Matter of Atkinson v Wilt
2012 NY Slip Op 02557 [94 AD3d 1218]
April 5, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 23, 2012


In the Matter of Thomas L. Atkinson et al.,Respondents,
v
Daniel Wilt et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of theTown of Arietta, et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Judge & Duffy, Glens Falls (Monica A. Duffy of counsel), for appellants.

Getnick Livingston Atkinson & Priore, L.L.P., Utica (Thomas L. Atkinson of counsel), forrespondents.

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Aulisi, J.), entered August 26,2011 in Hamilton County, which granted petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78, to annul a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Ariettafinding, among other things, that petitioners' use of their property constituted a touristaccommodation.

Petitioners are the owners of certain real property located in the Town of Arietta, HamiltonCounty. The parcel in question, which sits on the shores of Piseco Lake, lies within a single- ormulti-family residential use district and is improved with a six-bedroom residence. Petitionerspurchased the property in late 2009 and, shortly thereafter, joined the local Chamber ofCommerce and began advertising the premises on the Internet as a vacation rental. For sevenweeks during the summer of 2010, petitioners rented the property on a weekly basis to variousparties. The rest of the time petitioners, who intended to use the property primarily as a secondhome, entertained friends and family there "virtually every single week and . . .weekend."[*2]

In July 2010, and as the result of a neighbor's complaint,the zoning enforcement officer for respondent Town of Arietta notified petitioners that theywere—in his estimation—operating a tourist accommodation in violation of theTown's Land Use Ordinance. In response, petitioners discontinued advertising on the Internet andelected not to renew their membership in the Chamber of Commerce. Additionally, petitionerssought an interpretation of the Town's Land Use Ordinance permitting them to use theirsingle-family residence for "occasional rentals" or, in the alternative, requested that they begranted a special use permit to do so. The Town's Planning Board denied petitioners' applicationfor a special use permit and, following a public hearing, the Town's Zoning Board of Appeals(hereinafter ZBA) determined, among other things, that petitioners' use of their propertyconstituted a tourist accommodation.

Petitioners thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondentscontending that the ZBA's determination is irrational in that their property does not fall within themeaning of a "tourist accommodation" as that term is defined in the Town's Land Use Ordinanceand, further, that nothing in the Town's zoning law precludes the rental of a single-familyresidence to vacationing parties. Supreme Court granted petitioners' application and annulled theZBA's determination, and this appeal by respondents ensued.

We affirm. Although a reviewing court typically will grant great deference to the ZBA'sinterpretation of a zoning ordinance—disturbing that interpretation "only if it is irrationalor unreasonable" (Matter of Mack vBoard of Appeals, Town of Homer, 25 AD3d 977, 980 [2006]; see Matter of Kantor v Olsen, 9 AD3d814, 815 [2004]; Matter of Bonded Concrete v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofSaugerties, 268 AD2d 771, 773 [2000], lv denied 94 NY2d 764[2000])—where, as here, "the issue presented is one of pure legal interpretation of theunderlying zoning law or ordinance, deference is not required" (Matter of Subdivisions, Inc. v Town ofSullivan, 92 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2012]; see Matter of Erin Estates, Inc. v McCracken, 84 AD3d 1487, 1489[2011]; Matter of Blalock v Olney,17 AD3d 842, 844 [2005]). Further, "[z]oning regulations, being in derogation of thecommon law, must be strictly construed against the municipality which has enacted and seeks toenforce them, and any ambiguity in the language used must be resolved in favor of the propertyowner" (Matter of Hess Realty Corp. v Planning Commn. of Town of Rotterdam, 198AD2d 588, 589 [1993]; see Matter ofOhrenstein v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Canaan, 39 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2007];Matter of Arceri v Town of Islip ZoningBd. of Appeals, 16 AD3d 411, 412 [2005]).

Here, the Town's zoning law defines a "single family residence" as "[a] detached building,not including a mobile home, used as the living quarters for one family. The term shall include aseasonal cottage" (Land Use Ordinance of Town of Arietta § 2.020). A "touristaccommodation," in turn, includes "any hotel, motel, resort, tourist cabin or similar transientfacility used to house the general public, including an accessory restaurant" (Land Use Ordinanceof Town of Arietta § 2.020).

Applying these definitions to the record before us, we agree with Supreme Court that theZBA's characterization of petitioners' property as a tourist accommodation is irrational. While themanner in which petitioners marketed the property may have been perceived as somewhataggressive, neither their decision to advertise the property on the Internet as a vacation rental northeir membership in the local Chamber of Commerce transformed the premises from asingle-family residence into a tourist accommodation—particularly in view of petitioners'representations that they carefully screened potential renters, thereby belying any assertion thatthe property was open to the general public. Further, although we do not view either the Internet[*3]advertising or the Chamber of Commerce membership asbeing dispositive of this matter, petitioners' various submissions make clear that they had ceasedsuch activities prior to the underlying public hearing and resulting ZBA determination.

Respondents' further contention—that petitioners' property does not qualify as asingle-family residence within the meaning of the Town's Land Use Ordinance because it is notbeing used "as the living quarters for one family" (Land Use Ordinance of Town ofArietta § 2.020 [emphasis added])—is equally unreasonable. Nothing on the face ofthe Town's Land Use Ordinance expressly prohibits petitioners from renting their residence tovacationers and, on this record, we cannot say that petitioners' decision to do so placed theirotherwise obviously residential structure outside the Town's definition of a single-familyresidence—a definition that, as noted previously, expressly includes a seasonal cottage.Moreover, to the extent that it may be argued that the Town's Land Use Ordinance is unclear inthis regard, we need note only that any such ambiguity must be construed in favor of petitioners(see Matter of Ohrenstein v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Canaan, 39 AD3d at1042; Matter of Arceri v Town of Islip Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 16 AD3d at 412;Matter of Hess Realty Corp. v Planning Commn. of Town of Rotterdam, 198 AD2d at589). Respondents' remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed, have beenexamined and found to be lacking in merit.

Mercure, A.P.J., Rose, Malone Jr. and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.


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