Saline v Saline
2013 NY Slip Op 03827 [106 AD3d 1072]
May 29, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 26, 2013


Linda Saline, Appellant,
v
Richard Saline,Respondent.

—[*1]Michael J. Ferlisi, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Maurice A. Reichman of counsel), forappellant.

Ginsburg & Misk, Queens Village, N.Y. (Hal R. Ginsburg of counsel), forrespondent.

Motion by the respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of theSupreme Court, Queens County, entered May 26, 2011, which was determined bydecision and order of this Court dated April 24, 2012, or for leave to appeal to the Courtof Appeals from the decision and order of this Court.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in oppositionthereto, it is

Ordered that the branch of the motion which is for leave to reargue is granted and thedecision and order of this Court dated April 24, 2012 (Saline v Saline, 94 AD3d1080 [2012]), is recalled and vacated and the following decision and order issubstituted therefor; and it is further,

Ordered that the branch of the motion which is for leave to appeal to the Court ofAppeals from the decision and order of this Court dated April 24, 2012, is denied.

In an action, inter alia, to quiet title to real property pursuant to RPAPL 1501, theplaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Geller, J.H.O.),entered May 26, 2011, which, upon a decision of the same court dated March 7, 2011,made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendant and against her dismissing thecomplaint with prejudice and vacating a notice of pendency filed in connection with thesubject real property.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, it isdeclared that the estate of Philip R. Saline is the rightful owner of the subject realproperty, and the defendant is directed to tender a deed to the subject real property datedJanuary 12, 1996, to the plaintiff.[*2]

This action involves title to real property locatedin Woodhaven (hereinafter the subject property). Pursuant to a bargain and sale deeddated December 3, 1986, the plaintiff's decedent, Philip R. Saline (hereinafter thedecedent), transferred the subject property to his brother, the defendant.

In 2007, the decedent commenced this action against the defendant to quiet title tothe subject property. The decedent alleged that, on January 12, 1996, he exercised anoption to purchase the subject property back from the defendant, that the defendantexecuted a deed (hereinafter the 1996 deed) transferring the subject property back to thedecedent, and that the decedent delivered the executed 1996 deed to an attorney whorepresented both parties in connection with the transaction. The decedent further allegedthat, in December 2006, by means of fraud and deceit, the defendant nonetheless tookpossession of the 1996 deed, which had never been recorded, from the attorney who hadrepresented both of the parties.

Before trial, the decedent died and his wife, Linda A. Saline, as executor of hisestate, was substituted in his place as the plaintiff. After a nonjury trial, the SupremeCourt ruled in favor of the defendant, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant,among other things, dismissing the complaint.

Since this matter was decided after a nonjury trial, "the power of this Court is asbroad as that of the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by thefacts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing thewitnesses" (Marini vLombardo, 79 AD3d 932, 933 [2010]; see Northern WestchesterProfessional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]). TheSupreme Court improperly found in favor of the defendant since the plaintiff submittedevidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the defendant transferred title tothe subject property to the decedent in 1996, and a conclusion that the plaintiff is therightful owner of the subject real property is warranted by the facts (see generallyCohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). It is presumed that a deed isdelivered and accepted as of its date (see Ten Eyck v Whitbeck, 156 NY 341[1898]; Whalen v Harvey, 235 AD2d 792, 793-794 [1997]). Here, based on thedocuments entered into evidence, the trial court found that the decedent had an option tobuy the subject property from the defendant and that he exercised this option, whichresulted in the delivery of a deed to the mutual attorney for the parties. Contrary to thedefendant's contentions, the trial court properly admitted into evidence certain documentsconceded by him to be authentic and upon which it based its findings of fact (seeCPLR 3123; Matter of Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 89 NY2d 94, 103 [1996];Ocampo v Pagan, 68 AD3d1077 [2009]).

Although the presumption of delivery and acceptance of a deed as of its date "mustyield to opposing evidence" (Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v Continental Ins. Cos., 33NY2d 370, 372 [1974]), here, no admissible evidence which would have overcome thepresumption was presented in opposition to the evidence showing that the 1996 deed wasexecuted in the presence of and delivered to the parties' mutual attorney (compareid.). The fact that the deed was not recorded was not sufficient evidence to overcomethe presumption of delivery of the deed to the attorney, the mutual agent of both parties,since recording is not required in order to transfer title to real property (see RealProperty Law § 291). No evidence was presented that the delivery of the deed onthe date of its execution was conditional.

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

Since this action is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, it must be declared thatthe decedent's estate is the rightful owner of the subject property (see Lanza vWagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962],cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]), and that the defendant must tender the 1996deed to the plaintiff. Eng, P.J., Skelos, Dillon, and Austin, JJ., concur.


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