| Wendover Fin. Servs. v Ridgeway |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01884 [93 AD3d 1156] |
| March 16, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Wendover Financial Services, Appellant, v Jo-AnnRidgeway, as Heir to the Estate of Amelia Donvito, Also Known as Amelia C. Donvito,Deceased, Respondent, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Scaccia Law Firm, Syracuse (Dante M. Scaccia of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (James P. Murphy, J.),entered December 16, 2010. The order, among other things, vacated a judgment of foreclosureand sale dated December 18, 2009.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law bydismissing the complaint and as modified the order is affirmed with costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff appeals from an order insofar as it denied, inter alia, those parts of itsmotion to reissue the judgment of foreclosure and to amend the caption to add defendant Jo-AnnRidgeway, who was sued as heir to the estate of Amelia Donvito, also known as Amelia C.Donvito (deceased) (hereafter, decedent), as the executrix of decedent's estate. AlthoughSupreme Court did not address those parts of the motion with respect to reissuing the judgmentand amending the caption, the failure to rule on those parts of the motion is deemed a denialthereof (see Fisher v Flanigan, 89AD3d 1398, 1399 [2011]; Brown v U.S. Vanadium Corp., 198 AD2d 863, 864[1993]).
Approximately 6½ years prior to her death, decedent executed a note and mortgagewith respect to her home (hereafter, property) that plaintiff alleges it now owns by virtue of aseries of assignments. Letters Testamentary were issued to Ridgeway following the death ofdecedent. Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage.Notwithstanding decedent's death, plaintiff named her as a defendant in the summons andcomplaint. We therefore conclude that "the action [against decedent] from its inception was anullity [inasmuch as] it is well established that the dead cannot be sued" (Marte v Graber, 58 AD3d 1, 3[2008]; see Jordan v City of NewYork, 23 AD3d 436, 437 [2005]; see also Arbelaez v Chun Kuei Wu, 18 AD3d 583 [2005]). Further,we conclude that the caption may not be properly amended pursuant to CPLR 305 (c). "Thatprovision is generally used to correct an irregularity, for example where a plaintiff is made awareof a mistake in the defendant's name or the wrong name or wrong form is used" (Marte,58 AD3d at 4). In the order appointing a referee, the court amended the caption of this [*2]action by "striking the name of the defendant AMELIA DONVITOA/K/A AMELIA C. DONVITO . . . and substituting in place thereof JO-ANNRIDGEWAY AS HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF AMELIA DONVITO A/K/A AMELIA C.DONVITO." Here, however, decedent was never a party to the action, and thus there was noparty for whom substitution could be effected pursuant to CPLR 1015 (a).
We reject plaintiff's contention that it obtained personal jurisdiction over Ridgeway byserving her in her capacity as an alleged heir of decedent. Although the captions in the summonsand complaint included " 'John Does' and 'Jane Does,' " those unknown defendants weredescribed in the complaint as tenants or occupants of the property or those claiming a lien againstthe property. Ridgeway does not fit within either of those categories in any capacity. In order toname unknown parties pursuant to CPLR 1024, the complaint must adequately describe theintended parties such that, " 'from the description in the complaint,' " they would have known thatthey were intended defendants (Lebowitz v Fieldston Travel Bur., 181 AD2d 481, 482[1992]; see generally Olmsted v PizzaHut of Am., Inc., 28 AD3d 855, 856 [2006]). Here, inasmuch as plaintiff named bothdecedent and the "Doe" defendants in the summons and complaint and the complaint fails tomention decedent's death, it cannot be said that plaintiff intended to describe the "Doe"defendants to include decedent's heirs, nor did plaintiff adequately do so. We further concludethat, because Ridgeway, as executrix of decedent's estate, was not properly made a party to theaction, the complaint fails to assert a viable cause of action against a properly named party."Perhaps, had [plaintiff] abandoned [its] initial action, and properly filed a summons andcomplaint by purchasing a new index number and naming [Ridgeway], the personalrepresentative of [decedent], as defendant, the matter before us would not be the nullity it is"(Marte, 58 AD3d at 5).
We reject plaintiff's further contention that Ridgeway waived the defense of plaintiff's lack ofstanding by serving a notice of appearance as "Executrix under the Last Will" of decedent andfailing to raise that defense in a pleading or pre-answer motion. Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (e), "aparty" waives such a defense by failing to raise it in a responsive pleading or a pre-answermotion. Inasmuch as Ridgeway was never properly made a party to this action in any capacity,the waiver provisions of CPLR 3211 (e) are inapplicable to her.
We therefore modify the order by dismissing the complaint. In light of our determination, weneed not address plaintiff's remaining contentions. Present—Centra, J.P., Fahey, Peradotto,Carni and Martoche, JJ.