| Harrity v Leone |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01933 [93 AD3d 1204] |
| March 16, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Theresa Harrity, Respondent-Appellant, v Jared M. Leone et al.,Appellants-Respondents. |
—[*1] Law Offices of Karen Lawrence, Dewitt (Barney F. Bilello of counsel), fordefendant-appellant-respondent Martin Peterson. Cellino & Barnes, P.C., Rochester (Sareer A. Fazili of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent-appellant.
Appeals and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Harold L.Galloway, J.), entered February 8, 2011 in a personal injury action. The order granted in part anddenied in part the respective motion and cross motions of the parties for summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law bydenying that part of plaintiff's cross motion seeking dismissal of the first affirmative defense ineach answer and reinstating that affirmative defense and by transposing defendants' surnames inthe last ordering paragraph, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries she sustainedwhen the vehicle in which she was a passenger, driven by defendant Jared M. Leone, collidedwith a vehicle driven by defendant Martin Peterson. Supreme Court granted those parts ofdefendants' respective motion and cross motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff'sclaims under the significant disfigurement and the 90/180-day categories of serious injury withinthe meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), but denied those parts of their motions on theissue of negligence and on plaintiff's claims under the permanent consequential limitation of useand the significant limitation of use categories of serious injury. In addition, the court grantedthat part of plaintiff's cross motion seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses allegingplaintiff's culpable conduct, failure to wear a seatbelt, and improper service, but denied that partof plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of serious injury. Thisappeal by defendants and cross appeal by plaintiff ensued. We note at the outset that plaintiff hasabandoned any contention with respect to the serious disfigurement category of serious injuryand we therefore do not address it (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984[1994]).
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the court properly granted those parts of defendants' [*2]respective motion and cross motion with respect to the 90/180-daycategory of serious injury. Defendants submitted plaintiff's medical records establishing thatthere are no "objective medical findings of a medically determined injury or impairment of anonpermanent nature which caused the alleged limitations on [her] daily activities" within 90 ofthe 180 days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment (Dabiere vYager, 297 AD2d 831, 832 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 503 [2002]; seeInsurance Law § 5102 [d]; O'Brien v Bainbridge, 89 AD3d 1511, 1512-1513 [2011]). Basedon the record before us we agree with the court's reasoning in its decision that plaintiff failed toraise an issue of fact with respect thereto (see generally Linton v Nawaz, 62 AD3d 434, 443 [2009], affd14 NY3d 821 [2010]). Contrary to the contentions of defendants, however, the court properlydenied those parts of their motion and cross motion with respect to the permanent consequentiallimitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of serious injury. Defendants mettheir initial burden with respect to those categories by submitting the affirmation of a physician,who concluded that plaintiff had only degenerative changes in her spine and had suffered only astrain injury, and that her subjective complaints were not based on objective medical findings (see generally Eteng v Dajos Transp., 89AD3d 506, 507 [2011]; Herbst v Marshall [appeal No. 2], 49 AD3d 1194, 1195[2008]). Plaintiff, however, raised an issue of fact with respect to those two categories bysubmitting the affidavit of her treating physician, who outlined the objective medical evidence ofplaintiff's injury in those two categories, including a positive EMG test indicating acute bilateralradiculopathy at the L5 nerve root (seeFrizzell v Giannetti, 34 AD3d 1202, 1203 [2006]), positive straight leg tests (seeid.; see also Lavali v Lavali, 89AD3d 574, 575 [2011]), positive Patrick tests (see Parczewski v Leone, 14 Misc 3d 1218[A], 2003 NY Slip Op50065[U], *2 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2007]; see also Navedo v Jaime, 32 AD3d 788, 788 [2006]), and notationsof muscle spasms and trigger points (see Pagels v P.V.S. Chems., 266 AD2d 819, 819[1999]). Plaintiff's treating physician further raised an issue of fact by opining that the accidentwas the cause of plaintiff's lumbar spine injuries and continued disability, and by quantifyingplaintiff's resulting limitations. Plaintiff's treating physician thus controverted the opinion offeredby the physician in defendants' submissions that the worsening of plaintiff's physical problemswere not caused by the trauma sustained in the accident (see Brown v Dunlap, 4 NY3d 566, 577-578 [2005]; cf.Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 575 [2005]).
Contrary to the contention of the parties, the court did not dismiss the affirmative defense inLeone's answer that plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. The order on appeal specifies thatthe court dismissed a total of three affirmative defenses, i.e., plaintiff's culpable conduct,plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt, and improper service. Leone alleged the first two, in his firstand third affirmative defenses, while Peterson alleged all three, in his first through thirdaffirmative defenses. It is clear from the record that the court merely transposed the names ofthose defendants in the second ordering paragraph, and we therefore modify the orderaccordingly. We conclude, however, that the court erred in granting that part of plaintiff's crossmotion seeking dismissal of the affirmative defense of plaintiff's culpable conduct in eachanswer. There are records indicating that the source of plaintiff's burn to her hand was hot butter,an injury sustained at plaintiff's residence, while by plaintiff's own account her hand was burnedduring the accident, when meat juices spilled from a pan of pot roast that she was carrying on herlap in the vehicle. We conclude that defendants are entitled to explore that discrepancy as well aswhether plaintiff's conduct in carrying a pan of pot roast on her lap was culpable. "If there is anydoubt as to the availability of a defense, it should not be dismissed" (Warwick v Cruz,270 AD2d 255 [2000]). Likewise, although we would agree with the court that carrying the panof pot roast was not a causative factor of the accident or of plaintiff's spinal injuries, it could havebeen a causative factor of the burn on her hand. We thus further modify the order by reinstatingthat affirmative defense in each answer. Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Lindley andMartoche, JJ.