Davis v New York State Dept. of Educ.
2012 NY Slip Op 05051 [96 AD3d 1261]
June 21, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2012


In the Matter of Dover Davis Jr., Appellant, v New York StateDepartment of Education et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Dover Davis Jr., Montclair, New Jersey, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), forrespondents.

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.), entered January 20,2011 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, grantedrespondents' motion to dismiss the petition.

Petitioner filed a complaint with respondent New York State Department of Educationalleging that a physical therapist from whom he had received treatment engaged in professionalmisconduct—specifically, inappropriate touching. The matter was referred to respondentOffice of Professional Discipline (hereinafter OPD) which, following an investigation, concludedthat there was insufficient evidence to pursue petitioner's complaint. When OPD declinedpetitioner's subsequent request to reopen its investigation, petitioner commenced this CPLRarticle 78 proceeding in New York County seeking to reverse respondents' determination and, inessence, compel OPD to reopen the matter. Supreme Court (Stallman, J.) granted respondents'motion for a change of venue and, once the matter was transferred to Albany County, SupremeCourt (Teresi, J.) granted respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of standing. This appeal bypetitioner ensued.

We affirm. Standing is a threshold legal requirement for a party seeking to challenge agovernmental action, imposing upon the complaining party an obligation to demonstrate that heor she has suffered an injury in fact that is both distinct from that of the general public and[*2]"fall[s] within the zone of interests or concerns sought to bepromoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted" (New York State Assn. of NurseAnesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211 [2004]; see Matter of Diederich v St. Lawrence, 78 AD3d 1290, 1291[2010], lv dismissed and denied 17 NY3d 782 [2011]; Matter of Humane Socy. of U.S., Inc. vBrennan, 63 AD3d 1419, 1420 [2009]). Although petitioner may have suffered variousinjuries during or as a result of the alleged assault, he has failed to demonstrate that he"personally suffered some actual or threatened injury" (Sassower v Commission on Jud.Conduct of State of N.Y., 289 AD2d 119 [2001], lv denied 99 NY2d 504 [2002]) asa result of OPD's decision not to prefer charges against the therapist in question. Further, evenassuming that petitioner suffered an injury in fact based upon OPD's decision not to pursuedisciplinary action, we fail to discern how any such injury would be different from that sustainedby the general public. Notably, courts have found a lack of standing under similar circumstances(cf. Matter of Humane Socy. of U.S., Inc. v Brennan, 63 AD3d at 1420; Sassower vCommission on Jud. Conduct of State of N.Y., supra; Matter of Morrow vCahill, 278 AD2d 123 [2000], appeal dismissed 96 NY2d 895 [2001]; Matter ofWade v Suffolk County Med. Socy., 88 AD2d 602 [1982]). Accordingly, we agree thatSupreme Court properly dismissed the instant proceeding upon this basis—a conclusionthat is not altered by petitioner's assertion that such dismissal violates his First Amendment orequal protection rights.

Moreover, even if we were to conclude that petitioner had standing to maintain thisproceeding, we nonetheless would be compelled to uphold Supreme Court's dismissal of theunderlying petition. To be sure, OPD is required to "investigate each complaint which allegesconduct constituting professional misconduct" (Education Law § 6510 [1] [b]; see8 NYCRR 17.1, 17.2) and refer the results of that investigation to the designated professionalconduct officer; however, "[i]f such officer decides that there is not substantial evidence ofprofessional misconduct or that further proceedings are not warranted, no further action shall betaken" (Education Law § 6510 [1] [b]). Inasmuch as OPD plainly is vested with thediscretion "to determine whether further disciplinary action should be undertaken, or whether amatter should be closed" (David v Biondo, 92 NY2d 318, 321 [1998]), mandamus tocompel does not lie to require OPD to either reopen its investigation or arrive at a particularconclusion (see generally Matter of Mullen v Axelrod, 74 NY2d 580, 583 [1989]; Matter of McTootle v Rice, 60 AD3d1068 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 705 [2009]; Matter of Cantwell v Ryan,309 AD2d 1042, 1042-1043 [2003], affd 3 NY3d 626 [2004]; Matter of Bytner vGreenberg, 214 AD2d 931, 932 [1995]).

Mercure, J.P., Rose, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.