| People v Perez |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07958 [89 AD3d 1393] |
| November 10, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edwin Perez,Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael C. Green, District Attorney, Rochester (Leslie E. Swift of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Stephen R. Sirkin, A.J.), rendered April 5,2006. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict ofmanslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). Defendant failed to preserve for ourreview his challenge to the alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence because he failed to move for atrial order of dismissal on the specific ground now raised (see People v Carncross, 14 NY3d 319, 324-325 [2010]; People vGray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). In any event, defendant's challenge lacks merit. Defendant wascharged as an accessory in connection with the stabbing of two victims. One of the victims survived theassault but sustained serious injuries, and the other victim later died (hereafter, decedent). Defendantwas acquitted of assault with respect to the surviving victim and was convicted as an accomplice withrespect to decedent. The evidence at trial establishes, and defendant concedes, that he received a cuton his hand during the altercation. The evidence further establishes that the codefendant repeatedlystabbed decedent, and that defendant assisted the codefendant by holding decedent while thecodefendant attacked him. Inasmuch as there is no evidence that defendant took any part in the attackupon the surviving victim, the jury could therefore have concluded that defendant received the cut byholding decedent while the codefendant stabbed him. Consequently, the evidence is legally sufficient toestablish defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the first degree (see People v Rutledge, 70 AD3d 1368 [2010], lv denied 15NY3d 777 [2010]; People v Borgos, 168 AD2d 628 [1990], lv denied 77 NY2d958 [1991]; see generally People v Medina, 276 AD2d 367 [2000], lv denied 96NY2d 737 [2001]). Furthermore, because there is no merit to defendant's challenge to the legalsufficiency of the evidence, there also is no merit to defendant's contention that defense counsel wasineffective in failing to raise that challenge (seee.g. People v Dozier, 32 AD3d 1346, 1347 [2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 880[2007]; People v Lascelle, 23 AD3d1137, 1139 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 755 [2005]). Viewing the evidence in light of theelements of the crime of manslaughter as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we further concludethat the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).[*2]
"Because defendant failed to request an instruction [that thejury must acquit him of manslaughter if it convicted the codefendant of murder] or object to the chargeas given [on that ground], defendant also failed to preserve for our review his further contention that[County Court (Sirkin, A.J.), who presided over the trial,] erred in failing to instruct the jury" to thateffect (People v Youngblood, 261 AD2d 960 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1029[1999]). We decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in theinterest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Although defendant requested a charge that hemust have intended that the codefendant cause serious injury to decedent and, thus, contrary to thePeople's contention, he preserved for our review his further contention concerning shared intent bothwith respect to the court's initial and supplemental charges on the issue (see People v Edwards, 23 AD3d1140, 1141 [2005]; see also People vRivera, 77 AD3d 483 [2010]), we conclude that his contention is without merit."[D]efendant's concern that without the requested charge the jury might have found him guilty. . . under a theory of accessorial liability without finding that he shared the requisite intentto [cause serious physical injury] was obviated by the court's recitation of Penal Law § 20.00,including the statement that acting in concert liability requires acting with the mental culpability requiredfor the commission of the crime charged" (People v Slacks, 90 NY2d 850, 851 [1997]).Therefore, because "the court sufficiently explained the applicable legal principles to the jury, it was notbound to charge the jury as defense counsel proposed" (People v Leach, 293 AD2d 760, 761[2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 677 [2002]).
Defendant further contends that his case was improperly transferred between Supreme Court andCounty Court in Monroe County for various purposes because there are no transfer orders in therecord (see generally 22 NYCRR 200.14). Defendant failed to preserve that contention forour review (see CPL 470.05 [2]), and we decline to exercise our power to review it as amatter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We reject defendant'scontention that the alleged transfer error constitutes a mode of proceedings error such that preservationis not required (see People v Ott, 83AD3d 1495 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 808 [2011]; see generally People v Wilson, 14 NY3d 895 [2010]).
Contrary to the further contention of defendant, County Court (Sirkin, A.J.) did not violateJudiciary Law § 21 by allegedly issuing a decision on defendant's suppression motion at trialwithout hearing the evidence in support of the motion. The record establishes that County Court(Lindley, A.J.) presided over the Wade hearing and expressly denied the suppression motion,and that Judge Sirkin at trial merely clarified for the record that the motion had been denied. Defendantfailed to preserve for our review his further contention that Judge Lindley failed to comply with CPL710.60 (6) by setting forth the reasons for his denial of the suppression motion (see People vBattle, 202 AD2d 1045, 1046 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 908 [1994]; People vHunt, 187 AD2d 981, 982 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 887 [1993]), and we decline toexercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (seeCPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Finally, we haveconsidered defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Green and Gorski, JJ.