Fisher v Multiquip, Inc.
2012 NY Slip Op 04803 [96 AD3d 1190]
June 14, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2012


Thomas Fisher, Appellant,
v
Multiquip, Inc., Respondent,et al., Defendant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

—[*1]Fischer, Bessette & Muldowney, L.L.P., Malone (John J. Muldowney of counsel), forappellant.

Miranda, Sokoloff, Sambursky, Slone & Verveniotis, L.L.P., Mineola (Neil Sambursky ofcounsel), for respondent.

Stein, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), entered November12, 2010 in Franklin County, which, among other things, granted a motion by defendantMultiquip, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims against it,and (2) from an order of said court, entered May 20, 2011 in Franklin County, which deniedplaintiff's motion for renewal/reargument.

In September 2003, plaintiff was severely injured while attempting to clear concrete out of acylinder inside a concrete pump owned by plaintiff and manufactured by defendant Multiquip,Inc. (hereinafter defendant). At the time that plaintiff was injured, he and his supervisor, RichardHaas, were preparing to use the pump in the course of their employment with third-partydefendant, Costs of Wisconsin, Inc. However, the pump would not operate properly and plaintiffdiscovered that one of its cylinders appeared to be blocked by some hardened [*2]concrete left there the previous time that the pump wasused.[FN1]Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, prior to attempting to clear the blockage, he turned theengine key to the off position, observed that the pressure gauge read zero and then placed hisright hand into one of the cylinders. According to Haas, as he walked around the pump, henoticed that the instrument panel was illuminated and turned the key to the off position, whichcaused the pump to cycle, shifting the swing arm, and crushing plaintiff's hand, which ultimatelyrequired surgical amputation.

Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against defendant and others,[FN2]seeking damages for his injuries based, as pertinent here, on negligence and strict productsliability claims, both of which are premised on defective design and inadequate safety warnings.In its answer, defendant asserted, among other things, various affirmative defenses and, afterdiscovery was completed, moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims against it. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion, finding that plaintiff's failure toadhere to the warnings provided with the pump was the sole cause of the accident. Plaintiffsubsequently moved for leave to renew and/or reargue and Supreme Court denied that motion.Plaintiff now appeals from each order.

In order to recover in a strict products liability action, the plaintiff must prove that "thedefendant manufactured for sale, or sold, distributed, leased, or otherwise marketed" a product,that "the product was defective," that the plaintiff was injured and that "the defect was asubstantial factor in causing the injury" (Kreindler, Rodriguez, Beekman and Cook, New YorkLaw of Torts § 16:18 [15 West's NY Prac Series 2011]). "Under strict liability law, 'aproduct may be defective by reason of a manufacturing flaw, improper design or failure to warn'" (Steuhl v Home Therapy Equip.,Inc., 51 AD3d 1101, 1102 [2008], quoting Sukljian v Ross & Son Co., 69 NY2d89, 94 [1986]). Here, plaintiff premises both his negligence and his strict liability claims onimproper design and failure to warn, only. "[I]nasmuch as there is almost no difference between aprima facie case in negligence and one in strict liability" (Preston v Peter Luger Enters., Inc., 51 AD3d 1322, 1325 [2008]),we will address [*3]the negligence and strict liability claimstogether. Because our review of the record reveals the existence of triable issues of fact withregard to plaintiff's claims based upon defective design, we reverse in part.

Turning first to defendant's alleged failure to provide adequate warnings, it is well settledthat "manufacturers have a duty to warn against latent dangers due to intended uses andforeseeable unintended uses of their products" (Steuhl v Home Therapy Equip., Inc., 51AD3d at 1103). Liability for failure to warn may be imposed "based upon either the completefailure to warn of a particular hazard or the inclusion of warnings that are insufficient"(DiMura v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 828, 829 [1997]). "Although the adequacy of awarning generally is a question of fact, in a proper case the court can decide as a matter of lawthat there is no duty to warn or that the duty has been discharged as a matter of law" (Schillerv National Presto Indus., 225 AD2d 1053, 1054 [1996] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]; see generally Theoharis v Pengate Handling Sys. of N.Y., 300 AD2d884, 884-885 [2002]).

