| People v Parker |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01283 [92 AD3d 807] |
| February 14, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Keenan Parker, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Keith Dolan ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Del Giudice,J.), rendered July 20, 2009, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict,and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in removing him from the courtroom prior to the prosecutor's summation. "Adefendant's right to be present at a criminal trial is encompassed within the confrontation clausesof the State and Federal Constitutions" (People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 139 [1982],citing US Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; see Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337,338 [1970]). However, the right to be present "may be waived, and a defendant may forfeit hisright to be present when his conduct 'unambiguously indicates a defiance of the processes of lawand it disrupts the trial after all parties are assembled and ready to proceed' " (People v Hendrix, 63 AD3d 958,958 [2009], quoting People v Sanchez, 65 NY2d 436, 444 [1985]; see People v Mitchell, 69 AD3d761 [2010]). Here, the removal came after the Supreme Court issued several admonitions,which were ignored, as the defendant's outbursts continued. Furthermore, given the defendant'sprior behavior, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant'sapplications to return to the courtroom (cf. People v Hendrix, 63 AD3d at 958; Peoplev Valdes, 283 AD2d 187 [2001]).
Likewise, there is no merit to the defendant's claim that the Supreme Court erred in itsSandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) by not settingforth its reasoning and the balancing process in which it engaged in making the Sandovalruling. "Our law does not require the application of any particular balancing process inSandoval determinations . . . Similarly, an exercise of a trial court'sSandoval discretion should not be disturbed merely because the court did not provide adetailed recitation of its underlying reasoning" (People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459[1994] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
The Supreme Court did not err in discharging a sworn juror over the protest of the [*2]defendant (see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290 [1987]).After a chance encounter with one of the prosecution's witnesses, the juror approached theSupreme Court to express his uneasiness over their brief exchange. When asked if he couldremain fair and impartial following the incident, the juror answered "I can't tell you." Based onthe juror's response, the Supreme Court was justified in concluding that the juror was "grosslyunqualified" to continue serving based on his inability to state that he would not be influenced byhis meeting with the witness (see Peoplev Lennon, 37 AD3d 853 [2007]; see generally People v Rodriguez, 71 NY2d214, 219 [1988]).
The contention raised by the defendant in his pro se supplemental brief is academic. Theremaining contention raised by the defendant in his main brief does not require reversal. Skelos,J.P., Leventhal, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.