| Matter of Diaz v Evans |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09233 [90 AD3d 1371] |
| December 22, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Jose Diaz, Petitioner, v Andrea W. Evans,as Chair of the Division of Parole, Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), forrespondent.
Lahtinen, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Board of Parolewhich rescinded petitioner's open parole release date and imposed a hold period of 24 months.
In 1991, in the course of trying to gun down a rival drug dealer, petitioner fired a hail ofbullets into a convenience store, killing an assistant district attorney for the Bronx DistrictAttorney's office. As a result, petitioner was convicted of, among other things, murder in thesecond degree and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 15 years to life. In April 2009, afterhis third appearance before the Board of Parole, the Board granted parole with an open parolerelease date of August 25, 2009. However, after they were notified of petitioner's impendingrelease, several members of the victim's family and the Bronx District Attorney's office submittedletters in opposition and petitioner's release was temporarily suspended. The Board concludedthat the information was new and accordingly scheduled a rescission hearing. Following thehearing, the Board determined that there was substantial evidence warranting rescission ofpetitioner's parole release and imposed a 24-month hold. Following an unsuccessfuladministrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding and Supreme [*2]Court ultimately transferred the proceeding to this Court.
We confirm. The Board's broad discretion to rescind parole is limited only by therequirement that there be substantial evidence of significant information not previously known bythe Board (see 9 NYCRR 8002.5 [b] [2] [i]; Matter of Pugh v New York State Bd. of Parole, 19 AD3d 991, 992[2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 713 [2005]; Matter of Ortiz v New York State Bd. ofParole, 239 AD2d 52, 55 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 811 [1998]). Here, the victimimpact statements taken following the original parole release decision and letters from thevictim's family members contain detailed descriptions of the ongoing devastating impacts ofpetitioner's crime, far beyond any information contained in petitioner's sentencing minutes or thepresentence investigation report. These statements and letters thus constituted significantinformation not previously known by the Board and provide substantial evidence to supportrescission (see Matter of Raheem v NewYork State Bd. of Parole, 66 AD3d 1270, 1272 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 702[2010]; Matter of Pugh v New York State Bd. of Parole, 19 AD3d at 993). To the extentthat petitioner contends that he was deprived of due process, our review of the recorddemonstrates that he was adequately represented by counsel and the proceedings employed inrescinding his parole were constitutionally sufficient (see Matter of Rizo v New York StateBd. of Parole, 251 AD2d 997, 998 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 811 [1998]; Matterof Ortiz v New York State Bd. of Parole, 239 AD2d at 57).
Petitioner's remaining contentions have been considered and found to be either unpreservedor without merit.
Mercure, A.P.J., Spain, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Adjudged that thedetermination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.