Saline v Saline
2012 NY Slip Op 03162 [94 AD3d 1080]
April 24, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 23, 2012


Linda Saline, Appellant,
v
Richard Saline,Respondent.

—[*1]Michael J. Ferlisi, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Maurice A. Reichman of counsel), for appellant.

Ginsburg & Misk, Queens Village, N.Y. (Hal R. Ginsburg of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action, inter alia, to quiet title to real property pursuant to RPAPL 1501, the plaintiffappeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Geller, J.H.O.), entered May 26,2011, which, upon a decision of the same court dated March 7, 2011, made after a nonjury trial,is in favor of the defendant and against her dismissing the complaint with prejudice and vacatinga notice of pendency filed in connection with the subject real property.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, it is declared thatthe estate of Philip R. Saline is the rightful owner of the subject real property, and the defendantis directed to tender a deed to the subject real property dated January 12, 1996, to the plaintiff.

This action involves title to real property located in Woodhaven (hereinafter the subjectproperty). Pursuant to a bargain and sale deed dated December 3, 1986, the plaintiff's decedent,Philip R. Saline (hereinafter the decedent), transferred the subject property to his brother, thedefendant.

In 2007 the decedent commenced this action against the defendant to quiet title to the subjectproperty. The decedent alleged that, on January 12, 1996, he exercised an option to purchase thesubject property back from the defendant, that the defendant executed a deed (hereinafter 1996deed) transferring the subject property back to the decedent, and that the decedent delivered theexecuted 1996 deed to an attorney who represented both parties in connection with thetransaction. The decedent further alleged that, in December 2006, by means of fraud and deceit,the defendant nonetheless took possession of the 1996 deed, which had never been recorded,from the attorney who had represented both of the parties.

During the pendency of this action, the decedent served a notice to admit upon the defendant,annexing, inter alia, copies of the option to purchase, dated December 3, 1986, and signed by thedefendant, giving the decedent the option to purchase the subject property for the sum of$75,000, within 20 years of December 3, 1986, and the 1996 deed, signed by the defendant, [*2]transferring the subject property back to the decedent. Thedefendant did not timely serve a response to this notice to admit and, thus, the authenticity of theattached documents was deemed admitted.

Before trial, the decedent died and his wife, Linda A. Saline, as executor of his estate, wassubstituted in his place as the plaintiff. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court ruled in favor ofthe defendant, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant, among other things, dismissingthe complaint. The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse.

Since this matter was decided after a nonjury trial, "the power of this Court is as broad as thatof the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by the facts, bearing in mindthat in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses" (Marini v Lombardo, 79 AD3d932, 933 [2010]; see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town ofBedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]). The Supreme Court improperly found in favor of thedefendant since the plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that thedefendant transferred title to the subject property to the decedent in 1996, and a conclusion thatthe plaintiff is the rightful owner of the subject real property is warranted by the facts (seegenerally Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). It is presumed that a deed isdelivered and accepted as of its date (see Ten Eyck v Whitbeck, 156 NY 341 [1898];Whalen v Harvey, 235 AD2d 792, 793-794 [1997]). Here, the trial court found that thedecedent had an option to buy the subject property from the defendant and that he exercised thisoption, which resulted in the delivery of a deed to the mutual attorney for the parties. Contrary tothe defendant's contentions, the trial court properly admitted into evidence certain documentsadmitted by him to be authentic and upon which it based its findings of fact (see CPLR3123; Matter of Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 89 NY2d 94, 103 [1996]; Ocampo v Pagan, 68 AD3d 1077[2009]).

Although the presumption of delivery and acceptance of a deed as of its date "must yield toopposing evidence" (Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v Continental Ins. Cos., 33 NY2d 370, 372[1974]), here, no admissible evidence which would have overcome the presumption waspresented in opposition to the evidence showing that the 1996 deed was delivered to the parties'mutual attorney (compare Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v Continental Ins. Cos., 33 NY2d at372). The fact that the deed was not recorded was not sufficient evidence to overcome thepresumption of delivery of the deed to the attorney, the mutual agent of both parties, sincerecording is not required in order to transfer title to real property (see Real Property Law§ 291). No evidence was presented that the delivery of the deed on the date of its executionwas conditional.

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

Since this action is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, it must be declared that thedecedent's estate is the rightful owner of the subject property (see Lanza v Wagner, 11NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US901 [1962]), and that the defendant must tender the 1996 deed to the plaintiff. Skelos, J.P.,Dillon, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.

Motion by the respondent, on an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, QueensCounty, entered May 26, 2001, inter alia, to strike the appellant's appendix and brief on theground that they contain or refer to matter dehors the record. By decision and order on motion ofthis [*3]Court dated November 1, 2011, that branch of the motionwhich was to strike the appellant's appendix and brief on the ground that they contain or refer tomatter dehors the record was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing theappeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion, the papers filed in opposition thereto, andupon the argument of the appeal, it is

Ordered that the branch of the motion which was to strike the appellant's appendix and briefon the ground that they contain or refer to matter dehors the record is denied. Skelos, J.P., Dillon,Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.

[Recalled and vacated, see 106 AD3d 1072.]


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