| Haagen-Islami v Islami |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05140 [96 AD3d 1004] |
| June 27, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Jennifer Haagen-Islami, Appellant, v Enver Islami,Respondent. |
—[*1] Sandra Melendez, East Hampton, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief,from stated portions of (1) a decision of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kent, J.), datedJune 11, 2010, and (2) a judgment of the same court dated December 15, 2010, which, upon thedecision, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, imputed an annual income to the defendant of only$75,000 for the purpose of calculating child support and declined to award her maintenance.
Ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a decision(see Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509 [1984]); and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
"[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts" (Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710,711 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Giokas v Giokas, 73 AD3d 688, 688-689 [2010]; Baron v Baron, 71 AD3d 807, 809[2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello,46 AD3d 640, 641 [2007]). " 'The court may order maintenance in such amount as justicerequires, considering, inter alia, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, theincome and property of the parties, the distribution of marital property, the duration of themarriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, theability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting, and the reduced or lostlifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance' " (Scher v Scher, 91 AD3d 842, 847 [2012], quoting Kret vKret, 222 AD2d 412, 412 [1995]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6][a]; Giokas v Giokas, 73 AD3d at 689; Baron v Baron, 71 AD3d at 809).Maintenance is designed to give the nonmonied spouse economic independence and shouldcontinue only as long as is required to render the recipient self-supporting (see O'Brien v O'Brien, 88 AD3d775, 778 [2011]; Giokas v Giokas, 73 AD3d at 689; Griggs v Griggs, 44AD3d at 712). Here, considering the distributive award, the parties' respective financialcircumstances, their present and future [*2]earning capacities, andthe fact that they had been living separate lives for at least three years prior to the commencementof the divorce action, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiffwas not entitled to maintenance payments (see Scher v Scher, 91 AD3d at 848).
We also reject the plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court should have imputed annualincome of more than $75,000 to the defendant for the purpose of calculating child support. "Acourt need not rely upon a party's own account of his or her finances, but may impute incomebased upon the party's past income or demonstrated future potential earnings" (Duffy v Duffy, 84 AD3d 1151,1151-1152 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wesche v Wesche, 77 AD3d 921, 923 [2010]; Steinberg v Steinberg, 59 AD3d702, 705 [2009]). "The court may impute income to a party based on his or her employmenthistory, future earning capacity, educational background, or money received from friends andrelatives" (Duffy v Duffy, 84 AD3d at 1152 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeWesche v Wesche, 77 AD3d at 923). Here, given the defendant's current employmentsituation, his future earning capacity, and the scant evidence of additional streams of income, theSupreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in imputing an annual income to thedefendant in the sum of $75,000.
To the extent the plaintiff raises issues regarding alleged marital debt and marital fundsallegedly used to pay off the separate debt of the defendant, those matters are not covered by thejudgment and, therefore, are not properly before us on this appeal. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Engand Austin, JJ., concur.