely causing a driver to squint, absent a tangible manifestation ofinterference with the driver's operation of the motor vehicle, is sufficient to establish probablecause to believe that a defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (3). To thecontrary, the Court of Appeals in Meola explained that the conduct of an accused whichis proscribed by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (3) is the operation of high beams so as toproduce a dazzling light, and "the effect of such conduct upon the complainant is interferencewith his [or her] vision and hence with the operation of his [or her] car" (People v Meola,7 NY2d at 395 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Otherwise, if a defendant's high beams wereto simply cause another driver to blink, that conduct may be found to constitute a violation ofVehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (3).
Therefore, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was improper, and all further actions by thepolice as a direct result of the stop were illegal (see People v Rose, 67 AD3d 1447, 1449 [2009]). Since there wasno other basis to stop the defendant's vehicle, the evidence recovered as a result of the unlawfulstop must be suppressed.
In light of our determination, the defendant's remaining contentions have been renderedacademic. Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, and Hall, JJ., concur.
Balkin, J., dissents and votes to affirm the judgment with the following memorandum.
Balkin, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent, and vote to affirm the judgment because Iconclude that the State Trooper had probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle based on oneor more violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
As relevant here, section 375 (3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that "whenever avehicle approaching from ahead is within five hundred feet . . . the headlamps, if ofthe multiple beam type . . . shall be operated so that dazzling light does notinterfere with the driver of the approaching vehicle" (Vehicle and Traffic Law §375 [3] [emphasis added]). The testimony at the suppression hearing established that thedefendant's and the State Trooper's vehicles were approaching from opposite directions and wereless than 500 feet away from each other. It was nighttime, and the defendant's high beams wereilluminated. Further, as my colleagues in the [*3]majorityrecognize, the defendant's high beams "caused the State Trooper to squint his eyes as he wasdriving." Nothing more is required to constitute a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §375 (3).
According to our Court of Appeals, " 'interfere' plainly means to hinder or hamper the visionof an approaching motorist" (People v Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 395 [1960]). InMeola, the Court rejected the defendant's constitutional challenge to the statute on theground that "interfere" was vague. The Court held that its meaning was sufficiently clear: "[t]heinterference contemplated was plainly hampering or hindering the vision of the approachingmotorist, and this element of interference is certainly susceptible of factual proof" (id. at397; cf. People v Rose, 67 AD3d1447, 1449 [2009]). Although the Court in Meola described the particular effect ofthe defendant's high beams on the complainant—the State Trooper slowed down—itdid not suggest that either an actual mishap or a prudent response by the driver affected by the"dazzling light" is a necessary element of the violation. In other words, contrary to the conclusionof my colleagues, the statute requires only interference with the complainant's vision and notsome measurable effect on the operation of the complainant's vehicle. That the defendant'soperation of his high beams caused the State Trooper here to squint gave the State Trooperprobable cause to believe that the defendant was committing a traffic infraction.
Inasmuch as the State Trooper's testimony established probable cause to stop the defendant'svehicle (see People v Johnson, 83AD3d 733 [2011]), I would hold that the suppression court properly denied those branchesof the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress the evidence resulting from that stopand his statements to law enforcement officials.
Next, by pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited review of his claim that the County Courterred in determining a motion in limine as to the admissibility of certain evidence (see Peoplev Campbell, 73 NY2d 481, 486 [1989]; People v Perry, 60 AD3d 974 [2009]; People v Mead, 198AD2d 612, 613 [1993]). To the extent the defendant contends that his plea was renderedinvoluntary by reason of the County Court's decision on the motion in limine, his contention isunpreserved for appellate review as he never moved to withdraw his plea (see People vPellegrino, 60 NY2d 636 [1983]; People v Graham, 261 AD2d 414 [1999]).
Lastly, I find nothing in the record which would cast doubt upon counsel's effectiveness(see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712-713 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.