Here, defendant established that it provided a number of safety instructions and warnings ofthe danger encountered by plaintiff, both on the pump itself and in the operation manual. Forexample, it is uncontroverted that the manual contains several prominent warnings about thedanger of amputation if a person places his or her hand in the concrete cylinders or any part of hisor her body in the hopper when the engine is running or when there is accumulated hydraulicpressure. In particular, the service instruction section of the manual contains an explicit warningthat "[y]ou are at extreme risk if the engine is running or if pressure is in the hydraulicsystem" (emphasis added). The safety instructions further indicate that, before anymaintenance or repairs are performed, the engine should be turned off, the starter key should beremoved, a "[d]o not operate" tag should be placed over the switch and the battery cables shouldbe disconnected. The employee handbook of plaintiff's employer contains similar safetyinstructions. Defendant also submitted the affidavits of two experts, both of whom averred thatplaintiff's accident was caused by a series of errors and a general failure to follow such warningsand instructions. Thus, defendant met its initial burden of establishing a prima facie entitlementto dismissal of plaintiff's failure to warn claims, shifting the burden to plaintiff to demonstrate atriable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

Although plaintiff admittedly read and was familiar with the applicable warnings andinstructions and failed to follow them, he points to several warnings and instructions that hecontends were contradictory and confusing.[FN3]Additionally, he asserts that defendant should have specifically warned about the latenthazard—of which he was unaware—presented by the accumulation of hydraulicpressure that remains when the machine is turned off.

Notably, the purportedly contradictory warnings are in two different sections of themanual—one in the operating instruction section and one in the service instructionsection—and are clearly applicable to two different situations. Moreover, as previouslynoted, the service portion of the manual explicitly warns of the risk of pressure remaining in thehydraulic system [*4]even if the engine is not running. In ourview, this warning—combined with the other cautionary instructions provided bydefendant with respect to attempting to service the concrete pump—was sufficient to meetdefendant's duty to warn as a matter of law. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to raise a question offact regarding defendant's duty to warn sufficient to defeat defendant's motion for summaryjudgment.

We reach a different conclusion with respect to plaintiff's design defect claims. It is wellestablished that "a 'defectively designed product is one which, at the time it leaves the seller'shands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate consumer and isunreasonably dangerous for its intended use' " (Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59NY2d 102, 107 [1983], quoting Robinson v Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co.,49 NY2d 471, 479 [1980]). In order to recover on this basis, " 'it must be established that themarketed product in question was designed in such a way that it is not reasonably safe and thatthe alleged design defect was a substantial factor in causing the [plaintiff's] injuries' "(Preston v Peter Luger Enters., Inc., 51 AD3d at 1323, quoting Blandin v Marathon Equip. Co., 9AD3d 574, 576 [2004]). The determination of a design defect requires a risk/utility analysisthat involves consideration of whether, if the alleged defect was known at the time ofmanufacture, " 'a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product did notoutweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that manner' " (Denny v FordMotor Co., 87 NY2d 248, 257 [1995], quoting Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59NY2d at 108). Although such analysis generally presents a question of fact for trial, "[s]ummaryjudgment in a strict products liability case may be granted [to a defendant] on the basis of [a]plaintiff's conduct when the plaintiff's actions constituted 'the sole proximate cause' of his or herinjuries" (Yun Tung Chow v Reckitt &Colman, Inc., 17 NY3d 29, 34 [2011], quoting Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp.,77 NY2d 525, 534 [1991]). However, where "a factfinder could conclude on the basis of therecord before [it] that the product was so inherently dangerous that [the product] should neverhave found its way into the stream of commerce as packaged and marketed" (Yun TungChow v Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 17 NY3d at 34), a plaintiff's conduct will not be consideredthe sole proximate cause of his or her injuries and a defendant's motion for summary judgmentshould be denied.

