Gosden v Elmira City School Dist.
2011 NY Slip Op 08874 [90 AD3d 1202]
December 8, 2011
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 1, 2012


Robert Gosden et al., Respondents, v Elmira City School District etal., Appellants.

—[*1]Law Firm of Frank Miller, East Syracuse (Frank W. Miller of counsel), for Elmira CitySchool District and another, appellants.

Davidson & O'Mara, P.C., Elmira (Ransom P. Reynolds Jr. of counsel), for Dan Hurley,appellant.

Schlather, Stumbar, Parks & Salk, L.L.P., Ithaca (Diane M. Bruns of counsel), for LynnGrottenthaler, appellant.

Hinman, Howard & Kattell, L.L.P., Elmira (Leslie P. Guy of counsel), forrespondents.

Lahtinen, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Mulvey, J.), entered December2, 2010 in Chemung County, which, among other things, granted plaintiffs' cross motion forpartial summary judgment, and (2) from the judgment entered thereon.

Plaintiff Robert Gosden is a former administrator at defendant Elmira City School District(hereinafter District) who retired in 2006. This action was commenced alleging, among otherthings, that the District and two members of defendant Elmira City School District Board ofEducation (hereinafter Board)—defendant Dan Hurley and defendant LynnGrottenthaler—breached a settlement agreement and defamed him. The settlementagreement resulted from an audit by the Comptroller which concluded that Gosden may havebeen improperly paid in excess of $35,000 for accrued annual leave when he retired andrecommended that the District take steps to recoup the funds. The Comptroller noted ambiguityin Gosden's contract, and a separate [*2]audit by the Districtindicated the amount due was about $13,400. Gosden and the District eventually entered into asettlement in which Gosden agreed to pay the District $8,000 in full satisfaction of any claim thatthe District might have against him. The agreement also included a confidentiality provision, aswell as a recitation that Gosden disputed that any overpayment had occurred.

A local newspaper obtained a copy of the agreement under the Freedom of Information Law(see Public Officers Law art 6) and published articles about it and the Comptroller'sreport in October 2008. In the meantime, Gosden and his company—plaintiff ManusManagement Consultant Services, Inc.—had contracted through the Board of CooperativeEducational Services to supply services to area school districts, including providing financialresponsibility training to Board members. In an article published in the local newspaper inNovember 2008, Board members Hurley and Grottenthaler were reported as being insulted andangry that Gosden would be paid to train them about financial responsibility and they werequoted as saying, among other things, that Gosden had admitted to wrongdoing regarding hisannual leave payout. Similar comments were reiterated by Hurley and Grottenthaler at a Boardmeeting. Soon thereafter, the Board of Cooperative Educational Services canceled a contract withManus Management.

Before disclosure was completed in this action, defendants moved to dismiss (seeCPLR 3211 [a]) and for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212). Plaintiffs cross-moved forsummary judgment on their breach of contract cause of action. Supreme Court denied defendants'motions, but granted plaintiffs' cross motion. The court awarded plaintiffs the $8,000 thatGosden had paid to settle the potential claims against him plus an amount to be determined at aninquest based on lost business by plaintiffs. Defendants appeal.

We consider first defendants' argument that there are factual issues regarding plaintiffs'breach of contract cause of action. Although the settlement agreement had a confidentialityprovision, the parties also recognized in the agreement that it might be disclosed for a lawfulpurpose and they specifically set forth permitted comments by the parties in the case of suchdisclosure. As relevant here, the parties agreed that "[a]ll other inquiries about this SettlementAgreement or the matter to which it pertains will be responded to by the [p]arties by stating thatthe matter has been 'settled to the satisfaction of the parties.' " The terms of the agreement did, infact, become public pursuant to a Freedom of Information Law request and there is no contentionon appeal that this disclosure was improper. Hurley and Grottenthaler had been Board memberswhen the settlement was negotiated and remained Board members at the time of their comments.Their comments, which were reported in a local newspaper in November 2008 and reiterated at aBoard meeting, went beyond the scope of the comments to which the parties had agreed. Thisconstituted a breach of the terms of the agreement by defendants.

Although there was a breach, to receive more than nominal damages, a successful breach ofcontract cause of action must also include proof of actual damages caused by the breach (see Howlett Farms, Inc. v Fessner, 78AD3d 1681, 1683 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 710 [2011]; 2 NY PJI 4:20, at 790[2011]). On causation and damages, the record reveals factual issues. As for the $8,000 thatGosden paid under the original agreement, it is apparent that a primary purpose of this paymentwas to obtain a release from a potential—although disputed—liability to the Districtof in excess of $35,000. Damages in a contract action should leave the injured person in as gooda position as full performance, but should not provide a windfall (see Brushton-Moira Cent.School Dist. v Thomas Assoc., 91 NY2d 256, 261 [1998]; 2 NY PJI 4:20, at 789-790[2011]). The amount—if any—of the $8,000 allottable to a breach of the [*3]confidentiality provision is a factual determination that may turn inpart on proof regarding the intended purpose of such provision (see Shalor Designs v NBAProps., 264 AD2d 686, 687 [1999]).

The issue of damages for purported lost profits is replete with factual issues. We note thatthese alleged damages are intertwined with a nonparty to the settlement agreement, i.e., ManusManagement. Moreover, in light of the fact that both the Comptroller's report and the settlementagreement had been made public and were reported in the newspaper prior to defendants' breachof the confidentiality agreement, there is a factual issue regarding causation. Further, factualissues exist as to whether consequential damages—such as lost profits to eitherplaintiff—was "within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach atthe time of or prior to contracting" (Kenford Co. v County of Erie, 73 NY2d 312, 319[1989] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d187, 192-193 [2008]). Accordingly, Supreme Court erred in awarding damages of $8,000and setting an inquest regarding damages for plaintiffs' lost profits.

Turning to plaintiffs' defamation causes of action, Supreme Court denied defendants'dismissal motion without prejudice to seeking summary judgment at the conclusion ofdisclosure. We agree with Supreme Court that plaintiffs set forth sufficient allegations and factsto avoid dismissal under either CPLR 3211 or CPLR 3212. Some of the comments made aboutGosden, when considered in context and tested against the understanding of an average listener,are " 'reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation' " (Wilcox v Newark Val. Cent. School Dist., 74 AD3d 1558, 1560[2010], quoting James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415, 419 [1976]; accord Clark v Schuylerville Cent. SchoolDist., 24 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2005]) and, accordingly, "it becomes the jury's function tosay whether that was the sense in which the words were likely to be understood by the ordinaryand average reader" (James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d at 419; see Carney v MemorialHosp. & Nursing Home of Greene County, 64 NY2d 770, 772 [1985]). Similarly, the variousdefenses asserted by defendants do not provide a basis for summary disposition of plaintiffs'defamation claims at this point in the litigation. The remaining arguments have been consideredand found unavailing.

Peters, J.P., Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and judgment aremodified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted plaintiffs' crossmotion for partial summary judgment and awarded damages; said motion granted only to theextent of determining that a breach of contract occurred; and, as so modified, affirmed.


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