| Parolisi v Slavin |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02655 [94 AD3d 840] |
| April 10, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| James Parolisi, Respondent-Appellant, et al.,Plaintiffs, v Janet Slavin, Appellant-Respondent. |
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James J. Corbett, Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent-appellant.
In an action for injunctive relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so muchof an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), dated September 28, 2011, asgranted the motion of the plaintiff James Parolisi for a preliminary injunction enjoining thedefendant from moving structures, equipment, materials, and other items though the air spaceabove his real property and above the ingress and egress easement across his real property, andthe plaintiff James Parolisi cross-appeals from so much of the same order as fixed an undertakingpursuant to CPLR 6312 (b) in the sum of $750,000.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the motion of theplaintiff James Parolisi for a preliminary injunction is denied, and the determination in the orderfixing an undertaking in the sum of $750,000 is vacated; and it is further,
Ordered that the cross appeal is dismissed as academic, in light of our determination on theappeal; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
In 2009 the defendant requested approval from the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City ofLong Beach (hereinafter the ZBA) for variances which would permit her to reconstruct the firstfloor of her beachfront bungalow and construct a second-story addition. After a hearing, andupon review of submissions from those who were opposed to the project, the ZBA granted thevariances. Thereafter, the owners of the two separate parcels of real property adjacent to thedefendant's parcel commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgmentaction, contending that the ZBA's determination was arbitrary and capricious and, alternatively,seeking a declaration that the structure, as proposed, would interfere with their use of a commoneasement for ingress and egress. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the ZBA'sdetermination as arbitrary and capricious, denied the defendant's application for variances, anddismissed the declaratory judgment action as academic. On the separate appeals by the City ofLong Beach and the defendant, this Court reversed, concluding that the ZBA's determination wasrational [*2]and supported by the record, and that the structure, asproposed, would not interfere with the adjacent landowners' use of the common easement foringress and egress (see Matter ofGoldberg v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 79 AD3d 874 [2010]).
Thereafter, the owners of one of the adjacent parcels sold that parcel to the plaintiff JamesParolisi (hereinafter the plaintiff). Shortly after construction began on the defendant's property,the plaintiff commenced this action for permanent injunctive relief enjoining the defendant frommoving structures, equipment, materials, and other items through the air space over his propertyand above the ingress and egress easement across his property. The new owners of other adjacentproperty, James Margiotta and Nicole Margiotta, commenced a similar action against thedefendant, which was consolidated with the instant action, but they later settled their claimsagainst the defendant. After a hearing, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for apreliminary injunction, rejecting the defendant's argument that this action is barred by thedoctrine of res judicata, and set an undertaking in the sum of $750,000.
Under New York's transactional approach to the doctrine of res judicata, "once a claim isbrought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series oftransactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy"(O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see Matter of Calapai v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Vil. of Babylon, 57 AD3d 987, 989 [2008]; Matter of Palm Mgt. Corp. v Goldstein,29 AD3d 801, 804 [2006], affd 8 NY3d 337 [2007]; Town of Wallkill v Lachmann, 27AD3d 724, 725 [2006]). The doctrine not only applies to the parties of record in the prioraction, but also to those in privity with them (see Watts v Swiss Bank Corp., 27 NY2d270, 277 [1970]; Djoganopoulos vPolkes, 67 AD3d 726, 727 [2009]; Matter of State of New York v Seaport Manor A.C.F., 19 AD3d609, 610 [2005]; Bay Shore Family Partners v Foundation of Jewish Philanthropies ofJewish Fedn. of Greater Fort Lauderdale, 270 AD2d 374, 375 [2000]). Here, the causes ofaction asserted by the plaintiff are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as he is in privity withthe prior owners, who could have asserted these causes of action in the prior action (see Union St. Tower, LLC vRichmond, 84 AD3d 784, 786 [2011]; Jennings v City of Glens Falls Indus. Dev. Agency, 9 AD3d 773,774 [2004]). Since the plaintiff's causes of action are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, theplaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and, accordingly, his motionfor a preliminary injunction should have been denied (see Blinds & Carpet Gallery, Inc. v E.E.M. Realty, Inc., 82 AD3d691, 692 [2011]; Shasho v PrucoLife Ins. Co. of N.J., 67 AD3d 663, 665 [2009]; Tatum v Newell Funding, LLC, 63 AD3d 911, 912 [2009]).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions.Angiolillo, J.P., Belen, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.
[Recalled and vacated, see 98 AD3d 488.]