Here, defendant's experts opined that the pump met appropriate industry standards and wasreasonably safe as designed and manufactured and that there were "no malfunctions, failures, ordefects in the [pump] that were the cause of the subject accident." This was sufficient to shift theburden to plaintiff to present "competent proof that the [pump's design] 'was not reasonably safebecause there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to design the product in asafer manner' " (Stalker v Goodyear Tire& Rubber Co., 60 AD3d 1173, 1175 [2009], quoting Voss v Black & Decker Mfg.Co., 59 NY2d at 108). To that end, plaintiff provided the affidavits of two experts settingforth their opinions that the design of the pump—which undisputedly allowed for thestorage of hydraulic pressure in the pump after it was turned off, thereby enabling the pump tocycle a final time—was not reasonably safe and was the cause of plaintiff's accident.Plaintiff's experts also presented various alternative designs, which they claimed would haveprevented the storage of pressure after the pump was turned off and were economically andtechnologically feasible.

The conflicting opinions of the parties' experts regarding the reasonableness of the pump'sdesign present classic credibility issues, which are ordinarily a matter for the trier of fact toresolve (see Steuhl v Home Therapy Equip., Inc., 51 AD3d at 1104; Abar vFreightliner Corp., 208 AD2d 999, 1001 [1994]). Thus, even if, as defendant asserts,plaintiff's failure to heed the [*5]warnings and instructions causedthe accident and/or the accident resulted from Haas' conduct,[FN4]so long as " 'defendant's negligence and unsafe design can be shown to be a substantial cause ofthe events which produced the injury,' the existence of another proximate cause of the accident inaddition to defendant's defective design does not excuse defendant from liability" (Blandin vMarathon Equip. Co., 9 AD3d at 576 n, quoting Bush v Lamb-Grays Harbor Co.,246 AD2d 768, 771 [1998]). Thus, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff,Supreme Court should not have granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's defectivedesign claim.[FN5]

The parties' remaining contentions have been considered and are either academic or withoutmerit.

Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen, Spain and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order enteredNovember 12, 2010 is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof asgranted the motion of defendant Multiquip, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff'sdesign defect claim; motion denied to said extent; and, as so modified, affirmed. Ordered that theappeal from the order entered May 20, 2011 is dismissed, as academic, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: The pump's functioning involvestwo cylinders located in the hopper, which operate in alternating cycles of taking in and pushingout concrete, with the use of hydraulic pressure. The same hydraulic pressure operates a swingarm, which forces the exiting concrete through a hose towards where the concrete is to beapplied. The pump itself is controlled by a key operated switch which has three positions: start,on, and off. To start the pump, the key must be turned to the start position. Once the pump isstarted, the key rests in the on position. Simply turning the key from the off position to the onposition will not cause the pump to start, but will illuminate the lights on the pump's instrumentpanel. According to the deposition testimony of defendant's product manager, although turningthe key to the off position ceases operation of the hydraulic engine, hydraulic pressure remainsfor approximately 15 seconds and the swing arm cycles a final time.

Footnote 2: The action was discontinuedagainst one defendant and the other defendant is not involved in this appeal.

Footnote 3: For example, one part of themanual states, "WARNING: NEVER PLACE YOUR HANDS OR ANY PART OF YOURBODY IN THE HOPPER OR ALLOW ANYONE ELSE TO DO SO." In contrast, anothersection of the manual states, "You will be required to put your hand in the concrete cylinders,"which are located in the hopper.

Footnote 4: We also note the existence ofmultiple factual issues regarding the exact manner in which the pump was activated at the time ofplaintiff's accident, including, among others, the position of the switch and whether he checkedthe pressure gauge before attempting his repair.

Footnote 5: Defendant also moved to strikeplaintiff's second amended response to its first set of interrogatories, which motion was renderedmoot by Supreme Court. Given our partial reversal of summary judgment to defendant, thismotion is no longer moot.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.