| Forbes v Rubinovich |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02630 [94 AD3d 809] |
| April 10, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| James Forbes, Respondent, v Mitchell Rubinovich,Appellant, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Krentsel & Guzman, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Anthony Hirschberger of counsel), forrespondent. Burke, Scolamiero, Mortati & Hurd, LLP, Albany, N.Y. (Sarah B. Brancatella of counsel),for defendant Rome Memorial Hospital.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informedconsent, the defendant Mitchell Rubinovich appeals, as limited by his notice of appeal and brief,from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), dated June 1, 2011,as denied that branch of his motion which was to change the venue of the action from KingsCounty to Oneida County.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise ofdiscretion, with one bill of costs, that branch of the motion of the defendant Mitchell Rubinovichwhich was to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Oneida County is granted,and the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, is directed to deliver to the Clerk of theSupreme Court, Oneida County, all papers filed in this action and certified copies of all minutesand entries (see CPLR 511 [d]).
A demand to change venue based on the designation of an improper county (seeCPLR 510 [1]) "shall be served with the answer or before the answer is served" (CPLR 511[a]; see Thomas v Guttikonda, 68AD3d 853, 854 [2009]). Since the appellant moved for a change of venue after he served hisanswer, he was not entitled to a change of venue as of right (see Thomas v Guttikonda,68 AD3d at 854; Baez v Marcus, 58AD3d 585, 586 [2009]; Jeffrey L.Rosenberg & Assoc., LLC v Lajaunie, 54 AD3d 813, 816 [2008]). Thus, his motionbecame one addressed to the court's discretion (see Brash v Richards, 87 AD3d 556, 557 [2011]; Accardi v Kaufmann, 82 AD3d803 [2011]; Thomas v Guttikonda, 68 AD3d at 854).
In support of his motion, the appellant submitted evidence establishing prima facie that theplaintiff resided in Richmond County and that the defendants resided in Oneida County. In [*2]opposition to the motion, the plaintiff was required to establishthrough documentary evidence that he intended to retain Kings County as a residence for somelength of time and with some degree of permanency (see Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d797, 798 [1999]; Labissiere v Roland, 231 AD2d 687 [1996]; Mandelbaum vMandelbaum, 151 AD2d 727 [1989]). The plaintiff's driver's license, which was issued afterthe commencement of the action, was irrelevant (see Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d at798; Mandelbaum v Mandelbaum, 151 AD2d 727 [1989]; Siegfried v Siegfried,92 AD2d 916 [1983]). Furthermore, aside from a conclusory statement contained in his affidavitthat he resided at an address in Kings County prior to commencing this action, the plaintiff failedto present any other evidence sufficient to establish that he resided in Kings County with anydegree of permanency at the time this action was commenced (see Harley v Miller, 295AD2d 401 [2002]; cf. Ellis vWirshba, 18 AD3d 805 [2005]; Schaefer v Schwartz, 226 AD2d 619 [1996]).Moreover, the appellant moved promptly to change venue after ascertaining the plaintiff's trueresidence (see Neu v St. John'sEpiscopal Hosp., 27 AD3d 538, 539 [2006]; Supino v PV Holding Corp., 291AD2d 489 [2002]; Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d at 798). Accordingly, that branch ofthe appellant's motion which was to change the venue of the action from Kings County to OneidaCounty pursuant to CPLR 510 (1) should have been granted. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Hall,Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.